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1Introduction
When the first news about the accident at the Chernobyl 
nuclear plant began circulating in North and West Europe, 
everybody seemed totally surprised; also those who were supposed 
(or usually pretended) to be able to keep everything under control 
as far as nuclear power was concerned. Nuclear physicists 
repeated on every occasion that the occurrence of such an event 
was calculated to be extremely unlikely and public authorities of 
many European Countries tried at first to reassure people by 
saying that the danger was far away.
In the meantime, the first deaths and illnesses were 
registered among the rescuers working at Chernobyl and among the 
inhabitants of some villages near the plant. And the fears and 
uncertainties already awakened by the increases of radioactivity 
first detected in Scandinavian Countries started spreading around 
Europe.
The odyssey of the radioactive cloud showed that scientists 
and politicians were not only taken by surprise, but were 
incapable to cope effectively with such a large scale nuclear 
disaster. The media began spreading news on the moving of the 
cloud, its composition and the contamination it was causing. But 
these news resulted to be confusing in spite of the meteorological 
maps and the scientific sources referred to. Moreover, 
disagreements between experts emerged regarding the evaluation of 
the possible health and environmental consequences of the fallout, 
and different measures were decided (or not decided) by 
governmental authorities of neighbouring countries to deal with 
radiation risk.
The problems and controversies caused by the Chernobyl 
fallout did not remain confined to the short period of its 
occurring in April and May 1986. They lasted/are lasting for a 
rather long time and many changes had taken place in the years 
following the accident with respect to nuclear risk management and 
perception.
2In other words, short-term responses (during the fallout) and 
medium/long-term changes can be distinguished.
The research which is presented in the following pages seeks to 
understand why in some neighbouring countries there had been 
different short-term responses and different medium/long-term 
changes following the same event.
Particularly it analyses why those in charge were taken by 
surprise, why different definitions of the situation emerged, why 
certain limit values for radiation were set and why did they 
differ, why certain precautionary measures were taken -or not 
taken- to cope with radiation risk, why different timing in 
responding to or acknowledging the problems caused by the fallout 
can be observed. Moreover it inquires why certain changes 
occurred in the years following the accident, why did they differ 
or were similar in different countries, and whether they can be 
interpreted as results of learning processes.
In order to provide some ground and context for answering 
those questions, empirical work (based on individual interviews 
and qualitative analysis of documents and newspapers) has been 
undertaken.
The field of inquiry was defined according to both analytical 
and practical criteria.
An in depth examination of the events and processes that took 
place during the last days of April and the month of May 1986 
appeared to be necessary to understand why, how and by whom 
certain decisions were made and why the responses to the same 
threat varied. Some background information on the main actors 
involved in nuclear policy and risk management has been gathered 
and selected to put in context the responses to the Chernobyl 
fallout. Moreover, a description and an analysis of the main 
changes that have occurred in the years after Chernobyl with 
respect to nuclear risk management is offered in the attempt to
3understand why did such changes had been taking place and to make 
out whether they may be interpreted as results of learning.
Beside a temporal boundary, a spatial one had to be decided. 
Many unique "stories" began by the end of April 1986 in each 
state, region, town or village affected by the fallout. It is 
probably impossible (certainly it is for one person) to 
reconstruct all of them; and such an enterprise is also not 
necessary to approach the above mentioned problems.
A chapter is dedicated to the immediate response to the 
accident in the former USSR and references are made to some of the 
changes that occurred in that country in the following years. 
However my analysis focuses on some Western European countries 
due to practical reasons, such as my lack of knowledge of the 
Russian language, and especially due to the kind of issues I 
decided to address.
Given the crucial role played by governmental organizations 
(both political and scientific) in defining and managing the 
situation originated by the Chernobyl accident, three "national" 
case studies had been conducted. At the same time, given the 
differences or even conflicts within national borders and the 
transboundary dimension of the threat, the case studies had been 
constructed taking into account also local and transnational 
aspects.
The Italian case was chosen because my initial questions 
started developing while experiencing and reflecting on the 
Italian context. The two other cases, regarding the Federal 
Republic of Germany and France, had been selected to understand 
why neighbouring countries that belong to a quite strong 
supranational setting such as the European Community -EC- (beside 
being members of other international organizations) reacted in 
different ways to the same unexpected (while foreseable) threat.
The comparative work is not mainly aimed at "testing" one 
hypothesis by applying it to different cases, but at finding out 
which elements "made (and make) a difference" -and why- in 
reacting to Chernobyl and in managing nuclear risk.
4Beside the national cases studies, the EC response and the 
broader international response (especially the role played by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency -IAEA-) are investigated. In 
fact, even if the Chernobyl fallout was initially dealt with as a 
mainly "national affair", its transboundary dimension showed that 
nuclear risk do not stop at political borders.
Many readings and fruitful discussions accompanied the 
development of the research and provided me with analytical and 
interpretative tools.
In the attempt to find some possible answers to the questions 
previously mentioned, I chose not to stick to a single theory 
because I do not think (nor I pretend) there is one able to cover 
all the aspects to be taken into account. In the analysis 
presented in the following chapters I rather adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach and I utilize some concepts developed 
within different but, in my view, interacting theoretical 
frameworks; mainly within policy analysis, risk analysis, frame 
analysis, philosophy and sociology of science, organization 
theory, theories of learning.
A preliminary discussion of those contributions that help 
clarifying some basic points and terms addressed/used in the case 
studies is offered in the first and second chapters. Then the 
case studies are discussed and analysed. Finally an overall 
interpretation of response and learning processes based on both 
the literature and the case studies is suggested and some "opening 
conclusions" are put forward.
The reader will find through the whole text the references to 
those authors and theories which offered me the bricks for 
building my understanding and for contributing some critical 
reflections.
The argument that has been developing during the research can 
be summarized in the following terms.
5The Chernobyl accident and fallout pointed to serious 
shortcomings concerning the management of nuclear power both at 
the national and international level and rekindled scientific 
disagreements and political controversies over the risks connected 
with the utilization of such technology. In front of the same 
event, different responses were given in the affected countries 
during the fallout and different changes took places in the 
following years.
In my interpretation, this was due to the way scientific and 
organizational uncertainties were managed in defining the problem 
and responding to it. The management of scientific uncertainties 
was a determing factors since Chernobyl had been a technological 
accident and called on science ability to identify causes, 
consequences and possible solution of its own technological 
products. The management of organizational uncertainties was also 
determinant since an unprecedented, non-routine event like the 
Chernobyl fallout required the identification and/or negotiation 
of ill-defined responsibilities. With respect to both these 
aspects, the production, selection and utilization of information 
and knowledge by the relevant and interacting actors proved to be 
crucial.
In ‘turn the reason why these uncertainties had been managed 
in different ways -and different responses to Chernobyl emerged 
consequently- can be explained in the light of the interaction (in 
each country and at the international level) between what 
scientists select as relevant knowledge, what politicians wish to 
know and to be let known, what pressure social movements and 
interest groups are able to exert concerning the utilization and 
diffusion of knowledge, and what information the mass-media have 
access to, pick out and construct as news. These relations also 
influenced the changes, and learning processes, that have been 
taking place since Chernobyl.
This hypothesis, which forms the core of what will be called 
the "Policy Communication Model", points to the link between the 
ways problems are defined and selected for attention, and the ways
6actions (including decisions) are taken or not taken. While these 
two processes had been analysed in depth by several authors, a 
tendency can be noted to focus either on the first (issue framing) 
or on the second one (decision making). The present work tries 
instead to explore the link between the two mentioned processes, 
building on those contributions that identified such link while 
still focusing either on the way issues are framed or on the way 
decisions are made.
Regarding the above mentioned components of my hypothesis some 
specifications may be useful.
The role of scientists in managing uncertain knowledge and 
defining problems is crucial for various reasons. Nuclear power, 
like other high risk technologies, is science based, that is it 
results from scientific research rather than from practical 
experience. Therefore scientists are regarded as the "experts" 
who should be able to grasp problems and guide action against the 
possible side-effects implied by such technologies. However, due 
to various constraints, uncertainties in scientific knowledge and 
disagreements between experts emerge.
Uncertain knowledge is referred to and utilized by policy 
makers as an input for defining the issues and deciding about 
actions to be taken or avoided. Beside that, also uncertainties 
concerning the behavior of different organizations in face of non­
routine events have to be dealt with. Many problems can arise 
within and between the organizations involved in the various 
aspects of technology management, from the teams performing 
routine or emergency tasks to the regulatory bodies. These 
problems may contribute to the occurring of accidents and can 
hamper the minimization of the harmful consequences of such 
events.
In the case of Chernobyl it is also important to stress that 
scientific and organizational uncertainties became a public issue. 
The disagreements among experts and politicians about the 
evaluation of the situation, the distinction of responsibilities
7and the measures to be taken, could not be kept within scientific 
and governmental circles nor did they remain confined within 
national borders. This was due, on the one hand, to the ability 
of non governmental organizations (NGOs) to challenge the 
statements and actions of governmental officials and experts. And 
especially it was due to the role of the mass media that, in 
several cases, acted as media in the strict sense of the word, 
i.e. as means of communication (and debate) between different 
sectors of society within and across national borders.
This public dimension influenced, on the one hand, 
politicians' and scientists' management of uncertainty; on the 
other hand, it contributed to rising the issue of the 
accountability and credibility of the institutions responsible for 
the management of nuclear risk. The way scientific and 
organizational uncertainties are managed, i.e. whether they are 
taken into consideration or are ignored by experts and policy 
makers and whether they are communicated or not to the public, 
proved in fact to make a difference with respect to the issue of 
the accountability and credibility of institutions.
Learning from experience is assumed to be a widespread 
characteristic of human beings. And learning from such a major 
accident as Chernobyl appears to be necessary in order to avoid 
similar catastrophes and not to make useless the already 
irreparable sufferings of Chernobyl's victims.
But learning from Chernobyl can mean different things for 
different people. For somebody it can mean to learn how to deal 
with specific technical problems, for somebody else it can mean to 
learn how to improve his/her public image, and others can 
interpret it in many other ways.
In the following chapters the changes that occurred in the 
months and years after Chernobyl will be examined, and it will be 
argued that they can be regarded as results of collective learning 
processes. Processes where communication about, reflection on and 
interpretation (framing) of the Chernobyl experience (which differ
8for different actors and in different places) played a crucial 
role in fostering certain changes. Even if these changes do not 
necessarily represent improvements.
9RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND THEIR MANAGEMENT,
a. Risk in context..
Controversies over the utilization and management of nuclear 
power were rekindled as a consequence of the Chernobyl accident. 
Such controversies are focused on the notion of "risk". Risks 
concerning nuclear weapons proliferation, risk of accidents in 
nuclear plants or nuclear waste repositories, risks for health and 
environment due to high or low doses of radiation, and others.
Scientists, politicians, regulatory bodies, industry and 
anti-nuclear groups disagree about the way and possibility of 
assessing and managing the risks involved by nuclear power. As in 
a hopeless dialogue between people speaking different languages, 
proponents and opponents of nuclear power accuse each other of 
being "irrational" in addressing the problem of risk. In general 
terms, the proponents accuse the opponents -and many scientists 
accuse lay people- of being "irrational" because too "emotional" 
and incapable of evaluating risk "objectively". In turn they are 
accused of being only apparently "rational" because of their 
"vested interests" which make them underestimate the risk 
connected with nuclear power and to hide the unfair distribution 
of risk among different social groups and generations.
A sort of interdisciplinary discipline, risk analysis, has 
been developed around the notion of "risk". It seems worthwhile 
to start with a discussion of risk analysis literature as it sheds 
some light on the nature of the disagreements and conflicts 
concerning nuclear and other "high-risk" technologies.
Risk analysis can be regarded as being composed of various 
branches: risk assessment, risk evaluation, risk perception, risk 
communication and risk management. The differentiation between
1
these branches corresponds to various stages of development in the 
definition of the problems at hand; initially they had been 
defined as being scientific and technical in nature, then they 
were redefined in economic terms and later as being intrinsically 
social and political (Otway, 1985). This does not mean that the 
later developments/branches substituted the previous ones; 
actually all of them coexist, but in a quite conflictual way.
Although quantitative estimate of risk have been made and 
utilized by insurance coirpanies starting from the 14th century, 
the beginning of what is nowadays referred to as risk assessment 
can be traced back to the fifties. Such beginning is directly 
linked with the growth of the nuclear industry in the USA and the 
first attempts to regulate it (Mazuzan and Walker, 1984; Rip,
1986).
Within the framework of risk assessment, "risk" is understood 
as a measurable phenomenon and is defined as the predicted 
magnitude of a loss or damage multiplied by the probability of its 
occurring. The risks usually referred to are risk of accidents 
and risk for health and environment due to exposure to dangerous 
substances.
The two key tools elaborated to assess the risk of accidents, 
as defined above, are fault-tree and event-tree analysis. Each 
uses a tree structure to show the interrelations between 
components of the operating system and tries to reconstruct the 
pathways to disaster. Event trees start from a particular 
undesired initiating event and project all its possible outcomes. 
Fault trees start instead with a particular undesired final event 
and work backward to identify the component failures needed for it 
to have happened. The major danger in designing fault or event 
trees is leaving things out.and consequently underestimating the 
risk.
Following Baruch Fischhoff (Fischhoff, 1977), pathways seem 
to be particularly prone to five kinds of omission; 1. omissions 
regarding human error or misbehavior; 2. omissions concerning
11
changes in the environment in which the technology functions; 3. 
omissions arising from overconfidence in scientific and technical 
knowledge (for example, in the field of safety design); 4. 
omissions resulting from failure to see how the system functions 
as a whole; 5. omissions due to the difficulty of taking into 
consideration all the contingencies that may contribute to "common 
mode failures". Moreover, designers of fault and event trees 
must make numerous discretionary decisions regarding how to 
organize and present the various sources of trouble (Slovich, 
Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 1982), or in choosing the theory of 
probability to be used, the methods by which short and long-term 
effects are combined into a one-dimensional scale, the rules used 
for selecting the factors to be included in the analysis (Renn, 
1985).
Shifting from the assessment of the risk of accident to the 
assessment of risks for health and environment, it is usually 
acknowledged that the last one involves serious problems.
According to the US National Research Council (1983) such 
assessment can be divided into four steps: hazard identification, 
dose-response assessment, exposure assessment and risk 
characterization. But the first three steps involve large 
uncertainties, therefore they cannot but result in a far from 
unquestionable risk characterization, i.e. the summary of what is 
known about the likelihood and magnitude of adverse consequences.
In fact, hazard identification, dose-response functions 
(which specify how probabilities of adverse health effects vary 
with the size of the dose received) and -partially- exposure 
assessment have to be chosen and estimated on the basis of 
epidemiological or toxicological studies. However these studies 
can seldom provide uncontroversial answers regarding dose-effect 
and, more in general, cause-effect relationships.
Epidemiology requires in fact choices regarding the size and 
quality of the sample of population to be studied, the time span 
of the observations, the selection and organization of significant
data; and it also implies methodological problems (which are 
common to all forms of statistical inference) concerning the 
applicability of the results obtained analyzing one sample of 
population to the entire population. Toxicology involves 
intriguing issues like the choice of the extrapolation function 
and the possibility of obtaining sound results by extrapolating 
from high to low doses, from animals to humans, from laboratory 
conditions to uncontrollable, "in the open", conditions (Majone, 
1983; Maugh, 1978; Wong, 1986; Wynne, 1989).
Given these problems (beside other political and economic 
ones), disagreements between experts over the interpretation of 
epidemiological and toxicological data -and over the corresponding 
"risk characterization"- are quite widespread (Gillespie et al., 
1982; Liberatore, 1989: cap.4; Nowotny and Hirsch, 1980).
It is then worthwhile to emphasize that risk assessment, 
while starting with an apparently clear and measurable definition 
of risk, involves less clear assessment procedures and often ends 
with disputable numbers.
If risk assessment turns out not to be a purely objective 
matter, one can hardly expect risk evaluation to be grounded on 
objective -and measurable- "facts".
However some instruments and criteria have been suggested to 
make risk evaluation as rational (according to an economic model 
of rationality based on expected utility) and objective (in the 
sense of being quantifiable) as possible.
The main tool developed in this perspective is cost-benefit 
analysis, firstly put forward -with respect to the evaluation of 
technological risk- by Chauncey Starr (Starr, 1969).
The declared rationale of cost-benefit analysis is that when 
considering a proposed technology (or a proposed regulation), we 
should assess the costs and the benefits involved by the 
implementation of such technology (or regulation), and we should 
adopt the technology (or the regulation) only if the expected 
benefits outweigh the expected costs.
Cost-benefit analysis points to a very important issue, that 
is the need to acknowledge and deal with the trade-offs involved 
in deciding whether to carry on, and in which manner, certain 
risky activities. However that analysis presents some 
problematic aspects.
First of all, the very definition of what is a "cost" and 
what is a "benefit" is controversial. On the one hand, costs and 
benefits can be defined in quantifiable economic terms; the costs 
being the expenses needed to minimize risk and the benefits being 
measured in money or other resources which are saved/gained (for 
instance, by introducing or not introducting certain safety 
measures). From a different perspective, the "costs" and 
"benefits" can be defined as not merely economic ones; the "costs" 
implied by the adoption of a certain technology can be regarded as 
including the connected risk for health and environment together 
with elements like fears of accidents or distrust in institutions, 
while the "benefits" may include the enjoyment of a beautiful 
landscape or the preservation of endangered species.
The distribution of "costs" and "benefits" among different 
sectors of society at the local, national and/or international 
level as well as between different generations is another very 
problematic issue (Ashford, 1981; Breyer, 1982; Fischhoff, 1977; 
Reyner and Cantor, 1987; Wilson, 1980). Costs and benefits can be 
diffused and more or less equally shared; or they can be both 
concentrated, but unequally distributed; or the costs can be 
concentrated, and borne only by some social groups, while the 
benefits are widespread; or the costs can be diffused and the 
benefits concentrated and enjoyed by few people. Whatever the 
case, the handling of distributive aspects and the choice between 
various possible trade-offs involve important issues that cannot 
be dealt with in purely economic and quantitative terms but 
require political judgment and decision.
On the basis of the different definitions of costs and 
benefits and the different emphasis and points of view on 
distributive (and others) issues, controversies over the
evaluation of trade-offs frequently arise in the nuclear debate.
At the core of these controversies lies the concept of "acceptable 
risk".
Studies in the field of risk perception began developing in 
the seventies and focus on the issue of "risk acceptability". The 
term "acceptable risk" was introduced by Chauncey Starr in the 
article (Starr, 1969) where he suggested for the first time the 
adoption of cost-benefit analysis. Starr tried to answer the 
question, "how safe is safe enough"? and he concluded that: 1. the 
public is willing to accept "voluntary" risks roughly 1000 times 
greater than "involuntary" risks; 2. the statistical risk of death 
from disease appears to be a psychological yardstick for 
establishing the level of acceptability of other risks; 3. the 
acceptability of risks appears to be proportional to the third 
power of benefits (real or imaginary); 4. the social acceptability 
of risk is directly influenced by public awareness of the benefits 
of an activity (Starr 1969, p.1237).
Concerning the considerations that influence safety 
judgements and the acceptability of risk, William Lowrance 
(Lowrance, 1976) suggests that other considerations, beside the 
ones indicated by Starr, play an important role. The list 
includes: whether the risk is known with certainty or not; whether 
the effects are immediate or delayed; whether the consequences are 
reversible or irreversible; whether there are alternatives 
available or not; whether exposure is an essential or a luxury; 
whether exposure is encountered occupationally or non- 
occupationally; whether the hazard is common or "dread"; whether 
it affects average or especially sensitive people; whether the 
technology will be used as intended or is likely to be misused 
(Lowrance 1976, pp.87-94).
Other studies in risk perception (Fischhoff et al., 1981; 
Kahnemann et al., 1982; Slovich et al., 1984) point out the 
relevance of other aspects too, like the controllability and
observability of risk, their being new or old, their catastrophic 
dimension and their distribution.
Even if these elements are usually analyzed from a 
psychological point of view, it is important to stress that they 
do not merely refer to individual -and, at the same time, common 
to all human beings- mental features, but to the broader social 
context. The way people perceive risks cannot be separated from 
the way people perceive and judge social relations -particularly 
power relations (Nelkin, 1979)- and institutions (Douglas and 
Wildawsky, 1982; Rayner and Cantor, 1987; Short, 1984; Schwarz and 
Thompson, 1990; Wynne, 1987). Consequently different 
people/social groups perceive risks in different ways and/or pay 
attention to different kinds of risks (economic, environmental, 
health, political risks).
To give an example, to regard something as an unacceptable 
risk because of its unfair distribution among different sectors of 
society or generations implies judgements (in this case based on 
the category of fairness) about social relations; judgements which 
are not necessarily shared by everybody. And perceptions 
concerning, to give another example, the controllability of risks 
or the possibility that a technology will be misused involve 
judgements about the capabilities and the accountability of the 
institutions involved in risk assessment and management. Also in 
this case, different judgements and perceptions can emerge.
Following this reasoning, it is not surprising that often a 
marked difference is found between risk assessors and sections of 
the public in their perception and evaluation of risk. In fact, 
as pointed out in several empirical studies (for example,
Fischhoff et al., 1981; Slovic et al., 1984; Wynne et al., 1988; 
Zapponi et al., 1991) while risk assessors try to calculate in 
probabilistic terms the occurrence and the effects of certain 
events, most people do not evaluate risks thinking about 
probabilities but considering the above mentioned characteristics 
of risks (delayed or immediate effects, etc.), the quality of
i s .
social relations and the behavior of political, economic and 
scientific institutions.
These different perspectives are not necessarily 
incompatible, nor are they exclusively a matter of culture and 
perception.
On the one hand, risk for health and environment become 
actual -and partially quantifiable- harm in case of accidents or 
acute pollution. In this respect they are not only a matter of 
social relations nor are they only in the eyes of the beholder as 
some authors seem to argue (see, Douglas and Wildawsky, 1982); 
thus risk assessment methods can help in determining, for 
instance, the possible toxicity of certain substances. On the 
other hand, quantitative/probabilistic risk assessment can be 
regarded as being only a part of a wider social (not in the sense 
of being made by "society" as a whole, but in the sense of taking 
social aspects into account) risk assessment and evaluation where 
unquantifiable elements such as the credibility and accountability 
of institutions are taken into account.
The preference for quantitative or social risk assessment and 
evaluation is partially a matter of culture (such as professional 
training, pro- or against-quantification "biases", worldviews 
diffused in different societies and social groups), but it is also 
a matter of interest. Those who have a specific economic or 
political interest (even if it can change over time) in promoting 
the development of a certain technology, will favour a definition 
of risk which leave out intriguing considerations about social and 
power relations. On the contrary, those who have no specific 
interest in the development of such technology -and especially 
those who are critical about current social and power relations- 
will evaluate technologies according to a definition of risk that 
encompasses social and political aspects.
Given these different perspectives, also the terms 
"rationality" and "irrationality" which are frequently used in
controversies about risk cannot be regarded as univocally defined 
and absolute ones. Risks can be evaluated according to a model of 
instrumental, economic rationality, as in the case of cost-benefit 
analysis; or they can be evaluated following a model of social 
rationality (Perrow, 1984; Wartofsky, 1986) in which social 
bonding is emphasized. Beside that, risks can be evaluated 
assuming that rationality is "perfect" or recognizing its 
intrinsic and external limits (Simon, 1982; March, 1978; 
Liberatore, 1989b). Furthermore, rationality can be regarded as 
being opposed to -or detached from- passions or it can be argued 
that certain passions (fears, for instance) often have a rational 
ground (Donini, 1986). Finally, on the basis of these remarks it 
can be argued that there is not such a thing as one "true" 
rationality, but that there are plural rationalities (Schwarz and 
Thompson, 1990). In other words a conflict between different 
models of rationality, rather than a contrast between 
"rationality" and "irrationality", is at stake in controversies 
about risk.'
It is generally acknowledged that one of the best ways of 
dealing with controversies is to find some forms of communication 
between people holding different views.
Risk communication studies started growing in the mid-eighties 
and are especially focused on the disagreements and the 
communication between experts -mainly risk assessors- and the 
public (Plough and Krimsky, 1987). Channels, forms and contents 
of communication are explored taking into account that risks are 
not perceived and evaluated in the same way by experts and lay 
people, as well as by proponents and opponents of a specific 
technology.
However the purposes of communication are not seen in the 
same manner by everybody. In case it is assumed that experts know 
better than anybody else what the risks really are, risk 
communication will be regarded as a one-way process (from experts 
to lay people) aimed at "enlightening" the public. If it is
acknowledged instead that different concepts of risk and different 
rationalities have to be taken into account, risk communication 
will be considered a multi-way, while asymmetrical due to power 
relations, process. A process where each part (experts holding 
dissimilar opinions, political and regulatory authorities, 
industry, various social groups and the media) can learn from the 
others and must consider their points of view.
In this respect some studies in the field of risk 
communication are quite ambiguous. An article of Paul Slovic 
(Slovic, 1987), for instance, emphasizes the need to educate the 
public, in this way implicitly assuming that experts have the 
proper information/knowledge and that the aim of communication is 
to instruct lay people. On the other hand, the author recognizes 
that risk communication is doomed to failure unless it is 
structured as a two-way process, and this involves an idea of 
exchange between the parties involved rather than a more or less 
enlightened imposition of (some) experts’ point of view.
Such ambiguity may be explained by the fact that much risk 
communication work is linked with the problem of risk 
acceptability. Risk communication can be in fact regarded as an 
instrument to make acceptable (or simply accepted) otherwise 
unacceptable (unaccepted) risks, technologies and policies, or it 
can be regarded as a pluralistic process where all the parties 
give and receive information and form their opinion about the 
acceptability or unacceptability of risk.
But the attempts to make risk accepted by finding a "nicer" 
way of telling things can contrast with the need to take action to 
avoid risk. Such different aims -encourage risk acceptance or 
risk avoidance- embedded in different social contexts, results in 
some paradoxes that have been pointed out by Harry Otway and Brian 
Wynne (Otway and Wynne, 1989). Taking the case of major hazard 
communication, the authors argue that the reassurance-arousal 
paradox arises from the contradiction between siting and emergency 
plan communication, the first one being aimed at reassuring people
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that they can forget about risk and the second one being effective 
only if risks are considered not negligible and are remembered.
The information targeting paradox is due instead, to give another 
example, to the perceived need (mainly by business and certain 
political authorities) to restrict information to avoid public 
overreaction and the suspicion of a cover up, and the consequent 
reaction that such restriction can give rise to.
What is important to stress at this point is that risk 
communication can be regarded as an important element not only to 
impose or discuss the acceptance/acceptability of risks, but also 
to effectively manage risk (at least when the mentioned paradoxes 
do not prevent this). For example, if people living near 
hazardous plants are given the information they need, trust the 
sources of information about emergency measures and therefore 
comply with these measures, it will be easier (in case measures 
are appropriate) to cope with the risks for health in case of 
accidents.
From the point of view of T-islc management, various problems 
arise due to the conflicting, and differently rational, 
definitions and evaluations of risk, and to other aspects like the 
interpretation of laws or the problems concerning the 
implementation of regulations.
Various definitions of the term "risk management" has been 
suggested. It seems worthwhile to mention some of them to give an 
idea of the different and complex issues involved in the use of 
such term.
The US National Academy of Sciences defines risk management 
as the complex of judgement and analysis that uses the results of f 
risk assessment to produce a decision about environmental action 
(quoted in EPA, 1984; p.23). The US Environmental Protection 
Agency advances a similar definition of risk management but takes 
into account the specific Agency’s tasks; risk management is then 
defined as the determination and accomplishment of those actions 
that will reduce risk to the greatest degree given any particular
level of resources, meaning Agency's resources and those of 
society in general (EPA, 1984; p.23). From a broader perspective, 
Timothy O' Riordan proposes to regard risk management as a 
political scientific process that is constantly adapting as 
scientific understanding improves, as the political priorities 
alter and as the public mood modulates (O'Riordan, 1982; p.99).
It can be noticed that, according to the first two 
definitions, risk management follows risk assessment and is 
regarded as both an analytical process (in the definition of the 
National Academy of Sciences) and a practical one (as emerges by 
the emphasis of EPA on the accomplishment -beside the 
determination- of actions). The sequence from risk assessment to 
risk management is explicitly or implicitly assumed in many 
studies; the underlying logic being that in order to manage risks 
it is necessary to know them first. From this point of view a 
separation can be drawn between risk assessment, belonging to the 
pure realm of science, and risk management, referring to the 
prosaic world of politics.
This apparently clear picture is however simplistic and even 
misleading. As it was already pointed out, risk assessment is a 
quite controversial process and its results cannot be taken as 
"purely scientific". Beside that, risk assessment and risk 
management are not to be seen as sequential steps but as 
interacting processes: the (more or less controversial) results of 
risk assessment influence decisions concerning the priorities for 
action and the measures to be adopted to manage risk; on the other 
hand, the way risk are managed influence the probability of 
occurrence of certain accidental events and/or the seriousness of 
their consequences.
j-j The formulation, choice and implementation of methods for 
knanaging risks (mainly direct regulation, use of economic 
instruments, emergency planning, information and communication) 
are also matters of controversy. And this cannot but be expected 
if one takes O'Riordan's broad definition of risk management and
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links such definition with the problems discussed in these pages 
about the assessment, evaluation, perception and communication of 
risk.
In the next two paragraphs an analysis will be put forward 
concerning two aspects that are particularly important when 
addressing the problem of risk management, that is the management 
of scientific and organizational uncertainties.
Such aspects are very intriguing and difficult to handle, 
especially in face of non-routine and catastrophic events like 
Chernobyl. During and following the Chernobyl fallout, scientific 
uncertainties (especially regarding the risks for health due to 
low doses of radiation) and organizational uncertainties 
(regarding the definition and distribution of responsibilities and 
institutions' ability to cope with such unprecedented event) had 
to be dealt with. In order to understand the short-term responses 
and long-term changes that occurred after Chernobyl, it is then 
necessary to explore the main features of scientific and 
organizational uncertainties and the main problems characterizing 
their management
b. Uncertain knowledge and its utilization.
Scientific knowledge went through alternate vicissitudes in 
the course of time, often running into the opposition of some 
sectors of society while attracting at the same time the support 
of others. Well-known are the attacks launched in the past 
centuries by the Catholic Church against science labelled as an 
instrument of the evil, and the defences made, for instance, by 
Enlightenment philosophers who celebrated science as a vehicle of 
those lights of reason needed to fight the darkness of ignorance 
and superstition and to foster progress.
Nowadays not only conflicting views (opposition or support) 
held by different people, but also mixed attitudes toward science 
can be found. While being generally praised as a sort of
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cornucopia thanks to its important achievements, science is at the 
same time being regarded -particularly starting from the drop of 
the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki- as a source of 
disruption. Radical criticism of science and the type of progress 
-based on the subjugation of nature- that science contributed to 
develop are put forward by environmental groups (Eder, 1990); but 
also several scientists, politicians and lay people are 
acknowledging the "dark side" of science. Especially concerning 
environmental matters, scientific knowledge is in fact required 
not only to cope with natural disasters but also to deal with its 
own undesirable side-effects such as major technological accidents 
and widespread pollution.
Policy makers ask and utilize scientists' advice to design 
and legitimate regulatory options and other policy instruments 
aimed at coping with those "science-induced" problems. However, 
as it was mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are limits to 
the ability of science to assess and help in the management of 
health and environmental risks. Limits which are due to both 
internal constraints, like the inadequacy of available theories or 
methods and the limits of rationality, and external ones, like the 
finiteness of financial, technical and time resources.
Furthermore, it has been pointed out by post-empiricist 
philosophers and sociologists of science, as well as by 
psychologists working in the field of risk perception, that the 
pretence to completely separate facts and values, object and 
subject of research is ill-grounded. Starting from Heisenberg's 
principle of indeterminacy, the interactions between what is 
observed, the experimental equipment used and the subjective 
assumptions made to interpret the observations are acknowledged 
also in "hard sciences” such as theoretical physics (Heisenberg, 
1958); and the theory-ladenness of all observations and statements 
of fact has been pointed out by some contemporary philosophers of 
science, particularly by Mary Hesse (Hesse, 1974). Moreover, the 
role of value judgements in scientific practice has been inquired
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by various authors who emphasize the embeddedness of science in 
its social and historical context (Barnes and Edge, 1982; Hausen 
and Nowotny, 1986; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Kuhn, 1962; Ravetz, 1971).
These elements prevent the achievement of a perfect and 
objective scientific knowledge, particularly in fields which are 
relevant for answering policy relevant questions such as whether 
and how much certain chemicals or low doses of radiation are 
dangerous for health and environment in the long-term.
The term "trans-sci.entific" was introduced in 1972 by Alvin 
Weinberg to characterize those questions that can be stated in 
scientific terms but that are in principle beyond the proficiency 
of science to answer (Weinberg, 1972). Among these questions he 
includes the issue of the risks for health due to low doses of 
radiation. According to Weinberg, such questions transcend 
science because to get answers would be impractically expensive, 
or because the subject matter is too variable to allow 
rationalization according to the canons established within the 
natural sciences, or because the issue at hand involves moral 
and/or aesthetic judgements. In a subsequent article, Weinberg 
also suggests that one should define a new branch of science, 
called regulatory science, in which the norms of scientific proof 
are less demanding than are the norms of ordinary science 
(Weinberg, 1985).
Weinberg's contributions get to the heart of two very 
important problems, that is the recognition of the limits of^ 
science and the particularly weak status of some of the 
#disciplines which are referred to m  the regulatory process.! 
However, his distinction between science and trans-science or 
between ordinary sciences and regulatory science is problematic.
One can in fact interpret such distinction as a matter of 
principle (as Weinberg seems to do) or as a matter of degree. In 
the first case science is assumed to be able to establish the 
truth and provide objective answers while trans-science cannot; 
but the already mentioned criticisms to the separation between
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object and subject and between facts and values undermine such 
interpretation. In the second case, one can note that some 
disciplines are less "mature" than others but that certainty 
cannot be achieved even in the better established disciplines 
(Ravetz, 1971: cap.3, cap.14). This does not mean that the 
distinction between science and trans-science must be totally 
discarded, but that it must be regarded as a matter of degree. 
Mainly the degree of clarity in understanding and responding to 
certain problems.
But then the issue arises of institutional power (Jasanoff,
1987), that is, who should determine how the boundary is drawn 
between science and trans-science? And once this line is drawn, 
who should decide the controversial trans-scientific issues and by 
what procedures?
Weinberg attributes to scientists the prerogative of defining 
boundaries; in his words scientists have in fact the crucial role 
"...to make clear where science ends and trans-science begins"
I(Weinberg, 1972: p.220). However, other relevant actors advance 
. different positions; for instance, some administrative lawyers 
if view Weinberg's analysis as a rationale for expanding the role of 
• law and legal processes in face of scientific uncertainty 
(McGarity, 1979). It can therefore be argued, with Sheila 
Jasanoff, that the linguistic labels used to delimit the 
boundaries between science and policy are politically charged 
because they are aimed at explaining or justifying the allocation 
of power and prestige between the institutions of government and 
those of science (Jasanoff, 1987: p.199). Especially between 
government and that part of science (or, as Jasanoff calls it,
"the fifth branch of power", Jasanoff, 1990) which is created and 
used for policy advice.
The relation between science and policy, and especially the 
management of scientific uncertainty in the policy process, remain 
an open and critical problem. As Jerome Ravetz and Silvio 
Funtowicz write, nowadays "...we face "hard" policy decisions
(involving huge investments and the fates of many people) whose 
necessary scientific inputs will be irremediably "soft", uncertain 
and contested" (Ravetz and Funtowicz, 1989). In this respect the 
authors add that not only uncertainty but also ignorance has to be 
acknowledged; and they remind us that Renaissance mapmakers, who 
drew black spaces to locate the unknown, already understood that 
worse than ignorance of facts is ignorance of ignorance.
Given this situation it is important to analyze how uncertain 
knowledge and even ignorance can be and are actually used in 
policy making, particularly in the field of risk management.
Decisions concerning the management of technological and 
environmental risk necessitate the consideration of the 
consequences of various possible options. And this involve the 
evaluation of the uncertainties (and ignorance) in the scientific 
basis and the uncertainties regarding the political, economic and 
social implications of each alternative at the local, national and 
international level.
In face of such uncertainties, three main decisional 
alternatives are available: 1. decide to wait for more information 
and to postpone decisions; 2. make a decision taking uncertainties 
and ignorance into account; 3. make a decision neglecting or even 
hiding uncertainties.
Examples of the first two approaches can be found in the 
ongoing debate about the greenhouse effect. The US government 
(but also many developing countries) maintains that given the 
existing scientific uncertainties it is better to wait for more 
information rather than adopt costly measures that could be 
regretted in case further evidence will reveal that they were 
unnecessary; the EC Commission and most European governments are 
advocating instead the need to take precautionary action, before 
it is too late, on the basis of the uncertain but significant 
evidence already available.
The decision to develop nuclear power on an industrial scale 
can be interpreted as an example of the third approach.
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Uncertainties and ignorance regarding the safe disposal of nuclear 
waste, the decommissioning of nuclear plants, the possibility to 
cope with the consequences of major accidents have been 
underestimated (and kept secret) for a long time; and, as it was 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, the uncertainties involved in 
sophisticated risk assessment studies are still not fully 
acknowledged.
Why these different approaches to the management of 
uncertainty? Can a rational criterion be found to decide under 
uncertainty?
Concerning the tools suggested to guide decisions in 
conditions of uncertainty when high risks are at stake (as in the 
mentioned cases of climate change and nuclear power, or in the 
case of war), some rational choice theorists argue for the 
adoption of the maximin calculus, a calculus aimed at selecting 
the best worst outcome and implying the imperative of acting as if 
the worst that can happen will happen (Elster, 1979; Kavka, 1980).
This (normative) proposal sounds very reasonable, and a 
similar reasoning underlies the precautionary principle referred 
to in several international legal materials on environment 
^protection issues (see, Cameron and Abouchar, 1991) and initially 
developed within the German radiation protection regulation. The 
maximin calculus and the precautionary principle have the merit to 
guide action in conditions of uncertainty rather than suggesting 
to wait for eventually unattainable certainty. However some 
intriguing aspects regarding their applicability should be taken 
into account.
A problem of these approaches is that choices about the 
management of technological and environmental risks have a wide 
social, economic, and political impact and different social groups 
and political or economic organizations can have different 
perceptions and preferences regarding what is the "best worst 
outcome". This in turn involves contrasting opinions about the 
selection of the precautionary action to be possibly taken. For
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example, one can think that acting as if the worst that can happen 
will happen means to stop nuclear plants or the production of 
dangerous chemicals or the research on genetic engineering, while 
someone else may suggest to put safety devices and adopt 
regulatory measures.
Uncertainties are involved in each option. What seems to be 
crucial in the actual evaluation of such uncertaintiesCand in the^ -
choice between various possible options are, on the one hand, the 
way in which problems are defined and risks are selected for 
attention and, on the other hand, the existence of power 
relationships where knowledge and information (beside other 
resources) are not equally available for all and can be used to 
justify the choice of options which are politically or 
economically preferred by those who are more powerful.
This last remark points to the fact that knowledge and 
information have never been the only basis of political decisions, 
and that their utilization is a far from taken-for-granted 
process.
In face of a problem, or in defining a problem, decision­
makers do not necessarily try to obtain all the information which 
is or could become available, but select the information they need 
on the basis of their goals and resources. In other words, they 
look for a "half-knowledge" which can be safely organized into 
politics, avoiding the knowledge that could provoke embarrassment 
and conflicts (Marin, 1981).
This consideration applies also to the evaluation of the 
quality of information and the uncertainties in the scientific 
basis. In some cases to deepen and spread the knowledge about a 
certain issue may be regarded as risky by political and economic 
elites and then further information or research can be 
discouraged. On the other hand, also a "half-knowledge" has to be 
selected in a way to be good enough and credible enough to be 
usable.
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Discretion in selecting and utilizing knowledge is in fact 
limited by knowledge itself; politicians cannot pretend that 
certain data do not exist or that they can be neglected, at least 
when such data are widely known within and beyond scientific 
communities or national borders.
The relation between knowledge and discretion in policy 
making is thus twosided.
On the one hand, policy relevant knowledge is usually 
uncertain and insufficient to allow definitive conclusions about 
the consequences of policy options. This is demonstrated (for 
instance, in the Chernobyl case) by the widespread disagreements 
between scientific advisers not only about the interpretation of 
data or phenomena but also about the measures to be recommended. 
Disagreements due to both the uncertainties which characterize 
knowledge in any field (starting from the apparently more certain 
domain of the natural sciences), and to the commitments of each 
expert to different disciplinary trainings, cultural traditions, 
values, interests and perceptions. Given this situation, 
decision-makers cannot escape exercising discretion, that is -in 
the definition of Ted Greenwood- the power or right to decide or 
to act on either procedural or substantive matters according to 
one’s own judgement or choice (Greenwood, 1984: p.3). Such 
political and administrative discretion may take different forms 
in different contexts, from the selection -in the light of 
political and economic interests- of scientific evidence, to the 
interpretation of legal clauses such as the adoption of the best 
available technology or the adaptation of regulatory measures to 
scientific and technical progress.
On the other hand, knowledge constrains discretion by 
offering data, explanations or forecasts that cannot be completely 
ignored even if they are uncertain and controversial. At least 
because policy decisions taken, for instance, by national 
governments can be challenged by opposition groups, local 
authorities or international organizations on the basis of the
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available knowledge. Beside that, those who are regarded as 
depositaries of knowledge, that is the "experts", influence the 
exercise of political and administrative discretion by 
contributing to the selection and definition of both the problems 
to be addressed and the possible solutions. This seems 
particularly evident in case of crisis situations, such as the 
occurrence of major industrial accidents, where specialized 
knowledge is asked to provide quick answers about the risks 
involved and the measures to be taken. Especially in such 
situations the management of scientific uncertainties is a crucial 
aspect of the broader crisis management.
c . Organizational uncertainties anH thp nianagawftnt. of crises.
In face of unexpected events as Chernobyl not only 
uncertainties regarding their nature, causes and possible 
consequences have to be taken into consideration. Also 
uncertainties regarding who should take action and according to 
which criteria have to be dealt with. Moreover, even when 
responsibilities and procedures are established, each actor 
involved in the management of crises must face the uncertainties 
regarding her/his own reactions to non-routine events as well as 
the uncertainties regarding the behavior of the other relevant 
actors.
The main actors involved in risk management, both in routine 
and in crisis situations, are political authorities, 
administration, technical-advisory bodies, industry and some 
international organizations. Moreover, non governmental 
organizations and interest groups have an important role in 
influencing and evaluating the performance of risk managers, while 
the mass-media may act both as risk managers (for example, by 
diffusing information about measures to be taken in case of 
industrial accidents or high pollution due to other causes) and as
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public or private interest groups having the peculiarity of giving 
voice (even if not in same way and with the same weight) to 
opinions held by various social groups.
In general terms, activities and responsibilities in the 
field of risk management can be summarized as follows.
Political institutions at the central and local level have 
the responsibility of making decisions and formulating policies 
aimed at preventing or minimizing risk. Conflicts and overlap of 
responsibility within governments and between central/federal 
governments and local authorities may arise, especially in face of 
unprecedented events.
Administrations are often regarded as merely implementing the 
decisions made by governments or local authorities; however it has 
been pointed out (for instance, by Mèny, 1990 and Rourke, 1984) 
that bureaucracies, by supplying advice and having the power of 
implementing -or not implementing- decisions, also contribute to 
shape the political agenda and to determine the substance of 
political decisions .
Political institutions and administrations can resort to the 
help of some advisory bodies, both internal (like Ministries' 
technical/advisory committees) and external (like University 
departments or private consultants) ones. Given the previously 
mentioned problems concerning the management of scientific 
uncertainty and the corresponding disagreements between experts, 
the relations between advisers and adviced institutions can be 
difficult. Experts' advice is not so much an instrument for 
implementing policies (for instance, concerning technical aspects 
like monitoring) but contributes to the framing of problems and 
the formulation of policies.
Especially in cases of transboundary risk, national 
governments and bureaucracies.can.collaborate with the authorities 
of other countries and with the relevant international 
organizations. Supranational settings such as the European 
Community and some international organizations like the United 
Nations and its specialized programmes and Agencies (including the
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UN Environment Programme and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency) are becoming increasingly important actors in the field of 
transboundary risk management.
Given the fact that many risks for health and environment are 
linked with industrial activities, industry itself is required to 
adopt measures aimed at coping with risk. Measures that are not 
only imposed by law (when it is enforced), but also by market 
competition: usually accidents are not a good business, at least 
if safety devices and other risk-avoiding mechanisms are not 
regarded as too costly.
Finally, the mass-media, as arenas and vehicles of risk 
communication, are involved both in the formulation of decisions 
(by giving voice to -as well as influencing- the opinions of 
various social groups) and in their implementation (by diffusing 
the relevant information).
It is quite easy to see that all these risk managers do not 
act in isolation from each other.
In some cases they work together, and even when they do not 
collaborate or are in conflict they have to take into account each 
other role and behavior; in this way they exert a reciprocal, but 
usually not symmetrical (because not all of them are equally 
powerful), influence. Furthermore, each and all of them has/have 
to take into consideration also other actors (such as strong non 
governmental organizations and interest groups, and the media) and 
the features of their social, political, economic and cultural 
context.
The importance to focus on relational aspects has been 
stressed by several authors with special reference to political 
and economic organizations; however, also scientific institutions, 
non governmental.(non profit) organizations and the media can and 
have to be included.
The notion of interorganizational networks, that is the 
totality of all the organizations connected by a certain type of 
relationships, has been introduced; and some techniques have been
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developed to measure or graphically represent the links, density, 
reachability and other elements of the networks which are taken as 
basic units of analysis (see, Aldrich and Whetten, 1981; Benson, 
1975; Laumann and Pappi, 1976; Perrow, 1986: cap.6). Some 
specifications regarding the field and nature of 
interorganizational networks have been introduced such as issue 
networks (Heclo, 1978), policy networks (see, Marin and Mayntz, 
1991; Kenis and Schneider, 1991) and regulatory networks (Huber, 
1991). Apart from these distinctions regarding various types of 
interorganizational networks, Howard Aldrich and David Whetten 
draw an interesting distinction between networks, organization- 
sets, i.e. those organizations with which a focal organization has 
direct links, and action-sets, i.e. those groups of organizations 
that have formed a limited alliance for a limited purpose (Aldrich 
and Whetten, 1981).
The notion of action-set seems particularly useful when 
interpreting organizations' responses to non-routine events such 
as major technological accidents. In those cases action-sets may 
represent a way, for each organization involved, to reduce the 
uncertainties regarding the behavior of the other relevant 
organizations (or inter-organizational uncertainties) in order to 
cope with the problems at hand.
Besides inter-organizational uncertainties also intra­
organ i zational uncertainties must be usually dealt with in 
managing non-routine events.
Activities related to the prevention and minimization of risk 
are only a part of the activities carried on by political and 
administrative institutions, firms, media, scientific institutions 
not specialized in this area. Routines are followed in this field 
as in all the others, and this is not surprising because routines 
are necessary components of organized activities. In fact, in 
order to preserve or enlarge their structure and to work 
efficiently, organizations of any kind are based on the definition 
of certain tasks that have to be performed by some responsible
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units. In this context, the usual way to cope with non-routine 
events and manage risk is to create specialized units within the 
relevant organizations (see, Thompson, 1967, cap.6) or to 
establish new organizations that will also follow certain routines 
in their monitoring, research, enforcement or planning activities. 
The extreme case being the alienating but necessary work of some 
people in emergency units (especially when these units are 
permanently active) who spend their working time in front of a 
monitor to control if everything is all right.
But in spite of sophisticated forecasts, planning and 
training, in many cases organizations are taken by surprise when 
non-routine events take place. According to some authors 
(Wohlstetter, 1962; Shrivastava, 1987; Medvedev, G., 1991) such 
surprise is mainly due to the neglect of warning signals. This in 
turn can be attributed to misleading individual and collective 
perceptions (for instance, about the safety of nuclear plants or 
about the behavior/"move" expected from other individuals and 
organizations) and to various intra- and inter-organizational 
features like certain difficulties in, or even lack of, 
communication.
Therefore when non-routine and weighty events occur they 
bring along some elements that, because unexpected, challenge the 
routinized management of non-routine occurrences. In this respect 
these elements represent sources of uncertainty within each 
organization (intra-organizational uncertainty) concerning, for 
instance, its own abilities, resources, solidity and adaptability.
Different responses can be given in such circumstances.
And these responses depend very much on the definitions of the 
situation and on the relations within and between the 
organizations involved.
Concerning the first point, James March and Herbert Simon 
argue that choice is always exercized with respect to a simplified 
model of the situation, or definition of the situation; definition 
which elements are not given but are themselves the outcome of
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social and psychological processes including the activities 
performed and the procedures followed by the actors 
(organizations) involved, and their limit of attention or memory 
(March and Simon, 1958: cap.6). The authors also suggest that 
when a stimulus coming from the organizations' environment (which 
include other organizations) is of a kind that has been 
experienced repeatedly in the past, the response will be highly 
routinized; instead, when a stimulus is relatively novel, it will 
evoke problem-solving activity aimed initially at constructing a 
definition of the situation and then at developing one or more 
performance programs (March and Simon, 1958: p.140).
In a later article, March goes further and writes that, "life 
is not primarily choice; it is interpretation" (March, 1982: 
p.38), and that decision processes are only partly concerned with 
making decisions since they also provide an occasion for defining 
virtue and truth, distributing glory or blame for what has 
happened, and so on (March, 1982: p.37).
Also with respect to the links between definitions of the 
situation and organizations'responses to crises, William Starbuck 
maintains that environments instigate crises by changing 
unpredictably while also promulgating ideologies that impede 
adaptation to unpredicted changes (Starbuck, 1982: p.5). For 
instance, their environment instructs organizations to rely on 
rational analysis, to justify and plan their action, and to 
maintain coherence through hierarchical authority. According to 
Starbuck, these properties produce detrimental inertia when 
environments change abruptly in unexpected directions (Starbuck, 
1981: p.5).
On the basis of these remarks by March, Simon and Starbuck, 
it can be argued that in face of non-routine events, 
organizations' responses are firstly aimed at defining the 
situation; especially, whether it is a crisis or not, and which 
kind of crisis. Such definition will only partially depend on the 
specific features of the non-routine, unexpected events: the 
features of the organizations involved (their structure, technical
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resources, authority, etc.) being also very important. These 
organizational features and the definitions of the situation they 
contribute to produce influence the way intra and inter- 
organizational uncertainties are managed. For instance, the 
attempts to reduce non-routine events to routines and adopt a 
"normalizing" behavior or, on the contrary, to define and treat 
non-routine events as abnormal occurrences to be managed with the 
help of new or modified instruments and procedures.
After discussing some specific aspects related to the 
management of scientific and organizational uncertainties, some 
more general features of issue framing, decision making and 
learning processes will be analysed in the next chapter. The 
short-term responses the medium/long-term changes that followed 
Chernobyl were the result of these distinct but linked processes.
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ISSUE FRAMING, DECISION MAKING AND LEARNING.
As previously mentioned, the management of scientific and 
organizational uncertainties is crucial both in defining problems 
and responding to them. In other words, two processes must be 
taken into account, i.e. the way problems are defined (as 
scientific, trans-scientific, political problems, or non-problems 
at all, as routine or abnormal events, etc.), and the way actions 
are taken -or not taken- to deal with these problems.
As we will see in the cases studies, the same event -i.e. the 
Chernobyl fallout and its consequences- was defined in different 
ways and different actions had been taken to deal with it. It is 
thus worthwile to analyse the distinct but linked problems of 
issue framing and decision making.
In the first two sections of this chapter a discussion is 
provided of different conceptual models focusing either on issue 
framing (i.e. how problems are defined) or on decision making 
(i.e. how solutions/responses are produced). As far as the first 
conceptual "stream" is concerned, the contribution of Joseph 
Gusfield (1981) and the work of Michiel Schwarz and Michael 
Thompson (1990) are analysed. Regarding the second stream, the 
three conceptual models sketched by Graham Allison (1971) are 
referred to, i.e. the Rational Policy Model, the Organizational 
Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model. After such 
examination, the hypothesis suggested in the Introduction -which 
forms the core of what will be called the Policy Communication 
Model- is discussed in the light of both conceptual streams. Aim 
of the Policy Communication Model is in fact to integrate the 
different but linked foci on issue framing and decision making.
In the last part of the chapter some theories of learning are also 
discussed to provide a theoretical background to the subsequent 
analysis of the medium and long-term changes occurred after 
Chernobyl. Also learning processes can be interpreted on the
2
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basis of the Policy Communication Model, but they present some 
peculiarities to be taken into account.
a. Issue approaches.
With respect to issue framing, reference was made in the 
previous chapter to studies that point to some specific issues 
regarding the definition of certain problems as scientific or 
trans-scientific ones (such as the theory-ladeness of all 
observations, the issue of institutional power in defining the 
boundary between science and trans-science, etc.). Moreover 
reference was made to contributions that identify some 
peculiarities of organizational definitions of problems (like the 
presence of SOPs, inertia and/or ideologies that may favour or 
prevent the emergence of certain issues).
On a more general level, several sociologists (like 
Garfinkel, 1967; Goffmann, 1974; Goodman, 1978; Gusfield, 1981; 
Snow and Benford, 1991; Schwarz and Thompson, 1991) point to the 
social construction of problems, that is the way in which certain 
events and experiences are interpreted according to cognitive 
frames which are in turn developed on the basis of the 
interactions between actors living in a given society. According 
to Erving Goffmann (and other authors, especially those in the 
field of ethnomethodology), "primary frameworks" are needed to 
render what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect into something 
that is meaningful (Goffmann, 1974). This happens by locating, 
perceiving, identifying and "labeling" a seemingly infinite number 
of concrete occurrences (Goffmann, 1974; Goodmann, 1978). Primary 
frames and their combination into "interpretive packages" (Gamson 
and Modigliani, 1989), influence also the forming of conjectures 
as to what occurred before and expectations of what is likely to 
happen in the future. In turn these conjectures and expectations 
influence the designing and selection of possible options, i.e. 
decision making.
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Among the studies that focus on the way problems are framed 
and socially constructed, "The Culture of Public Problems" by 
Joseph Gusfield (1981) and "Divided We Stand" by Michiel Schwarz 
and Michael Thompson (1990) provide an excellent basis for 
examining which elements we can see looking through the cultural 
approach "lenses", and which ones we may eventually miss.
Joseph Gusfield (1981) focuses on how meaning is constituted, 
particularly on how certain events are categorized and defined as 
"public problems" (as distinct from "social problems" since not 
all social problems become public ones). Taking the case of 
drinking and driving as a public problem in the US context, 
Gusfield masterly illustrates how the link between drinking and 
unsafe driving had been developed and how certain solutions 
(focused on preventing drivers to drink and punishing them if they 
do) had been selected shuting out other possible ways of seeing 
the phenomenon.
Three main factors are identified by Gusfield to explain how 
such definition of the problem and the selection of its solution 
developed: a. the authority of scientific research as a basis for 
the construction of factual reality; b. the role of law in 
reinforcing meanings; c. the "ownership" of public problems by 
some actors who try to exclude others from defining and taking 
responsibility about such problems. With respect to these 
factors, Gusfield also points to some of the mechanisms that 
determine each of them and the form of their influence. For 
example, the social organization and internal dynamics of 
scientific research and the use of scientific evidence as 
arguments in the legal sphere; sphere which is in turn very 
influencial since it is given the authority of building an image 
of social order based on moral consensus. The author concludes 
that public actions and policies can be regarded as "theatrical" 
since cerimonies and rituals are performed to develop and 
establish meanings, and thus to construct reality. This last 
point raises some problems regarding the distinction between
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"performers" and "audience" of the public policy "drama"; in fact 
in many cases also those actors who do not "own" problems do not 
simply "watch" those who lead the definition of problems but 
participate in such definition. Nevertheless, Gusfield's 
approach provides important tools to understand not only how 
meaning is constituted and problems are framed, but also to see 
how frames influence the definition and selection of possible 
solutions.
In the Chernobyl case, we will see that scientists played a 
crucial role in defining the fallout as a radiological and public 
health problem (or non-problem) by interpreting and selecting the 
available information. And the attempts by governmental experts 
and authorities to "own" the framing and management of the 
Chernobyl fallout, together with the attempts by non-governmental 
actors to challenge such "ownership", will be also evidentiated.
Gusfield's analysis helps to identify these elements, but it 
leave us with an unanswered question, that is why certain specific 
actions and decisions are taken. While the definition of the 
problem certainly influences the formulation and selection of 
possible solutions, it remains to be understood why, for instance, 
different measures (or non-measures) are taken in the US and in 
Italy regarding the similarly defined drinking-driving problem.
Or why (as it will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5) some 
different measures were taken in the FRG and Italy notwithstanding 
a similar "dominant" definition of the problem during the fallout. 
Furthermore, while the emphasis on issue framing attracts our 
attention to the fact that the different frames that emerged with 
respect to the consequences of Chernobyl influenced (particularly 
set limits to) the possible adaptations to be made, it does not 
explain why certain specific changes occurred in the years 
following the accident.
Also Schwarz and Thompson (1990) focus on how issues are 
framed. They argue that, above and beyond the various interests 
of the various actors, there are different convinctions as to how
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the world is and to how people are. Therefore to understand how, 
for instance, technology choices are made, it is necessary to 
analyse how different definitions of the problem (and different 
definitions of the solution) develop.
In order to identify the main elements that underlie 
different definition/framing of issues, the authors elaborate a 
typology (building on the work of anthropologists, mainly 
M.Douglas, and ecologists like C.Bolling) which includes three 
main dimensions: forms of social relationships (market -or 
individualism-, hierarchy, egalitarianism, fatalism), myths of 
nature (benign, perverse/tolerant, ephemeral, capricious) and 
models of rationality (substantive, procedural, critical, 
fatalist). Linking these dimensions, the authors draw the 
following typology (adapted from Schwarz and Thompson, 1990, p.9):
market/individualism hierarchy
nature benign nature perverse/tolerant
substantive rationality procedural rationality
fatalism egalitarianism
nature capricious nature ephemeral
fatalist rationality critical rationality
Criticisms can be made regarding this typology; for instance, f
it can be argued that other forms of rationality ("systemic", t
"communicative", etc.) or myths of nature ("sacred" vs "dominated |
by humans", etc.) or social relationships (totalitarianism, etc.)
should be also taken into account, or that not necessarily the 
links between the three selected dimensions are the ones suggested 
in the typology (for example, not all "egalitarians" see nature as 
"ephemeral"; on the contrary -as the case of Marxism show- they 
can regard it as "benign"). Moreover it can be noted that the
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"myths of nature" are already frames; therefore, while they can 
certainly underlie the development of other frames, they need an 
explanation regarding how are they elaborated. In this respect it 
must be noted that according to the authors the main explanatory 
variable within the typology is the form of social relationships 
the actors participate to. Social relations are in fact regarded 
by Schwarz and Thompson as the basic source of framing and frame- 
shifts; the last ones taking place as a result of shifts in social 
context ("egalitarians" coopted by the establishment being a case 
in point).
Apart from the above mentioned criticisms, the typology 
suggested by Schwarz and Thompson can still help identifying some 
elements (even if not all the elements) that contribute to the 
different definitions of the problem. In the case of Chernobyl, 
for instance, one can argue that the different definitions of the 
fallout put forward by environmental groups and by governmental 
authorities were influenced by the "myths of nature" held by the 
various actors and by their positions within (or preference for) 
certain forms of social relations.
However, while Schwarz and Thompson approach can explain why 
different kinds of actors hold different views and frame problems 
in different ways, it is insufficient to make sense of the 
different framing eventually referred to by similar groups of 
actors such as governmental authorities in the same country or in 
different ones. Moreover, it does not explain (as it was noted 
also concerning the analysis of Gusfield) why certain specific 
outcomes (decisions and actions) are produced. For instance, why 
some different measures were taken in Italy and the FRG during the 
Chernobyl fallout in spite of a similar dominant definition of the 
problem as a nation-wide radiological risk. Finally, Schwarz and 
Thompson contribution helps-understanding how the consequences of 
(or lessons from) Chernobyl had been differently framed by 
different social groups in the years following the accident. But 
it does not fully explain why certain specific changes occurred on 
the basis of those different frames.
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The main features of the approaches focusing on issue framing 
as exemplified by Gusfield, Schwarz and Thompson and others can be 
summarized as follows: 1 . individual and collective actors are 
regarded as participating in -and being constrained by- forms of 
social relations that differ in different contexts; 2 . social 
actors make sense of the world on the basis of given frames; 3 . 
beside referring to primary frames, actors participate in the 
elaboration of frames and frame packages which can be viewed as 
unintended results of the interaction and communication between 
the actors involved; 4. issue framing influence the way any other 
action is performed.
As previously mentioned, issue framing approaches provide 
important tools to understand how problems are defined and how 
this influence the selection of possible solutions. However, 
they leave us with some unanswered questions regarding how certain 
specific actions and decisions are actually taken to address those 
socially framed problems. It is thus necessary to see whether 
some decision making models are able to answer such questions.
b. Decision iwafcina models.
Allison's "Essence of Decision" (1971) provides a thoughtful 
summary and discussion of the most widely used (even if with some 
variations and/or in mixed -rather than "pure"- form) decision 
making models in political science literature. Allison calls them 
the Rational Policy Model, the Organizational Process Model and 
the Bureaucratic Politics Model i.
Other interesting ways of analysing the various models of 
decision making had been put forward following Allison's
1 In a previous article (Allison, 1969), the author uses the term 
Bureaucratic Politics Model while in book he adds "Governmental, 
or Bureaucratic". To be short, and to keep the broader notion of 
bureaucracy, the original term will be used in these pages.
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contribution. John Steinbruner, for instance, contrasts what he 
calls "the analytic paradigm", based on the rational choice 
approach, and the "cybernetic paradigm" based on the work of those 
authors (like W.R.Ashby and H.A.Simon) who emphasize the limits of 
rationality and the role of cognitive processes in decision making 
(Steinbruner, 1974). The "analytical paradigm" coincides with the 
"Rational Policy Model" and the "cybernetic paradigm" overlaps 
with the "Organizational Process Model" even if it is not limited 
to organizations * specific dynamics but refers also to individuals' 
thought processes (see Steinbruner, 1974: cap.2-3). While taking 
the "cybernetic paradigm" and its emphasis on cognitive processes 
in mind, Allison's distinction will be referred to in the 
following pages as it seems the one that makes explicit and 
discusses in the clearest way the basic assumptions and inference 
patterns of different decision making models.
b .1. The Rational Policy Model.
Rational Choice Theory assumes that individuals have clear 
and stable preferences, are self-interested, are able to utilize 
all the available infomation concerning both the means to achieve 
their goals and the consequences of all possible actions, and try 
to maximize their utility 2. The Rational Policy Model springs 
from Rational Choice Theory as applied to collective actors and 
assumes that national governments, conceived as unitary decision 
makers, are agents who choose actions in a rational way, i.e. on 
the basis of the above mentioned assumptions. Therefore, in terms 
of this conceptual model, analysts attempt to understand 
happenings as the purposive acts of unified national governments 
(Allison, 1971: cap.l).
On the basis of the -assumptions made by the Rational Policy 
Model, the responses to Chernobyl can be regarded as rational and
2 Standard and less standard formulations of Rational Choice 
Theory can be found in Barry and Hardin, (1982); Elster (1979; 
1983); Heath (1976); Hogarth and Reder (1987).
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intended choices made by unified national and transnational 
actors. However, those very assumptions present problematic 
aspects.
As far as actors are concerned, the assumption of the 
Rational Policy Model (but not of Rational Choice Theory) that 
collective actors can be treated as large individuals or "unitary 
actors" may turn out to be simplistic or even misleading. An 
analysis based on such assumption can in fact deal with conflicts 
and other forms of interaction between different actors but fails 
to "see" and explain conflicts or bargainings within collective 
actors such as governments, firms, etc.
Also the assumptions stating that actors have clear 
preferences and goals and that it is possible to explain their 
choices/behavior according to the category of intentionality (i.e. 
intention to pursue given goals) are rather intriguing. Going
back to issue framing approaches, it can be argued that the
Rational Policy Model (and Rational Choice Theory more in 
general), neglect the possibility that actors change their views, 
preferences and goals through communication beside dealing 
strategically and intentionally with each other on the basis of 
given and stable preferences and goals.
Finally, even supposing that there are rational and
intentional actors willing to pursue certain goals and maximize 
their utility, it is at least to be verified whether they are 
really able to discern which means are useful to achieve which 
ends and whether they can obtain and use all the necessary 
information to make choices. Usually (and certainly in the 
Chernobyl case), scientific and organizational uncertainties make 
not so easy to find out which means would be more suited to 
achieve any supposedly clear goal. To give an example, it is not 
so evident whether the best way to protect the national nuclear 
programmes from the Chernobyl political fallout was to underplay 
the extension of the radioactive fallout or to exhibit efficiency 
in copying with it.
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Summing up, in spite of its apparently crystal-clear logic 
the Rational Policy Model provides us with some debatable 
assumptions. Let us see whether the other models sketched by 
Allison offer more promising analytical tools.
b.2. The Organizational Process Model.
According to the Organizational Process Model, what the 
Rational Policy Model categorizes as "choices" are instead outputs 
of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns 
of behavior. At any given time, a government consists of existing 
organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating 
procedures and programs. "The behavior of these organizations -and 
consequently of the government- relevant to an issue in any 
particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by 
routines established in these organizations prior to that 
instance" ( Allison, 1971: p.6 8 ).
Within the framework of the Organizational Process Model 
(based on concepts developed by Organization Theory) actors and 
actions are then defined as follows.
The actor is not a monolithic nation or government but rather 
a constellation of loosely allied organizations (also not to be 
seen as monolithic units) on top of which government leaders sit. 
In a case like the one of Chernobyl also the relations between 
these governmental organizations and various non-governmental 
organizations (involving different degrees of internal 
differentiation and complexity a) has to be taken into account.
Actions are regarded as organizational outputs resulting from 
the prominent features of organizational activity, that is: a.the 
constraints (i.e. internal resources as well as external
3 One can think about the different degrees of organizational 
differentation which characterize (just to mention actors relevant 
for the Chernobyl case) anti-nuclear groups, the press and the 
nuclear industry.
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expectations and demands) defining acceptable performance; b.the 
sequential attention to problems; c.the standard operating 
procedures -SOPs- that enable organizations to perform their 
routine tasks; d.the avoidance of uncertainty (mainly the attempt 
of each organization to regularize the reactions of other actors 
with whom they have to deal); e.the problem-directed search; f.the 
possibility of organizational learning and change especially in 
response to major disasters (Allison, 1971: cap.3). It can be 
noted that some of these organizational features play a role not 
only in responding to problems but also in defining, frinning them. 
In this respect, organization theory specifies some 
(organizational) incentives and/or constraints to the broader 
social process of issue framing discussed above.
The Organizational Process Model provides us with interesting 
elements to understand the responses to Chernobyl.
It pays attention to the specific features of certain 
collective actors -organizations- instead of just transferring to 
them the characteristics of individuals. It also points to the 
relevant intra- and inter-organizational relations rather than 
treating collective actors as monolithic units. Moreover, it 
illuminates important organizational elements that enter the 
process of problem definition (like the processes of 
organizational intelligence and organizational options selection) 
instead of starting with given preferences and goals as sorts of 
pre-defined problem definitions. Finally, it accounts for 
results/outputs which do not imply a value judgement about their 
being "rational" according to a means-ends model of rationality.
However, also the Organizational Process Model presents some 
problems.
In the first place, the dynamics characterizing the inter- 
organizational relations between different sorts of organizations 
are not dealt with. The Organizational Process Model only takes 
into consideration governmental bodies leaving out the 
interactions between them and non-governmental organizations of
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different sorts. Interactions that proved to be crucial in the 
Chernobyl case. It must be added that not only the Organizational 
Process Model but Organizational Theory more in general tends to 
neglect this point. While there is a large literature on intra- 
and inter-organizational relations concerning similar kinds of 
organizations (especially firms and governmental organizations) as 
well as between governmental agencies and strong interest groups, 
organizational theorists usually do not include in their enquiry 
the interactions between the mentioned organizations and other 
(scientific, media, citizens’) organizations.
This can be due on the one hand to the fact that the specific 
features of organizations such as scientific bodies, mass media, 
environmental groups and citizens’associations are less studied 
and understood than the features of governmental and business 
organizations. And, on the other hand, to the fact that a study 
including the interactions between all these different sorts of 
organizations must necessarily deal with broader political and 
societal dynamics that go beyond organizational features and 
relations.
Beside that, the focus on organizational features can lead to 
an undervaluation of the role of leading individuals within (but 
also outside) the relevant organizations. In this respect it can 
be noticed that if it is controversial and even misleading to 
transfer the intentions of individuals to collective actors, it is 
also true__that individuals in key positions can try to direct, 
according to their own interests and perceptions, the behavior of 
the organization they are part of. Of course, also the scope for 
such "individual manouvering" is constrained by the features of 
each organizations; however, attention should be paid to the
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interests and intentions of individual members« that not always 
coincide with those of the organizations they are member of.
A last point to be made and connected with the two previous 
ones is that the Organizational Process Model seems to neglect 
certain political and social dynamics that are quite important in 
a case like Chernobyl. The emerging of certain organizations 
instead of others as leading actors is in fact not only due to the 
specific features of these organizations but also to their 
position within the political and social sphere. In other words, 
the political bargainings between Ministers, central and local 
authorities, political parties, etc. and the prevailing of certain 
forms of social relations (for instance, degree of acceptance of 
or contrasts with hierarchy -like state authority- by interest 
groups and social movements) should be considered beside/together 
with the features that characterizes the various governmental and 
non-governmental organizations.
This last consideration make us shift to the third model 
referred to by Allison, the Bureaucratic Politics Model.
b.3. The Bureaucratic Politics Model.
Following the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the actor is not a 
unitary government nor a constellation of organizations, but 
rather a number of individual players whose actions are defined by 
the position they occupy within the government.
Differently from the Rational Policy Model and the 
Organizational Process Model, "What moves the chess pieces is not 
simply the reasons which support a course of action, nor the 
routines of organizations which enact an alternative, but the 
power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in
4 This remarks applies to the Organizational Process Model as 
outlined by Allison rather than to Organizational Theory in 
general. Contributions concerning the role of individuals in 
organizations can be found, for instance, in the classical works 
of organizational theorists such as March and Simon (1958), 
Selznick (1957), Simon (1957), Thompson (1967), and others.
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question" (Allison, 1971: p.145). Accordingly, actions^and 
policies are regarded as political resultants. Resultants in the 
sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem 
but rather results from compromise, conflict and confusion among 
government officials with different interests and unequal 
influence; political in the sense that the activity from which the 
outcomes emerge is best characterized as bargaining (Allison,
1971: cap.5).
The way political resultants are generated depends on various 
elements: different priorities, perceptions, interests, stakes, 
power of the actors involved as well as the available action 
channels, i.e. those regularized ways of producing action 
concerning type of issues that structure the game by pre-selecting 
the major players. All this in a context characterized by 
inordinate uncertainty about what must be done, the necessity that 
something be done, and crucial consequences of whatever is done.
In this perspective, action does not presuppose intention, "The 
sum of behavior of representatives of a government relevant to an 
issue is rarely intended by any individual or group. Rather (..) 
separate individuals with different intentions contribute pieces 
to a resultant. Resultant which is then distinct from what anyone 
would have chosen" (Allison, 1971: p.175).
The Bureucratic Politics Model is praiseworthy for its 
attempt to take into account both subjective (like skills) and 
structural (for example, position) elements. What is more, it 
attracts attentions to a particularly important aspect of 
political life, that is power.
According to Allison's definition, power is equated with the 
effective influence on policy outcomes and is regarded as an 
elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages, 
skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players' 
perceptions of the first two ingredients (Allison, 1971: p.169).
Of course other definitions of power could be and are given in
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political philosophy and political science literature s. Without 
pretending to summarize in few sentences a debate that traces back 
to ancient Greek philosophers, one can at least mention that 
Allison1s definition of power correspond to a behavioral 
perspective (developed, for example, by Robert Dahl, 1961) which 
regards power as the ability to affect outcomes, i.e. the ability 
of A to make B do something he/she would not do otherwise.
However this perspective, called by Steven Lukes the one­
dimensional view of power (Lukes, 1980), neglects what Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz name the second face of power; that is 
the ability of A to limit the scope of the political process to 
public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively 
innocuous to A (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). In this respect, 
Bachrach and Baratz argue that not only decisions should be taken 
into account but also the nondecision-making process, defined as 
the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to 
"safe" issues (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963).
According to Lukes also this two-dimensional view of power, 
by focusing on nondecision-making power as existing only when 
there are grievances which are denied entry in the political 
process in the form of issues, neglects important aspects. Mainly 
the fact that, "the supreme and most insidious exercise of power 
(is) to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances 
by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a 
way that they accept their role in the existing order of things" 
(Lukes, 1980: p.24).
Finally, it should be mentioned that Lukes' three-dimensional 
view of power can be related to those contributions that points to 
the communicative *, as distinct from the coercive, aspects of
5 Concerning the distinction and interactions between these two 
fields see, Bobbio (1971) and Zolo (1987, cap.2).
6 Especially Hannah Arendt (among contemporary thinkers) stressed 
the difference between power and violence and emphasized 
communicative aspects. Her concept of power as, "the human 
ability not just to act but to act in concert" (Arendt, 1969) has
57
power. One can think, for example, to Niklas Luhmann's definition 
of power as a medium of communication, i.e. the possibility to 
influence the selection of acts and options and reduce complexity 
for others (Luhmann, 1979, cap.l). /
These perspectives which conceptualize power as the 
asymmetrical capability to shape perceptions and preferences and 
to select options for others provide useful insights to understand 
the Chernobyl case. In that case in fact no use of direct 
coercion and violence was made to impose certain decisions or 
nondecisions. Which does not mean, of course, that the coercive 
aspects are not crucial in other circumstances.
Coming back to the Bureaucratic Politics Model, a 
controversial aspect should be pointed out. While trying to put 
together subjective and structural elements, that model mainly 
emphasizes the first ones ("the core of the bureaucratic politics 
mix is personality" writes Allison, 1971: p.166) and deals with 
the second ones only as basis or constraint for 
individuals'action.
But if it is usually the case that who sits in a certain 
position matters and makes a difference, it is rather problematic 
to reduce complex decisional processes involving several 
collective actors to the skills and stakes of few leading 
individuals. While the Rational Policy Model is based on the 
debatable assumption (among others) that collective actors can be 
treated as large individuals, the Bureaucratic Politics Model 
seems to imply a similarly debatable assumption: i.e. that it is 
possible to reduce the behavior of collective actors to the 
behavior of some individuals.
been however criticized (see, Habermas, 1977) as involving too a 
consensual view of power. While the interpretation of Arendt's 
view remains open, undoubtedly she had an important role in 
attracting attention to non coercive aspects of power.
c. Linking frames and decisions; the Policy Co— unication Model.
The hypothesis presented in the Introduction argues that the 
short-term responses to Chernobyl and the changes occurred in the 
following years were due to the way scientific and organizational 
uncertainties were managed in defining the problem and responding 
to it. And that this in turn can be explained in the light of 
what scientists select as relevant knowledge, what politicians 
wish to know and to be let known, what information the mass media 
have access to, pick out and construct as news, and what pressure 
social movements and/or interest groups are able to exert 
concerning the selection, utilization and diffusion of 
information.
In other words a policy communication process is outlined, 
that is a process where the various actors involved in a certain 
policy field (in this case, nuclear risk management) communicated 
in a multi-directional way and reciprocally, but asymmetrically, 
influenced each other both in framing issues and in making 
decision.
Differently from the models and approaches previously 
discussed, the Policy Communication Model suggested in this work 
does not focus either on issue framing or on decision making but 
on the links between these two processes, particularly on the 
transformation/passage from the definitions of problems into 
actions to deal with them. In this respect it must be underlined 
that the influence of frames and interpretive packages on decision 
making is mediated by communication processes such as the 
circulation and strategic use (as in the case of politically- 
driven interpretations of scientific uncertainties) of competing 
frames and interpretive packages. It is through such circulation 
and use that certain definitions of problems and solutions emerge 
(or are discarded) and that decisions, which are always "framed 
decisions", are made.
When evaluating options and adopting responses, the various 
actors cannot but be influenced by the actual or expected
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definitions of the situation, and the connected responses, of the 
other relevant actors. In other words, mutual -while 
asymmetrical- adjustment processes take place (Lindblom, 1959,
1965 and 1990) where actors do not simply respond to events such 
as accidents or economic recession but also to each other's 
expectations, views and behaviors. The only exceptions being the 
"monopolistic" cases, very rare indeed, where one actor has the 
absolute power of defining the situation and chosing the response 
to be adopted. With the exception of "monopolistic" cases, the 
issue of the role of arguments and the strategic use of 
information comes into play when one analyses the processes 
through which certain definitions become "dominant" or are
"marginalized" and certain responses are selected. It is in fact
through the interpretation of available evidence and the 
elaboration of arguments that interested parties may impose their 
definition of the problem and of the instruments appropriate to 
its resolution (Majone, 1989), and may eventually adjust to each 
other positions and views. And it is on the basis of what is 
conceivable/make sense according to the dominant frames and what 
is feasible taking into account each other positions and 
interests, that actors select certain specific options and 
responses. This seems especially the case when "hard facts" 
cannot be referred to as uncontroversial basis for decisions and
uncertainties must be rather dealt with.
By emphasizing the communicative inter-action 7 between actors 
in framing problems and making decisions, the Policy Communication 
Model does not aim at substituting preferences, interests and 
power relations which are the "core" of the conceptual models 
previously discussed. Rather it tries to extend those decision­
making models and introduce a dynamic element that can account for 
changes in preferences and interests and that can explain why not 
always the most powerful actors (in terms of their economic
7 This play upon words refers to the notion of "communicative 
action" introduced by Jürgen Habermas (see Habermas, 1984).
resources and/or political status) are the "winners”, i.e. are 
able to impose certain definitions of problems or certain 
decisions. Such dynamic element, that is the (asymmetrical) 
communicative interaction between actors jand the way this 
interaction shapes the management of scientific and organizational 
uncertainties, seems also to go beyond -while building on- those 
approaches that regard frames as "given" or that limit themselves 
to the analysis of issue framing without dealing with the 
transformation of frames into actions.
It must also be mentioned that the concept of communication 
utilized in these pages does not involve any assumption, nor 
judgement, concerning the motivations of those who communicate.
Or better, it is assumed that the different actors involved in a 
communication process have different motivations and try to use 
and eventually manipulate the communication process for different 
purposes (reach understanding, improve their image, cope with 
critics, impose certain meanings or decisions, etc.). What 
matters in this perspective is not so much the motivation of
actors, since the interactions between individual intentions can
still produce unintended results, but the overall process. A 
process where actors must interpret and use evidence and give 
arguments when defining problems and making decisions; and, 
according to the non-decision approach, also when trying to 
prevent the emerging of certain issues and the prevailing of other
definitions and decisions. It is through this communicative
interaction that response and learning processes develop.
Summing up, the main features of the Policy Communication 
Model are the following.
First, all the actors involved in a certain policy arena or 
issue, both governmental and non-governmental actors (in 
asymmetrical positions) and individual and collective actors (both 
of them acting on the basis of rules and constraints provided by 
the social and organizational context they take part to) are taken 
into account. These actors are assumed to refer to different
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values and models of rationality, and to have intentions and 
preferences that may change over time and that not necessarily 
result in intended choices.
Two main kinds of action/activity are considered, that is 
issue framing and decision making. The way issues are framed 
influences (especially by limiting the scope of) decision making, 
but it does not completely determine decisions (for example, their 
content and timing).
Issue framing and decision making are developed through the 
asymmetrical communicative interaction between the actors involved 
in the specific policy field where the issue under consideration 
is dealt with. The specific forms of interaction between actors 
(including the use of actors’resources) determine the way issues 
are framed and why certain specific decisions and actions are 
taken. Both issue framing and decision making are constrained by 
some specific elements; institutional features (openess or closure 
of the political system, centralization or fragmentation of such 
system, etc.), organizational features (such as SOPs and inertia), 
and social ones (collaboration or conflict between different 
social groups, apathy of certain groups of actors, etc.).
The management of scientific and organizational uncertainties 
is crucial in framing technological crises and responding to them, 
both in the short period (response) and in the long term 
(learning). In this respect the interpretation and use of 
information resources play an important role since they determine 
whether and how scientific and organizational uncertainties are 
taken into account or neglected, are regarded as a public or 
"private" (within restricted circles) issue, and influence 
decision (or non decision) making.
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d. Theories of l f l a m i n g .
In the following chapters both the short-term responses to 
the Chernobyl fallout and the medium/long-term changes that 
occurred as a consequence of that event are analysed.
"Short-term" and "long-term" refer to both the quantity and 
quality of time, but in particular to the second aspect since it 
is always relative to determine whether one day or one century is 
a "short" or a "long" period. By referring to the "quality" of 
time I therefore suggest (as it is often done in economic theory 
and policy analysis literature) to regard as "short-term” a period 
characterized by the fact that actors take certain constraints 
(laws, technology, economic resources, etc.) as given and act -or 
do not act- on the basis of them, and to regard as "medium and 
long-term" those period which allow (even if they do not 
necessarily lead to) to reconsider/reflect on and eventually 
change constraints, behaviour and perceptions.
With respect the latter, in the following chapters it is 
inquired whether they can be interpreted as parts or results of 
learning processes.
To address this issue a preliminary investigation on the uses 
of the term "learning" is necessary».
d.l. Who ?
First of all, a distinction must be made concerning who is 
supposed to learn. In this respect, the basic distinction to be 
made is the one between individual and collective learning.
A large part of literature on learning focuses on individuals 
and regards learning as an individual process based on certain 
features or mechanisms of the human mind. This view is shared not 
only by most authors working in the psychology field, but also by
8 A different and more comprehensive review of the literature on 
learning can be found in Parson and Clark, 1991.
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some sociologists. Jürgen Habermas, for example, grounds his 
theory of social evolution on individual learning and argues that, 
"Individually acquired learning abilities and information must be 
latently available in world views before they can be...transposed 
into societal learning processes" (Habermas, 1984: p.121).
This approach has been criticized by Klaus Eder and Max 
Miller who oppose the genetic individualistic view -held by 
Habermas- that ascribes the process of learning only to 
individuals and regards cognitive structures as a priori 
attributes of individuals (Eder, 1985 and 1987; Miller, 1986). 
These authors consider instead learning as a collective, 
interactive process and point to the communicative processes and 
to the structures of the social world which are constitutive of 
individual learning. In other words, according to these authors, 
learning can take place only through the intersubjective, 
communicative experience that occur in given social and historical 
contexts; therefore also learning by individuals is a social 
process. As Piet Strydom notes, Habermas reacted to Eder's and 
Miller’s criticisms by making some significant theoretical 
concessions; particularly by acknowledging the relevance of a 
sociological learning theory (Strydom, 1987).
The analytical tension between learning as an individual or 
as a collective process is relevant also with respect to the 
development of a theory of learning at the level of organizations.
The literature on organizational learning borrows heavily 
from research on individual cognition (see, Argyris and Schön, 
1978; March and Olsen 1976; Simon, 1957 and 1976; Simon and 
A.Newell, 1972). But while recognizing that organizational 
learning occurs through individuals, organization theorists do not 
conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the 
cumulative result of their members' learning. In the words of Bo 
Hedberg, "Organizations do not drift passively with their members' 
learning: organizations influence their members'learning, and they 
retain the sediments of past learning after the original learners
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have left" (Hedberg, 1981). In this perspective, organizational 
features such as SOPs can be regarded as behavior repertories 
inherited from past experience and transmitted to the new members 
whose learning is therefore influenced and constrained by these 
organizational features. Thus organizational learning represents 
a specific form of collective learning.
Theories of organizational learning assumes that learning 
occur through a stimulus-response relationship between 
organizations and their environment *. In such relationship, 
characterized by unpredictable changes in the environment, the 
time dimension is crucial as organizations need to elaborate new 
information before responding to non-routine stimuli. We will 
expand on this point later on when discussing the notion of 
adaptiveness.
Another form of collective learning which has been researched 
is governmental learning both in the domains of domestic and 
foreign policy. In this respect, Peter Haas stresses the role of 
groups of scientists, or "epistemic communities", in favouring 
governmental learning through persuasion (at the international 
level) and through the bureaucratic preemption (at the domestic 
level) of policy making by ministries sensitive to the arguments 
provided by the epistemic communities themselves (Haas, 1989).
Also concerning governmental learning, some authors suggest 
that governments can learn either vertically, when new ideas and 
norms are generated through the interaction among domestic groups,
9 In the framework of Organization Theory, the "environment" of a 
certain organization is usually regarded as being formed by the 
other organizations which directly or indirectly interact with 
such organization. It also includes the broader social context 
which changes may affect the organization(s) under analysis. In 
other words, the focus is on the "artificial" rather than on the 
"natural" environment. For a discussion of the concept of 
environment in Organization Theory, see Perrow (1986). A review 
of some uses of the term "environment” in the social sciences is 
provided by Young (1986).
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or horizontally, that is through interactions with other 
governments at the international level (Legvod, 1988; Putnam,
1988) .
The term "social learning" is used by several political and 
social scientists. On the basis of the remarks suggested above 
social learning can be viewed as a synonim of collective learning 
since any form of collective learning occur through social 
interactions. However the term "social learning" is attributed 
different meanings; some examples can be useful to illustrate the 
polysemy of such term.
In his "The Nerves of Government", Karl Deutsch refers the 
term social learning to organizations, to political decisional 
systems and to systems in general (Deutsch, 1963: cap.10).
Adopting a systemic and cybernetic approach, Deutsch defines 
learning as the structural changes made in response to an external 
stimulus; changes which depend on the possible recombinations of 
some single information elements and the resources available (not 
already utilized) within the system or organization under 
consideration. It can be noticed that both the reference to the 
stimulus-response paradigm and the emphasis on information 
management aspects characterize also organizational learning (and 
problem-solving) theories. Therefore Deutsch's use of the term 
"social learning" largely overlaps with the concept of 
organizational learning.
From a rather different perspective, Hugh Heclo focuses on 
the policy process and writes that, "Much political interaction 
has constituted a process of social learning expressed through 
policy" (Heclo, 1974). Following Heclo's footsteps, the concept 
of social learning has been taken up by other policy analysts and 
by theorists of state. Some of them point to the internal 
dynamics of the policy process and treat social learning as a 
dimension of policy making that confirms the autonomy of the state 
(Sacks, 1980; Skocpol, 1985); others argue instead that societal 
developments intimately affect the learning processes that take
place in the policy field (Hall, 1989 and 1990). Even if Peter 
Hall agrees with those scholars who say that policy is influenced 
by and responds to previous policies, he maintains (and shows in 
his case study on economic policy making in Britain) that this is 
only one side of the coin and that policy is also, "..deeply 
influenced by the terms of policy discourse, and these are 
generally constructed out of a dialogue in which politicians, 
officials, the media, organized interests, and experts in the 
outside marketplace of policy ideas are all involved" (Hall, 1990: 
p.20-21). Given this emphasis on the strict links between policy 
and the broader social context, it is understandable that Hall 
uses as synonyms "social learning" and "policy learning". It is 
however disputable that those two terms can be regarded as 
synonyms outside a policy analysis context. Policy learning can 
be rather regarded as a special case or component of a broader 
social learning process.
In dealing with the issue of social learning in the 
management of global environmental risk, William Clark adopts a 
catholic approach by using the term "social learning" in a very 
general meaning, i.e. as opposed to merely individual learning 
(Clark, 1990). In this way he is able to include all kinds of 
collective learning processes taking place within society, to take 
into account the interactions among all the involved social groups 
and eventually to discover -both empirically and theoretically- 
the processes of innovation, selection and diffusion that emerge 
from the interactions among social groups and that constitute, in 
his definition, the main aspects of social learning (Clark, 1990: 
p.12). While attractive for its comprehensiveness, this approach 
needs some specifications to avoid remaining too general.
Reference to specific contexts (policy, organizational, cultural) 
is in fact necessary to identify the mechanism of and constraints 
to learning. On the other hand, Clark's definition provides a 
basis for understanding different forms of collective learning as 
inherently social processes even if they take place in specific 
(but not isolated) sectors of society.
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Finally, it can be mentioned that the term "social learning" 
has been also used to denote a model of policy research aimed at 
designing experiments in social practice, that is experiments that 
call for responses in the actors' (policy-makers) theory of 
action, values and strategies, either confirming what they already 
know or creating incongruities that clamor for resolution 
(Friedmann and Abonyi, 1978). While the viability of such kind of 
intended and designed (therefore partially "controllable") 
experiments in social practice is debatable, it can be noted that 
unintended "social experiments" -a term used also to define the 
Chernobyl accident (Krohn and Weingart, 1986)- provide matter for 
reflection on the learning abilities of social actors as well as 
on the social sciences abilities to interpret and eventually (as 
suggested by Friedmann and Abonyi) to promote learning.
d.2. What ?
While asking who is supposed to learn, we also came across 
some elements concerning what is the learner supposed to learn and 
how. It is however necessary to better clarify what these 
elements are as they constitute the core of the concept of 
"learning".
As far as the content of learning is concerned, it is 
implicit in the everyday use of the term learning (for example, 
referred to the role of schools and education more in general) 
that what is learned mainly includes skills and information. 
However it can be argued that information cannot be "learned" as 
such since it requires that the ability to process information is 
acquired first. Among skills one can include as different things 
as reading, writing and counting, practical skills such as walking, 
or swimming, the ability to recognize, process and utilize (new) 
information, the ability to adapt to changes in the environment, 
and even the ability to learn how to learn (or, as Gregory Bateson 
calles it, "deutero learning", Bateson, 1947).
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As a result of learning these skills, various results can 
come out including the changes in knowledge, perceptions, 
behaviors, organizational structures, and so on. Michel Crozier 
and Erhard Friedberg argue, for instance, that through collective 
learning processes actors discover or create new models of 
understanding and new relational models (Crozier and Friedberg, 
1977).
The problem is to understand how skills are actually learned 
and how the corresponding results are being produced. In other 
words we must ask, what characterize the very process of learning?
d .3. How ?
When analysing how does learning occur, the mechanisms of and 
the constraints to learning must be identified. In this 
perspective, several elements have to be taken into consideration. 
Especially important are the development and use of cognitive 
abilities and their limits, the utilization of existing frames as 
a basis and as a constraint to learning, the reference to 
experience as a source of and as a test for learning, the 
communication processes through which changes in cognition and 
eventually in behavior take place. A brief examination of each of 
these elements seems useful to understand their specific role and 
the relations between them.
Cognition. As already mentioned, the concept of learning - 
both at the individual and the collective level- is often 
associated with the concept of cognition. Cognitive capabilities 
can be regarded as the tools that allow learning. In fact 
learning takes place through the use of cognitive abilities such 
as information processing and evaluation, memory, attention and 
others (including the mentioned ability to learn how to learn).
Following this reasoning, learning is a cognitive process.
But this does not mean that cognitive abilities are the only
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elements needed to allow this process to occur. Information, 
experience and communication are also needed.
Before treating these elements, it is worthwhile to discuss 
two points with respect to cognitive elements; one regarding the 
limits of cognition and the other concerning frames.
As far as the limits of cognition are concerned, the concept 
of "bounded rationality" firstly introduced by Herbert Simon 
(Simon, 1957) points to the intrinsic as well as to the external 
limits of human rationality. The last ones include, among other 
things, the constraints on information availability and on the 
viability of different options; the intrinsic limits of 
rationality indicate the limits of attention, memory, information 
processing capabilities and so on. Both these types of limits 
must be taken into account as they can eventually constrain 
learning.
About frames, they can be regarded both as vehicles of 
learning and as socially constructed and individually internalized 
constraints to learning. As previously mentioned, according to 
Goffman and other authors "primary frameworks" are needed to make 
sense of otherwise meaningless aspects (Goffman, 1974). On the 
other hand, as Gaye Tuchman writes, frames not only produce but 
also limit meaning (Tuchman, 1978). Therefore not only the 
ability to learn through given frames but also to learn to change 
frames should be taken into consideration. Paul Watzlawick, John 
Weakland and Richard Fisch examine what they call "the gentle art 
of reframing", and they regard it as the process through which the 
definition of the situation is changed by re-classifying concepts 
once regarded as belonging to a certain class of objects and by 
putting them into another class (Watzlawick et al., 1974: cap.8 ).
Reframing involves then "unlearning", that is a process 
through which learners discard acquired knowledge and make way for 
new responses and mental maps. Only by unlearning the previous 
definition of the situation, a new frame can emerge.
Within the context of organization theory, Bo Hedberg and 
William Starbuck argue that while minor changes in the environment
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can be handled by organizations through adjustments in existing 
action programmes, more substantial changes in organization- 
environment relationships require that old responses be deleted 
and sometimes replaced (Hedberg, 1981; Starbuck, 1983). According 
to Hedberg, unlearning (at the organizational and at the 
individual level as well) can occur through the disconfirmation of 
mechanisms for selecting and identifying stimuli, or the 
disconfirmation of connections between stimuli and responses, or 
the disconfirmation of connections between responses (Hedberg, 
1981). At the broader societal level, arguments for unlearning 
are often put forward by social movements such as the 
environmental one. Criticisms to the ideology and practice of 
consumerism or to models of unrestrained economic growth involve 
the idea that these things should be unlearned in order to make 
way for new (more "sustainable" and fair) economic and social 
behaviors. How this can occur, or how can the above mentioned 
disconfirmations occur, is an open question which involve the 
consideration of actual experience besides cognitive abilities and 
information.
Experience is a powerful source and tool of learning. Source 
as it provides the "material" for reflection and self-reflection; 
tool because, especially though trial-and-error strategies, it 
makes possible not only to recognize in theory but also to test in 
practice what mistakes are made and eventually what 
changes/adaptations should be developed not to repeat them.
Regarding reflection and self-reflection, reflection on 
events that occurred outside the sphere of action (in other times 
or places) of the learners and self-reflection on the actions 
taken and the results achieved are an important basis for 
learning. It is in fact mainly through reflection and self- 
ref lection that experience does not simply take place but is 
cumulated and can be transmitted to others. On the other hand it 
must be noted that learning not always involves reflection and 
self-reflection; in some cases (as children's learning of
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language seems to exemplify) unintended, non self-reflective 
"matching" between the cumulation of information or skills and 
certain experiences produce the acquisition of new abilities or 
the emerging of a new awareness and framing of problems.
With respect to experience as a "test”, it must be stressed 
that learning from experience though trial-and-error is often a 
purely reactive process and presents several problems like the 
interpretation of problematic feedbacks or the need to anticipate 
-rather than wait for- severe consequences (see, Morone and 
Woodhouse, 1986). This is a very important point regarding the 
management of high-risk technologies designed to master unique 
challenges such as nuclear power (see, Hafele, 1974).
Adaptiveness. Learning is a process, and as such it involves 
change; but not any change is learning. According to several 
authors, learning can be regarded as that form of change which is 
adaptiveness at the cognitive and behavioral level (for instance, 
Hall, 1990; March and Simon, 1958; Morone and Woodhouse, 1986; 
Starbuck, 1983). Furthermore, not any adaptation is to be 
considered as learning.
Following the classical definition of March and Simon, 
"Short-run adaptiveness corresponds to what we ordinarily call 
problem-solving, long-run adaptiveness to learning" (March and 
Simon, 1958: p.170). In other words, only adaptiveness that 
develops and lasts in time should be referred to when we speak 
about learning. What is quickly done in response to a certain 
event but also quickly forgot or discarded is "just" (but it can 
be absolutely crucial) response, not learning. This means that 
learning involves, beside all the mentioned aspects, some kind of 
institutionalization and transmission of what is learned.
Peter Hall points to other important aspects and argues that, 
"we can define policy learning as a deliberate attempt to adjust 
the goals or techniques of policy in the light of past experience 
and information. Learning is indicated when policy changes as the 
result of such a process" (Hall, 1990: p.5). A problematic aspect
72
of this perspective regards the issue of intentionality. While 
reflection and self-reflection, i.e. intended activities, are 
(usually) crucial components of learning, the adaptations actually 
made are not necessarily intended. These adaptations can in fact 
be hardly imaginable as the result of a long (learning takes time) 
and consistent sequence of intended choices; rather they are the 
unintended result of political, social, organizational and/or 
bureaucratic dynamics in which the learners are involved and that 
they contribute to shape without being necessarily able to 
"direct", even if they have the intention to.
Other authors argue that learning and adaptations are 
different processes. According to several scholars (see, for 
instance, Hedberg, 1981) learning -differently from adaptation- 
involves improvement. A discussion of this point is offered in 
the last part of this chapter. Moreover, in the view of Ernst 
Haas, learning and adaptation differ in their dependence on new 
knowledge that may be introduced -for instance- in decision making 
(Haas, 1990). He makes then a distinction where, a. adaptation is 
characterized by incremental changes in behavior without examining 
implicit theories and without altering existing ends; b. learning 
is instead characterized by the questioning of implicit theories 
and the redefinition of ends (Haas, 1990: cap.l). Ernst Haas' 
definition, while representing a brilliant attempt to introduce a 
more precise use of the term "learning", can be regarded as a 
matter of degree rather than a matter of different logical types. 
Beside that, and beside its focusing only on knowledge while 
underestimating the role of experience, that definition 
implicitly introduces an evaluative/normative element by 
suggesting that only "radical" rather than "incremental" changes 
represent learning. While one may sympathize with this view, its 
analytical usefulness seems arguable.
Communication is a constitutive element of learning 
processes.
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On the one hand, communication enables all those involved to 
exchange factual information as well as to be aware of each other 
points of view; and this represents an increase of knowledge, an 
aspect always implied (sometimes the only one) in the concept of 
"learning". On the other hand, through communication -and through 
communicative elements such as argumentation- frames are developed 
and changed. In other words, through communication elements 
previously neglected or new ones are circulated and paid attention 
to, and the existing ways of interpreting experience are modified 
and/or new ones emerge.
The communicative processes through which framing and 
reframing occur are very important when we deal with the issue of 
"learning from experience" as in the case of the Chernobyl
accident. In fact, as March and Olsen point out, "..organizations
adapt their behavior in terms of their experience, but that 
experience requires interpretation" (March and Olsen, 1976: p.55). 
In this respect they argue that organizations' members interpret 
"facts" depending on whether they are integrated or not in their 
organization and whether they trust or not the other members. In 
other words, socialization processes -which necessarily involve 
communication- determine the way experience is interpreted, and 
consequently they influence learning.
A similar line of argumentation can be found also in the 
literature on risk communication, risk perception and risk 
management previously discussed. In that context some authors 
point to the fact that, on the one hand, the way risks are
perceived influence the way they are regarded as acceptable or not
and indirectly influence the way they are communicated and 
managed; and that, in turn, the perception of risks depends on 
past and present experience concerning the way risks are managed 
and concerning the related credibility and trust (or distrust) 
relationships.
kFollowing this reasoning, learning to deal with risks is not !J 
a merely technical or organizational matter but a complex social 
process where communication is crucial.
Summing up, a working definition of learning can be suggested 
where the relations between the above mentioned elements are 
sketched. That is, learning as a collective cognitive process 
involving the re-framing of issues (which may then produce changes 
in behavior and various kinds of adaptations) and the acquisition 
|of skills. Such process occur through communication and is based 
on the incorporation of new or previously neglected information 
and (usually) on reflection and self-reflection on previous 
experience. Beside these "mechanisms" of learning, also some 
constraints to learning can be identified such as limits to 
cognitive abilities and skills, restrictions in communication 
(such as lack of access to certain information sources), strenght 
of existing frames and consensus that may prevent reframing, 
organizational and institutional inertia, and others.
In the following chapters it will be examined how did these 
mechanisms and constraints work in the Chernobyl case, and whether 
they can help understanding and explaining why certain changes 
were made.
d.4. Learning and improvement.
The idea of improvement is usually associated with that of 
learning, the assumption being that "to learn" can be regarded as 
a synonymous of "doing better". Instead it seems more correct to 
argue that learning can be a basis for doing better, but it is not 
the same as doing better.
As noted by Mark Granovetter, theories of social evolution 
often assume that it is possible to make systematic rank ordering 
of societies by referring to the idea of advancement defined as 
problem solving and adaptive capability (Granovetter, 1979). 
However, the author argues that, on the one hand, the idea of 
ranking societies by referring to the concept of advancement 
involves controversial issues such as the interpersonal comparison
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of utilities; and that, on the other hand, the idea of adaptation 
does not necessarily involve the idea of advancement.
With respect to this last point, Klaus Eder points out that 
evolutionary processes can involve both improvement or worsening 
and that therefore also ”pathologische Lernprozesse” can occur 
(Eder, 1985; cap.2). In a different context, but from a similar 
perspective, Hall argues that policy does not necessarily becomes 
better or more efficient as a result of learning, "Just as a child 
can learn bad habits, governments, too, may learn the 'wrong' 
lessons from a given experience" (Hall, 1990: p.26).
The concepts of "bad" and "good", the related comparative 
"worse" and "better", and the idea of "improvement" that involves 
the last one, all implies value judgements. While it is true that 
the distinction between facts and values is not sharp and that the 
interpretation of facts usually involves implicit or explicit 
judgements, the mentioned concepts are definitely a normative 
rather than an analytical (more or less "biased") matter.
Since the notion of "improvement" implies normative judgments 
one should ask, "better for whom and in which circumstances ?" 
Therefore the analyst should try to reconstruct the "consistency 
frameworks" of the relevant actors/learners to find out whether, 
from their point of view, something can be regarded as an
improvement or not. It goes beyond the scope of this work to
engage in such an exercise; however, looking at certain changes 
made after Chernobyl (like the abandonment of nuclear power 
production in Italy or the centralization of monitoring data in 
the FRG), it can be easily realized that some actors regard them 
as improvements while others disagree with this judgment.
On a more general level, some possible criteria to evaluate 
"improvement" may be suggested such as the criteria of 
effectiveness, i.e. (in our case) the ability of achieving better
results in the actual management of nuclear risks, and the one of
policy consistency, i.e. the ability of including and integrating 
all the most important aspects of nuclear risks in the relevant 
regulatory system.
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An evaluation in terms of effectiveness is (fortunately) not 
possible at this stage because only the occurrence of another 
fallout could "test" whether the adaptations made are enabling the 
responsible institutions and society more in general to deal with 
such event in a way to save more lives and prevent more 
illnessess, environmental disruption, economic losses and so on. 
Simulations might provide some hints to evaluate the adaptations 
made after Chernobyl in terms of increased effectiveness, but also 
simulations go beyond the scope of these pages.
As far as policy consistency is concerned, the evaluation 
could focus on the attempts made to fill certain gaps in 
legislation and certain technical and organizational lacunae. But 
also when these attempts can be traced, the evaluation in terms of 
achieved policy consistency may still be controversial since 
certain changes made to fill the above mentioned gaps and lacunae 
may be viewed as contradictory or as steps backwards (rather than 
improvements) in comparison with previous norms or organizational 
structures.
Given the above mentioned difficulties in evaluating whether 
learning is also improvement, such evaluation will not be provided 
in the following chapters. The attention will be focused on 
analysing whether learning processes can explain certain changes 
rather than asking whether those changes represent something 
"better".
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THE OCCURRING OF A CATASTROPHE.
Before analysing the short-term responses and the 
medium/long-term changes that occurred in some Western European 
countries following the Chernobyl accident, it is necessary to 
inquiry how did such catastrophe happen and why, and how did the 
fallout started becoming a transboundary problem beside a USSR 
one.
a. The accident.
On the 25th of April 1986, in the course a planned shut-down 
for inspection, an experiment was being carried out with one of 
the turbo-generator sets of Unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear plant 
in Ukraine.
Paradoxically, the experiment that resulted in a major nuclear 
accident was aimed at improving the safety of the reactor. The 
intention was in fact to verify whether, in case of power failure, 
the mechanical energy of the turbo-generator would be sufficient 
to provide electricity until the emergency diesel generators had 
run up. Similar experiments had been already carried out at 
Chernobyl without raising safety problems i, but their results had 
not been satisfactory. Therefore a new test had been planned.
A detailed analysis of the accidental sequence is a matter 
that goes beyond the scope of the present work. Few remarks may 
be however useful in order to provide the background of some post- 
Chernobyl measures, and to understand how a core mealtdown with 
dispersion of radioactive material in the atmosphere (i.e. an 
event which probability of occurrence was calculated to be one
3
1 This does not mean that no accidents ever occurred at Chernobyl 
and other nuclear plants in the USSR (see Medvedev, G., 1991).
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chance in a million year reactor by refined risk assessment 
studies z) could happen.
The steps that led to the accident are reconstructed in the 
report presented by the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of 
Atomic Energy at the meeting of the IAEA held in Vienna in August 
1986 (USSR State Committee, 1986) and in the summary report of 
such meeting prepared by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory 
Group (INSAG, 1986). According to these documents, operator error 
was the main cause of the accident.
A similar explanation had been offered in the report of the 
Kemeny Commission on the accident occurred in 1979 at the US 
nuclear plant of Three Mile Island (President’s Commission, 1979). 
With a difference. At TMI a major problem seemed to be the 
unpreparedness of operators to analyze the events initiated by 
equipment failures and to timely adopt the necessary emergency 
measures. At Chernobyl instead it seems that not only there had 
been errors, but that safety procedures were deliberately 
disregarded by operators because of their willingness to bring the 
experiment to an end. Willingness accompanied by an excessive 
optimism on the good functioning of the reactor.
Beside human/individual failures, the USSR State Committee 
and the Kemeny Commission also mention some institutional and 
organizational failures.
With respect to TMI (where a partial mealtdown occurred and a 
possible catastrophe was avoided at the last minute), the Kemeny 
Commission concluded that given the deficiencies in the training 
of operators, the lack of clarity in the operating procedures, the 
deficiencies in the design of the control room and the failure of 
the relevant organizations (mainly the nuclear industry) to learn
♦from previous incidents, an accident like TMI was eventually 
inevitable (President's Commission, 1979, p.11). The Kemeny
2 This estimate was first suggested in the Rasmussen Report (WASH 
1400 Reactor Safety Study, 1975) commissioned by the US Atomic 
Energy Commission. In spite of various criticisms to the Report, 
such estimate has been widely accepted in risk assessment studies.
Commission also criticized the Federal authority responsible for 
nuclear power regulation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for 
its insufficient attention to the process of assuring nuclear 
safety and for its poor performance in responding to the TMI 
accident (President's Commission, 1986, Overview).
Deficiencies in the training of operators and in the 
operating procedures (especially the ones related to the planned 
experiment) are also mentioned in the report on Chernobyl prepared 
by the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy. 
Particularly it is stated that the quality of the experiment 
programme was poor, that its provisions regarding safety aspects 
were purely formal, that the operators were not adequately trained 
for the experiment and consequently they were not fully aware of 
the risk involved (USSR State Committee, 1986, cap.2). The report 
also affirms that the experiment programme had not received the 
prescribed authorization, but it does not explain how and why 
could such a thing happen.
With respect to this point, Zhores Medvedev argues that it is 
unconceivable that a new voltage-regulating system on the 
turbogenerator could be tested at Chernobyl without the knowledge 
and authorization of both the Ministry of Power and 
Electrification and the Ministry of Power Machines and Buildings 
of former USSR (Medvedev, Z., 1990). On the other hand, former 
USSR Ambassador to the EC Vladimir Shemiatenkov points to the fact 
that a growing crisis of the centralized Soviet system at every 
level of management was already going on at the time of the 
Chernobyl accident as shown also by other disasters (especially in 
the transport sector) that happened more or less in the same 
period (Shemiatenkov, interview). Specifically regarding the 
consequences of such crisis in the nuclear sector, including the 
test program at Chernobyl, Grigory Medvedev emphasizes that,
"..the irresponsibility and carelessness at these state agencies 
[All-Union Industrial Department for Nuclear Energy, Nuclear 
Safety Committee, Gidroproyect Institute in charge of plant's 
design] had reached the point where they all found it possible to
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say and do nothing" (Medvedev, G., 1991: p.36). This 
"irresponsibility and carelessness" at high levels together with 
the lack of information about negative events (like the TMI 
accident) at lower levels 3, contributed in neglecting or even not 
recognizing some "warning signals" such as some minor accidents 
previously occurred at Chernobyl and other nuclear plants. 
Administrative changes that took place after the accident indicate 
that bureaucratic malfunctions at high levels -beside poor 
management at the Chernobyl plant- were actually found and some 
corrections, now undergoing revision, were attempted (see Marples, 
1988; Medveded, Z., 1990).
A part from the worries that the reported remarks may raise 
regarding the management of nuclear power (both civil and 
military) during the ongoing period of major changes in former 
USSR a, it can be noticed that plant operators' errors represent 
only a (minor) part of the accident's explanation and that 
deficiencies at all levels, but especially at high-levels of 
management, played a crucial role.
On the basis of the reports presented to the IAEA meeting on 
Chernobyl and of the above mentioned studies, two remarkable 
differences may be singled out concerning the role played by 
organizational problems at TMI and Chernobyl. While at TMI the 
operational procedures and the overall organization of safety
3 According to Grigory Medvedev, in the USSR -at least before 
Chernobyl- "negative information" (such as the TMI accident) were 
kept for most senior leaders, while the wider public and even the 
personnel working in nuclear plants were victims of a "conspiracy 
of silence" (Medvedev, G., 1991: p.7, 39).
4 One can think, for instance, of the illegal trade of nuclear 
material from the former USSR to the Middle East via Italy and 
Switzerland reported by Western newspapers in December 1991- 
January 1992 and to the alarmed reports diffused also in 1992 on 
the safety of nuclear plants in the former USSR. On the risks of 
accidents due to the impacts of economic and political instability 
on the management of nuclear power in the former USSR see, for 
example, Courier International, 1992.
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showed to be inadequate to cope with unexpected failures, at 
Chernobyl safety measures proved to be vulnerable to 
underestimation (to have them does not necessarily means to use 
them when it would be necessary) or even to encourage risky 
operations (there are emergency measures, therefore also risky 
operations may be -mistakenly- regarded as "safe"). Moreover 
safety measures proved to be vulnerable to "carelessness" in 
management of nuclear power at various levels.
All the above mentioned aspects are certainly relevant to
f understand how did TMI and Chernobyl happen. They also show that ’multiple scientific/cognitive and organizational uncertainties interact in the management of nuclear power technology. These 
uncertainties, previously underestimated by risk assessors and by 
those responsible for technology choices and management, appears 
to be finally acknowledged. But the way they are acknowledged is 
still problematic.
Reading the official reports and the recommendations issued 
after TMI and Chernobyl, one gets the impression that they are 
based on the implicit assumption that such uncertainties can be 
eliminated through some improvements in equipment and in 
organization. Improvements can be certainly made and prove to be 
useful; yet it is dubious that, for instance, better trained 
operators would be able to discern all possible accidental 
sequences and know all possible consequences of their actions.
And it is not clear whether more rigid controls and operating 
procedures could be implemented and would help in responding 
//correctly to unexpected events. In more general terms, it is 
/|questionable that uncertainties in knowledge and organizational
11 uncertainties can be overcome. It is then necessary to ask' !whether major accidents in nuclear plants can be avoided in spite 
of these uncertainties.
An answer to this question is suggested by Charles Perrow 
(Perrow, 1984). It is a not optimistic answer, but events like
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Chernobyl seem to confirm his point of view. In Perrow's view, 
operator error, faulty equipments, lack of attention to safety 
features and poor management are widely spread and unavoidable 
features of all organized activities. Therefore, in order to 
account for the occurring of accidents and for variations in the 
failure rate of different systems, the author argues for an 
explanation based on system characteristics (Perrow, 1984: p.63).
Following Perrow, nuclear power and other high risk 
technologies like genetic engineering, chemicals and space 
technology, are highly complex and tightly coupled system which 
would require contradictpry elements for handling failures in 
their components. They would need centralization to cope with 
tight coupling because immediate response and unquestioned 
obedience are necessary when time is short and sequences are 
invariant. At the same time they would need decentralization to 
cope with unplanned interactions of failures; interactions to be 
each time searched and dealt with by those closest to the 
subsystems (Perrow, 1984: 331). But while a "mix" between 
centralization and decentralization is_ possible and is sometimes 
implemented in less complex and/or loosely coupled organized 
activities (like firms and universities), this appears very 
difficult and perhaps impossible for systems that are highly 
complex and tightly coupled (see Perrow, 1984: p.334).
Following this reasoning, nuclear accidents should be 
regarded as normal, rather than abnormal, occurrences. And this 
is quite alarming given the catastrophic potential involved by 
nuclear power and other high risk technologies.
Obviously, not everybody agrees with Perrow's analysis. 
Jacques Theys, for instance, maintains that Perrow holds an 
unilateral view of complexity which brings him to inapplicable and 
unacceptable conclusions (Theys, 1989: p.32). According to Theys, 
it is necessary to develop a less absolute notion of 
"vulnerability" which links the risk of accidents to specific 
forms of technical systems’ pathologies, such as the aging of
8B
technical structures, the vulnerability to abnormal working 
conditions and the "sicknesses of communication” (Theys, 1989: 
p.32-33). While it is probably possible to make some improvements 
with respect to these "pathologies", it is certainly impossible to 
eliminate them; for instance, no "elixir of eternal youth" is 
likely to be found for all the components of technological 
systems. Beside that, it is not clear whether these pathologies 
should be addressed separately or as a whole in order to cope with 
them. It seems then that Theys' remarks adds to, rather than 
undermine, Perrow's argumentation.
On the other hand, one can push Perrow's reasoning even 
further and ask why "normal" accidents do not occur more 
frequently. Joseph Morone and Edward Woodhouse address this issue 
and argue that this is due to the fact that strategies for 
"averting catastrophe" have been developed (Morone and Woodhouse, 
1986). They stress, for instance, that the history of nuclear 
power regulation (they mainly refer to the US context) is replete 
with examples of trial-and-error learning s and that, even if 
regulators have been criticized by the nuclear industry for 
overreacting to incidents, this helped to prevent (more) major 
accidents (Morone and Woodhouse, 1986: pp.132-133). However, this 
learning can only occur if errors are recognized and there is 
information and discussion about them. As previously noticed, this 
seemed not to be the case in the USSR before Chernobyl.
In his "Normal accidents" published in 1984, Perrow made an 
unfortunately successful prediction, i.e. that a major accident,
5 This statement seems to contradict a previous statement by the 
same authors who writes that, "regulation of nuclear power was 
never based on normal trial and error" (Morone and Woodhouse,
1986: p.122). However it is true that "normal" trial and error 
procedures could not been relied upon due the severity of possible 
consequences of accidental "experiments". Rather actual 
accidental occurrences like TMI provided a basis for eventually 
learning from errors. For an interesting discussion of the notion 
of major nuclear accidents as unplanned social experiments (with 
special regard to Chernobyl) see Krohn and Weingart, 1986.
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worst than TMI and with release of radioactivity in atmosphere, 
would probably take place within a decade (Perrow, 1984: p.4 , 60). 
Two years later, Chernobyl fulfilled the prophecy. But nobody 
seemed to be able to forecast nor to cope with the scale and 
seriousness of the announced but nevertheless unexpected 
catastrophe.
When the operators of Chernobyl tried to put the emergency 
barriers into action it was too late. Two explosions occurred, 
the heavy reactor cover plate was displaced by the suddenly 
released energy * and hot reactor fragments were ejected.
The destruction of the reactor and the reactor building allowed 
air to enter, which caused the graphite to burn.
It was 1.23 of April 26.
Immediately fire brigades were called to extinguish the fires 
caused by the explosions and then helicopters were used -till May 
6 - to drop various substances (dolomite, boron carbide, sand, 
clay, lead) into the reactor where the graphite was burning.
Before 6 in the morning of April 26, 108 people had been taken 
in some specialized hospitals of Kiev and Moscow. Some of the 
plant's workers and several valiant rescuers were the first 
victims of Chernobyl.
While the difficult operations to cope with the fires were 
undertaken, everything seemed quiet in Prypyat, a village at 3.5 
Km. from the plant. On the morning after the accident children 
were playing football in the streets and a wedding party was held 
in the city on the same evening. This in spite of the fact that
6 Many experts emphasized the differences, particularly concerning 
safety devices, between the RBMK reactors (like the one of 
Chernobyl) and the reactors more diffused in Western countries, 
that is the PWRs, and argued that a huge release of radioactivity 
would be impossible in the case of PWRs thanks to their 
confinement system. However, there is no agreement about the fact 
that such a system would be able to withstand explosions like the 
ones occurred at Chernobyl. For a well-documented discussion of 
these and other technical points see, Pharabod-Shapira, 1988, 
cap.6 .
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the Prypyat city government had some notion of what had occurred 
(Illesh, 1986).
After some hesitation, several measures were issued by the 
city government (and implemented thanks to the work of members of 
the Komsomol, the young communist organization), like the 
distribution of iodine pills, the closure of schools and the 
recommendation to remain indoor. However these measures proved to 
be insufficient; an evacuation was necessary.
The inhabitants of Prypyat were only evacuated 36 hours after 
the accident. "Knowledgeable people" asked by Andrei Pralnikov (a 
journalist of Moscovskie Novosti) why the evacuation was carried 
on so late, answered that radiation levels were only raising 
gradually and that buses and trucks were assembled in the shortest 
possible time. In the opinion of Pralnikov, these responses 
revealed an "absence of glasnost" (quoted in Marples, 1988: p.29). 
One year later, in June 1987, Viktor Bryukhanov, the former plant 
director at Chernobyl, received a 10 year sentence for the delay 
in evacuating Prypyat and for releasing figures on the radiation 
level that were "dozens" of times lower than reality ?.
Hi As it will be argued later on, the issue of transparency and
I|j|information had been a major one in the Chernobyl case and, more 
L jfj in general, in cases of nuclear accidents. However it shall be 
stressed that the Soviet authorities (as the authorities of any 
other country) were unprepared to cope with a nuclear disaster 
which possible occurrence had been underestimated; consequently 
serious difficulties were met in dealing with the burning reactor 
and in quickly organizing massive evacuations.
7 Even if this sentence seems to confirm that Pralnikov was right 
in denouncing the lack of .transparency in decisions about 
evacuation, many observers (including Pralnikov and other Soviet 
and Western journalists) did not regard the trial of plant 
official held in Chernobyl in June 1987 as a "victory of 
glasnost". Beside its being held in a secretive way, the trial 
was also criticized as being aimed at putting the blame on few 
individuals thereby exonerating the political and scientific 
establishment (see, Marples, 1988. pp. 118-124).
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The tardy but efficient evacuation of Prypyat (in less than 
three hours 45.000 people were transported in other areas 
considered safe) was in fact the first of a long series. 
Approximately 135.000 people had been evacuated in May 1986 from 
Ukrainian and Bielorussian towns, and thousands of children had 
been evacuated in the same period from cities quite far from 
Chernobyl like Kiel (around 130 km from the plant). And 
evacuations did not end in 1986. In the fourth anniversary of 
Chernobyl, the mass media of various countries reported that the 
evacuation of other 2 0 0 . 0 0 0  people from still contaminated areas 
had been decided by Soviet authorities.
b. Nuclear secrecy versus political "alasnost".
The first alarm outside the USSR concerning the Chernobyl 
fall-out came from Sweden on the 28th of April 1986.
Abnormal increases of radioactivity had been detected, 
starting from the previous day, around the Swedish nuclear plant 
of Forsmark, in the North of Stockholm. At first the plant's 
operators thought that a release from the plant had occurred and 
alerted the National Institute for Radiological Protection. The 
majority of the plant’s worker were evacuated, while others 
remained in order to check where the failure could be. Eventually 
none was found. In the meantime increases of radioactivity were 
detected also in other Swedish plants and research centers, and 
anxiety started spreading among the Swedish population informed 
through the media.
The cause of the contamination was unknown. On the basis of 
the first analysis, the hypothesis of an accident in a military 
nuclear installation was discarded; in fact, some particles were 
found of Cesium 134 which can be produced only in nuclear power 
plants. No accident in Swedish nuclear plants was reported, then 
the hypothesis was put forward that an accident had occurred in a 
plant outside Sweden. But where? Winds blowing from South-East 
indicated that an accident had maybe taken place in USSR, but no
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information had been yet released from that country (sources, 
Nohrstedt, 1991; Pharabod-Shapira, 1988; WISE, 1986a).
While Swedish scientists and authorities were still wondering 
about what was happening, news on radioactivity increases in 
Sweden started spreading in Europe through official and non­
official channels 8. Radioactivity monitoring were intensified in 
other countries and showed that there had being increases in 
radiation levels also in Finland, Norway, and Denmark. The search 
for the origin of such a large scale contamination became more and 
more pressing.
According to the statement (reported by Western newspapers 
the following day) of a spokesman of the White House, the US 
government was the first one to know for sure the origin of the 
fallout before the announcement made by the Soviet authorities. 
This thanks to satellite photographs gathered by the Central 
Intelligence Service.
In the late afternoon of April 28, the Soviet representative 
by the IAEA informed the IAEA Director about the accident, and the 
Soviet TV and the TASS press agency released the first terse news 
on what was going on at Chernobyl.
This two-days delay in notifying the accident to foreign 
countries and to IAEA had been widely criticized both within and 
outside the Soviet Union. Some Western observers maintained that 
the delay was due to a regime regarded as irreparably 
authoritarian, while other Western and Soviet observers argued 
that it was due to the fact that the reforms and the "glasnost" 
policy promoted by Michail Gorbachev were in progress but still 
weak (Flavin, 1987; Marples, 1988; Medvedev, Z., 1990; Medvedev, 
G., 1991; Schemiatenkov, interview).
8 In Italy, for example, the first news arrived from Cairo where 
the message of a Swedish amateur radio-operator had been received 
(Borrelli et al., 1988: p.74).
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Nowadays no doubt is left concerning both the significance 
and the difficulties of Gorbachev's "perestroika". But regarding 
the Chernobyl case a more general point should be stressed, i.e.
| that nuclear secrecy and political transparency conflict 
everywhere. In this perspective it can be argued that the initial 
silence of the Soviet authorities was not primarily due to 
specific features of the Soviet political system, but to the 
secretive attitude that generally characterizes the management of 
nuclear technology and to the lack of internationally binding 
provisions on early notification of nuclear accidents.
In fact, as it has been demonstrated by other serious nuclear 
accidents like the ones at the British plant of Windscale in 1957, 
at the US military nuclear installations of Hanford, Savannah 
River and Fernald over many years, at the German plant of Biblis 
in 1987, etc. (others are probably still kept secret 9), secrecy 
within and outside the country where the accidents take place is 
not peculiar to the Soviet political system. Rather it can be 
regarded as a necessary feature of the technological- 
organizational nuclear system. Taking, for instance, the case of 
Windscale (now, Sellafield), one cannot certainly indicate the 
behavior of the British authorities as a model of transparency.
For three days after the fire at Windscale, British people were 
not informed about it and protective measures were not issued in 
spite of the high releases of radioactivity. Information was 
given after the radioactive cloud had been monitored over Holland 
(leading to protests by the Dutch government), the fire had been 
estinguished, and Iodine 131 had been already drunk with milk by 
children (Gould, 1990: p.17; Wynne, 1982: pp.20-23).
9 Greenpeace, for instance, published some witnesses (Greenpeace, 
1990, Wellington) regarding an accident occurred in 1979 in the 
atoll of Muroroa where the French were doing experiments with the 
neutron bomb; according to a witness the accident caused the death 
of four people. The French authorities deny that any serious 
accident ever occurred in the atoll.
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Secrecy on nuclear matters is especially "needed" in 
countries where the civil and military uses of nuclear power are 
directly connected. But not only there; as the NUKEM scandal in 
the FRG showed (Der Spiegel, 18.1.1988), also countries that do 
not themselves produce nuclear weapons can help others to produce 
them by illegally providing the necessary materials. And even 
putting aside the civil-military connection, nuclear technology 
compels secrecy because of its centralized and hierarchical
4 management, its vulnerability to terroristic and wartime attacks,
a
1 and its decreasing public acceptability that could reach the 
bottom (as demonstrated by the anti-nuclear referenda held in 
Italy after Chernobyl) if serious accidents are made public.
Furthermore, when Chernobyl occurred there was no 
international convention on the early notification of nuclear 
accidents. Some multilateral treaties regarding nuclear issues - 
especially focused on nuclear weapons- had been concluded starting 
from the sixties, like the Treaty of 1963 banning atmospheric 
nuclear weapons tests and the Treaty of 1968 on the non­
proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, nuclear matters have 
been mainly regarded as national affairs and the possible 
transboundary dimension of contamination caused by a nuclear 
accident had not been fully acknowledged before Chernobyl io.
In this context of generalized nuclear secrecy -reinforced in 
former USSR by the still weak "glasnost"- is not surprising that 
the Soviet authorities had been initially tempted to treat 
Chernobyl as a "confidential" domestic affair.
But here an important element comes into play, that is the 
role of the international information network in hampering nuclear 
secrecy.
10 It is worth mentioning that the IAEA issued some Guidelines on 
information in case of transboundary releases of radioactivity 
just one year before the Chernobyl accident. But these Guidelines 
were not binding. For a discussion of the role of IAEA see cap.5.
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As it was mentioned above, the diffusion of environmental 
monitoring made possible to detect the fallout before knowing its 
origin and to orientate the search of the origin itself. Beside 
that, satellite photographs of the Chernobyl fire prevented any 
attempt to keep it secret and pretend that radioactivity increases 
were due to something else. Sophisticated information 
technologies seemed then to be able to verify news in spite of the 
lack of accessibility of the official sources of information.
In this respect it has been argued (Minow: Foreword, in 
Sands, 1988) that the satellite photographs of Chernobyl 
dramatically demonstrated that governments control over the flows 
of information is decreasing and that boundaries are now so porous 
that shutting off communication is impossible. While some 
distinctions ought to be made regarding the general validity of 
this argument 1 1 , it seems true that in the Chernobyl case the 
working of an international information network (including 
environmental monitoring, satellites, diplomatic/political 
channels and the media) made absolute secrecy impossible. In more 
general terms, the important role played by that network also 
proved that in our "global village" the accountability of the 
political authorities -and the experts- of each (a bit less 
"sovereign") State is being scrutinized both within and beyond the 
borders.
But the existence of an international information network 
does not necessarily imply that all information and communication 
problems are solved.
Following the discovery (through monitoring and satellites) 
and the official announcement of the Chernobyl accident, confusing 
news started spreading.
11 At least two points should be taken into account: 1) highly 
sophisticated and expensive communication technologies are 
unequally distributed in the world, therefore the governments of 
some (richer) countries have more control than others on 
information flows; 2 ) borders are increasingly porous, but 
governments have still many possibilities to hide important 
information and to rig -if not to shut off- communication.
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c. Cloudy news.
In the TASS press release of April 28 (as quoted by several 
European newspapers) it was briefly said that an accident had 
occurred at Chernobyl, that all the measures to eliminate the 
consequences of the accident had been taken and that concrete help 
was being given to those affected.
On the basis of these concise information and on the basis of 
the data concerning radioactivity increases in Scandinavian 
countries (and while many ambassadors in USSR were asked by their 
governments to gather more details on the dynamic and consequences 
of the accident), the mass media of various countries began 
working to build the news.
The moving of the "radioactive cloud" was one of the main 
topics covered by the media of many European countries 12 in the 
period following the accident. The cloud was an interesting 
subject because it linked the disaster that was occurring so far 
away to the hie et nunc of everyday life and daily news; people 
(i.e. the "audience") are usually more interested in things - 
including danger- that are close, and the cloud represented a 
direct threat that the media "monitored" for several days.
Sources for this "monitoring" were data and opinions provided by 
scientists and politicians; in turn these data and opinions became 
in many cases not only sources but also subject of the news.
Scientific data were the necessary starting point for media 
accounts because of the nature of the event (a technological 
disaster) and the complexity of the problems involved, especially 
concerning the health and environmental consequences of the 
accident. Moreover science was needed to cope with a peculiarity
12 A more detailed analysis of the coverage of Chernobyl news in 
three countries (Italy, FRG and France) is offered in the 
following chapters.
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of the cloud as a subject for news, that is its invisibility. A 
radioactive fallout cannot be seen as such; however the media 
tried to make visible the invisible. For example, the invisible 
cloud was drawn on meteorological maps that were shown on TV and 
published in the newspapers, and the invisible radioactivity took 
the form of printed words like Iodine 131 and Cesium 137.
In spite of the halo of exactness provided by maps, numbers 
and technical words, the news on the radioactive cloud appeared 
quite confusing. Forecasts regarding the moving of the cloud 
were given in each country according to the contrast "here/there" 
and were accompanied by evaluations of the risk involved by the 
fallout which were based on a second contrast, "dangerous/not 
dangerous". The "here/there" (or "us/they") distinction was 
usually not merely spatial but ideological (Guizzardi, 1987), 
explicitly or implicitly meaning that such a thing could never 
happen "here", i.e. in "civilized and free" -as opposed to 
"backward and authoritarian"- Western countries. Anyway, the 
quickly changing winds made the separation here/there already 
obsolete at the time when the forecasts appeared in the news; and 
the assessment of risk showed to be based on far from 
uncontroversial "facts", interpretations and value judgements.
In countries like Italy and the FRG, people were told on 
April 29 that the cloud and the danger were far away, the day 
after they were informed that the cloud was very close but that 
there was no danger, and on May 2 they were asked to comply with 
some precautionary measures decided by the responsible 
authorities. In other countries (in France, for instance) 
citizens discovered later on that they had been exposed to the 
fallout without being informed about that.
In several cases the media (especially when "pushed" by 
letters of concerned citizens and/or by pressures from 
environmental groups) began asking different "knowledgeable 
people" -but not only "official" ones- why and how it was to be 
judged whether there was danger or not. Disagreements between
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experts and between politicians started then emerging about the 
evaluation of the long-term risk implied by the fallout and about 
the measures to be taken.
These disagreements and the underlying scientific and|organizational uncertainties were managed in different ways and 
Ishaped the different responses to the common threat.
The responses to the Chernobyl fallout in Italy, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and France axe analyzed in the following 
chapters.
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4
EMERGENZA ! 
CHERNOBYL IN ITALY.
a. Background.
To understand the response to Chernobyl in Italy it is 
necessary to briefly analyze the political and legislative context 
of nuclear policy previous to the Chernobyl accident.
Italian nuclear policy has been marked by alternating phases 
of governmental indifference, or "wait-and-see" policy, and phases 
of nuclear euphoria. The reasons for this are mainly the 
conflicts of economic interests (especially between the "oil 
lobby" and the nuclear one, and between the American nuclear 
industry and the attempts to establish an Italian one), together 
with quite a strong influence from the international context 
(for example, the desire not to have a marginal role within 
EURATOM and in the European nuclear business more in general).
Scientists initially played a role only in the sense of 
attracting attention to the possible economic utilization of 
i nuclear physics research: at the beginning of the nuclear «
emphasized only after launching nuclear power on an industrial j 
scale.
As far as the legislation is concerned, some important 
decisions were taken before establishing the laws regulating the 
utilization of nuclear energy, i.e. before establishing the "rules 
of the (nuclearl) game".
Some discussion of the history of these processes may be 
useful at this juncture.
"adventure", risks were not an issue and the necessity to 
promote scientific research to deal with these risks has been
/!
a.i. Nuclear policy.
Immediately following the Second World War, American, Soviet 
and European scientists started to debate and conduct research 
into the possible peaceful use of nuclear energy. Some Italian 
physicists also took an interest in this field and succeeded in 
obtaining support from some firms; as a result a research centre 
on nuclear matters, the CISE (Centre for Information, Studies and 
Experiences) was founded in 1946 by Edison, Fiat and Cogne, later 
joined by Montecatini and Sade.
In those first years of nuclear research, the Italian 
government and Parliament paid little attention even though 
certain physicists (especially those working in CISE) tried to 
attract the attention of the politicians and to win financial and 
institutional support by pointing out the likely economic 
advantages of nuclear energy (Silvestri, 1968). Only six years 
later -in June 1952- a public body, the CNRN (National Committee 
for Nuclear Research), was instituted by a Prime Ministerial 
Decree.
The CNRN was dependent on the Ministry of Industry and had 
the task to develop studies and experiments in the field of 
nuclear physics, to promote the development of the industrial 
applications of nuclear energy, and to cooperate with the 
international organizations and foreign institutions in the field 
of nuclear research. As a first important step, it was proposed 
to study an experimental reactor to be entirely planned and built 
in Italy; but then the CNRN decided not to "lose time" and to buy 
an experimental reactor by the American Car and Foundry. On the 
13th of_ April 1959 the reactor, called Ispra I, was officially 
inaugurated. After few weeks it had to be stopped and a new core 
had to be bought; and after two months the Ispra I and its 
research centre were handed over the EURATOM (European Community 
for Atomic Energy, founded in 1957) without much explanation by 
the government.
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While the CNRN was initiating this Ispra "affair", and before 
the law regulating the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Italy 
(Law 1860 of 31 December 1962) was passed, three important 
contracts were signed and three nuclear reactors were imported 
afterwards: one reactor (a Magnox) was bought in 1957 by the Agip 
Nucleare (a sector of the ENI, Hydrocarbon National Agency) from 
the British Nuclear Power Plant Company, and it started 
functioning in 1963 near Latina; a second reactor (a BWR) was 
bought between 1956-1957 by the semi-state industry^Iri- 
Finelettrica, through the Sen (National Electronuclear Society), 
from the American General Electric, and it started functioning in 
January_196_4__on. the river Garigliano; a. third reactor (a PWR) was 
_bought in 1957 by Edison from the American Westinghouse, and it 
started functioning in October 1964 in Trino Vercellese.
Therefore, when Law 933/1960 set up the CNEN (National 
Committee for Nuclear Energy) which substituted the CNRN, and 
when Law 1860/1962 regulating the peaceful use of nuclear power 
was passed, many important decisions concerning the production of 
nuclear power in Italy had been already made. And it is quite 
easy to notice that they had been made often hastily and outside 
the official channels, and that their main result was an almost 
complete economic and technological dependence on the US nuclear 
industry (Renzetti, 1979; Silvestri,1969).
This situation was partially challenged by the initial 
activity of CNEN which included in its first five-year plan 
experimentation in four different types of reactor to discover 
which type was more suited for Italian energy needs. But this 
plan met serious political difficulties beginning in 1963 when the. 
general secretary of CNEN, Felice Ippolito, was accused of wasting 
public resources, put on trial and sentenced to eleven years 
imprisonment. Ippolito's explanation of his prosecution 
(Ippolito, 1977) is that it was due to his attempt to establish a
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national nuclear industry, attempt which was opposed by the "oil 
lobby" and by the US nuclear industry.
What is certain is that after this episode the activity of 
CNEN was more or less blocked for some years and in 1970 it was 
ENEL (National Body for Electric Energy) that ordered the fourth 
nuclear plant, then sited in Caorso. Once again the technology 
was bought from the US General Electric while the Italian 
industry Ansaldo had to "apply" US technology to build the plant.
Following the oil crisis of 1973, a new period of nuclear 
euphoria started and was symbolized by the extraordinary nuclear 
development proposed in the PEN (National Energy Plan) of 1975 
prepared by the Ministry of Industry and CIPE (Interministry 
Committee for Economic Planning). According to the Plan around 50 
nuclear plants of 1000 Mw each should have been built in Italy 
before 1991. However, this policy aroused doubts and conflicts 
(within governmental and especially business circles) concerning 
its economic costs and its technical feasibility, and it also 
encountered some oppositions (by local authorities and anti- 
nuclear groups) motivated by the high risk involved in nuclear 
power.
Due to the increasing controversies over nuclear power, an 
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety was appointed in 1979 within 
the Ministry of Industry; this Ministry also promoted a National 
Conference on Nuclear Safety held the following year. While being 
generally acknowledged that the Conference was successful as an 
occasion of debate between scientists, politicians and 
representatives of groups opposing nuclear power, no common 
agreement about the continuation or suspension of the nuclear 
programme could be reached.
It can be noticed that this lack of agreement and the 
controversies about nuclear policy in Italy had been met in spite 
of the fact that all the major political parties, both those 
ruling (that is, the Christian Democratic Party) or participating 
in the various governmental coalitions and those in the opposition
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(mainly the Communist Party, in 1990 renamed Democratic Party of 
the Left), were pro-nuclear. At least till Chernobyl; following 
such accident the Communist and the Socialist Parties changed in 
fact their attitude. Nuclear policy represents then a case of a 
governmental policy failing to take off not because of 
disagreements between political parties, but for other reasons.
The role played by some powerful economic interest groups like the
oil lobby had been very important in this respect; maybe as much 
important, and surely more visible, had been the wide socio­
political opposition to nuclear power which developed in Italy 
starting from the early seventies.
a.2. Anti-nuclear opposition.
Interestingly enough, the first oppositions to the siting of 
new nuclear plants in the early seventies did not come from 
environmental groups (at that time not yet in evidence) but from 
local authorities. The incidence of disputes between communes and 
ENEL rapidly increased and the central authorities intervened on 
the side of ENEL by introducing some Laws (Law 880/1973, and Law 
393/1975) intended to curtail the powers of local authorities in
the siting procedures (Spaziante, 1980).
Nevertheless, disputes between central and local authoritiesi 
and between the latter and ENEL continued, and in 1977 the Court - 
in this case the administrative court (TAR) of Lazio- had to 
decide on the stoppage, ordered by the Mayor of Montalto di 
Castro, of the construction of a nuclear plant in his commune. The 
Mayor's ordinance was revoked, but the plant was still unfinished 
when the referenda on nuclear power (where the majority of the
voters voted against) were held, in 1987, causing the
Parliamentary decision (made in August 1988) to complete the 
Montalto plant as a gas and fuel oil -instead of nuclear- one.
1 On center-periphery relations in the Italian administration see 
Cassese, 1983 and Dente, 1985.
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In the early eighties the issue of the link between the civil 
and the military uses of nuclear power reached the agenda of local 
governments, especially the left-wing ones. Several communes 
established a network of "comuni denuclearizzati" (denuclearized 
communes), that is communes that refuse the location and transit 
of nuclear weapons -to or from the NATO bases in Italy- in their 
territory. The issue of the military use of nuclear power was 
then mainly addressed by peace groups rather than by the anti- 
nuclear ones, even if there have been overlaps (for example, in 
terms of militants) between the peace and the anti-nuclear 
movement (Mattioli, interview).
The anti-nuclear movement 2, formed by environmental and left- 
wing groups organized at the national level and by local action 
groups, became highly visible in the late 1970s especially due to 
a number of mass demonstrations that took place in 1977.
A demonstration against the already operating Caorso plant 
was organized by the Italian Radical Party with the help of such 
environmental organizations as Italia Nostra, WWF, the anti- 
nuclear committees of Lombardy and Piedemont, and many left-wing 
groups; however, local socialist and communist authorities and 
residents did not participate. In Montalto di Castro instead, 
where a local antinuclear committee had been established, also 
local resident and communist local authorities participated - 
together with environmental, pacifist and leftist groups- to a 
large demonstration which was held in August 1977. The 
demonstration, that ended in clashes with the police, was 
extensively reported by the media.
The efforts of the various antinuclear groups had been 
partially coordinated by the CCSE (Committee for the Control of 
Energy Choices) established in 1978 at the national level as well 
as at the local, decentralized, one. This Committee, mainly
2 On the Italian anti-nuclear and environmental movement see 
Bettini, 1977; Biorcio and Lodi, 1988; Diani, 1988; Liberatore and 
Lewanski, 1990.
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formed by scientists, provided expertise to the movement and 
represented the first brick of the so-called "scientific 
environmentalism" that later characterized large sectors of the 
Italian environmental movement. The CCSE also started diffusing 
counter-information in the field of nuclear power and other energy 
sources through its journal Quale Energia (Which Energy) which is 
still being published.
Beside scientists and students, also some trade unionists had 
been involved in the CCSE as well as in the antinuclear movement 
more in general. In this respect it may be mentioned that leading 
members of UIL (the trade unions linked with the Socialist Party) 
and FLM (Federation of metal and mechanical workers, a sector of 
the CGIL, that is the trade unions mainly linked with the 
Communist Party) expressed strong criticisms of Italian nuclear 
policy during the National Conference on Nuclear Safety held in 
1980 (Benvenuto, 1980; Paparella, 1980). However, with the 
exception of FLM and reservations within UIL, the Italian trade 
unions generally supported nuclear power; this till the Chernobyl 
accident that caused changes especially within CGIL (Bertinotti,
19 86; Bondini, 1986).
The Committee for the control of energy choices continued to 
be active, especially focusing on research and information, during 
the 1980s and some of its leaders were at the forefront of the 
anti-nuclear campaign that followed the Chernobyl accident.
In spite of the growth of the anti-nuclear movement, and 
maybe due also to the lack of representation of this movement 
within political parties (and this is especially important in 
political systems, like the Italian one, based on party politics 
or -as nowadays even party leaders say- "partitocrazia"), a new 
attempt tp launch a large scale nuclear programme was made in 
1985.
The new National Energy Plan approved in that year provided 
in fact for the quadruplication (from 3,2% to 12,3%) of nuclear 
power production and the building of new plants.
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When the accident at Chernobyl occurred, the siting 
procedures of two new plants had been started and were meeting 
strong opposition from the local populations and authorities of 
Lombardy and Puglia, while the building of a third plant in Trino 
Vercellese had been approved by the Piedemont Region in spite of 
oppositions from the local anti-nuclear committee. As we will 
see, Chernobyl prevented the continuation of these -as ever 
controversial- plans.
a.3. Legal and institutional framework .
To complete the account of the political and legislative 
context relevant in order to understand the policy response to 
Chernobyl in Italy, it is useful to examine the only comprehensive 
-but somewhat outdated- piece of Italian legislation in the field 
of nuclear plants safety and health protection from ionizing 
radiation: i.e. the DPR (Presidential Decree) 185 of 1964.
DPR 185/1964, that incorporates into the Italian legislation 
the EURATOM provisions on basic radiation protection norms 3, is 
crucial for the foregoing analysis because it was the only (even 
if deficient) legislative reference point for the management of 
the Chernobyl emergency. Moreover, starting from it we are able 
to identify the main Italian regulatory and advisory institutions 
in the field of nuclear risk management.
Leaving aside the procedures established by DPR 185/1964 for 
the authorization and siting of nuclear plants, let us concentrate 
on the elements more directly relevant for the Chernobyl case.
One important point is the measurement of radiation levels. 
According to DPR 185/1964, three organizations are responsible - 
with different competences- for that: 1) the nuclear plants’ 
operator (in Italy, because of the nationalization of energy 
production, the operator is always ENEL) must provide equipment
3 While Euratom provisions have been updated in the following 
years, this was not the case of DPR 185/1964.
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for permanent monitoring of levels of radioactivity in the 
atmosphere, water, soil and food (art.57); 2) the Ministry of
Health -by means of its technical bodies- must control (also 
through inspections) the sources of radioactivity and the levels 
of environmental radioactivity to protect health and to prevent 
the contamination of nuclear plant's workers as well as the 
general population (art.88 and art.109); 3) the CNEN, in 1982 
reformed and renamed ENEA (National Committee for Nuclear and 
Alternative Energy), must -according to the directives established 
by the Ministry of Health- coordinate the measurements of 
radioactivity levels, communicate the data to the EC Commission 
and promote, where necessary, the establishment of monitoring 
stations (art.109). This last point showed itself to be 
particularly important during the Chernobyl emergency, when the 
coordination function of ENEA -DISP was faced with the lack of a 
homogeneous and efficient national monitoring network.
Regarding ENEA, an important element has to be stressed, that 
is its double institutional role. When it was set up in 1960, 
CNEN was assigned not only the tasks to develop research and 
promote nuclear industry that were previously attributed to CNRN 
(see previous pages), but also the functions of control and 
scientific supervision of all the phases of transport and 
treatment of radioactive substances, and of the phases of siting, 
building and running of the nuclear plants. In other words, the 
CNEN was at the same time the controller and the promoter of the 
activity/industry to be.controlled. In 1974 a partial attempt 
was made to separate these two functions when, within the inner 
reorganization of CNEN, the DISP (Central Direction for Nuclear 
Safety and Health Protection) was established. But the relative 
autonomy of DISP was still not explicitly mentioned in Law 84/1982 
which reformed CNEN and renamed it ENEA. Moreover, according to 
Law 85/1982, the director of ENEA-DISP is appointed directly by 
the Ministry of Industry: in this way the dependency of the 
control body on the promotion Ministry remained.
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Coming back to the other institutions concerned with 
radioactivity measurements, the plants' operator, i.e. ENEL, was 
the main owner of measurement equipment and that was rather 
problematic with respect to the problem of the transparency and 
accessibility of data. Following the disputes surrounding the 
installation of the Caorso plant (Schiavi,1987; Spaziante 1980) 
and thanks to the approval of Law 833/1978 creating the National 
Health Service- the local health authorities, both the USL (Local 
Health Units) and the PMP (Multizone Prevention Stations), were 
allowed to have access to ENEL data beside making their own 
measurements.
11 The institution which is listed third in this account, but is
j responsible "in primls" for the control of radioactivity levels, 
is the Ministry of Health. And because health protection was a 
main concern during the Chernobyl fallout, it seems worthwhile to 
provide some details about the functioning of the scientific 
bodies that the Ministry of Health has at its disposal to control 
radioactivity.
Two scientific bodies -operating within the National Health 
Service- advise the Minister of Health: the ISS (National Health 
Institute) and the ISPESL (National Institute for Prevention and
i I Safety at Work). According to Law 519/1973, ISS must conduct research on all the elements relevant to citizens' health j protection, including radiation risk.
In many occasions (for instance, at the National Conference 
on Nuclear Safety held in 1980), the members of ISS warned of the 
dangerous underestimation in the Italian authorization and siting 
procedures, and in the very deficient emergency plans, of the 
possible occurrence of serious accidents. The accident at Three 
Mile Island confirmed the importance of this warning and the 
"foresight" of the studies made within ISS <; but in the meantime a
4 See, for example, Arnaldi,U., G.Campos Venuti, S.Frullani, 
L.Maiani e E.Tabet (1971), "Criteri di scelta dell'ubicazione
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Law which had been passed to reform the health service (Law 
833/1978) prevented the ISS from giving scientific advice in the 
field of health conditions concerning the production of nuclear 
power and radioactive substances (art.9). This "coup de main" was 
explicitly directed by the Ministry of Industry who argued (see, 
Corriere della Sera, 6 January 1979) that this exclusion of ISS 
was necessary in order to eliminate the overlapping of functions 
(between ENEA and ISS) in the controls of radioactivity levels and 
sources. This way of solving the problem (if it really is a 
problem) has been interpreted as an allegedly punitive move 
against ISS because of its critical position (Spaziante, 1980).
Afterwards, the competence taken away from ISS was attributed 
to ISPESL? but ISPESL has not yet the equipment and the 
scientific and technical personnel which would be necessary to 
carry out the work previously assigned to ISS. As a result, ISS 
continues to do it (and its role was crucial during the Chernobyl 
fallout) but in an atmosphere of institutional and legislative 
uncertainty.
An other advisory institution that has to be taken into 
account before analyzing the Chernobyl case, is the CGR (High 
Risks Commission) instituted in 1984 within the Department of 
Civil protection, a Department within the Council of Ministers and 
directed by a Minister without portfolio. That Commission has the 
function of giving scientific advice to the Minister of Civil 
Protection and includes six sectors of risk? among them, one 
concerning nuclear risks. The members of the section of CGR 
dealing with nuclear risk are (according to Decree of 2 July 1986) 
the Directors of ENEA-DISP, ISS, ISPESL, and two University 
Professors.
The most important Italian research body, the CNR (National 
Research Council) has also to be mentioned among the scientific 
advisory institutions in the field of nuclear power. But it
delle installazioni nucleari", in Annali dell'Istituto Superiore 
di Sanità, voi.7, pp.626-646.
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played quite a marginal role in the management of the Chernobyl 
emergency: CNR mainly participated in the measurement campaign
by means of IFA-CNR (Atmospheric Physics Institute of CNR) and its 
President was asked to give his advice during the inquiry of the 
Chamber of Deputies following the Chernobyl emergency.
After this account of the Italian political and legislative 
context, and before analyzing the management of the Chernobyl 
fallout in Italy, it can be useful to sum up by drawing a figure 
where the main actors of what could appear as an institutional 
labyrinth are indicated.
Figure 1 summarizes the organization of nuclear safety in 
Italy, i.e. the responsible (according to the law) authorities, 
their "in-house" expertise, and the electricity utility. The 
figure does not comprehend other actors that play an important 
role in the debate on nuclear safety (mainly, the anti-nuclear 
movement, the political parties and the media) but are not 
included in the organization of nuclear safety as defined by law.
I. It is important to stress that, differently from the USA
If context where a single Agency (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
It centralizes responsibility in the field of nuclear risk 
I! management, in Italy (and in most European Countries) a plurality 
of related actors -that is, an interorganizational/regulatory 
network- is involved in nuclear risk management s including 
monitoring, siting, reactor safety and emergency planning. This 
means that the relations between these actors -mainly the 
coordination, overlap and/or conflict of responsibilities and 
competences- are crucial in the actual management of nuclear risk. 
Beside that, as the analysis of the Chernobyl case will show, such 
relations are not "given for ever" but are a matter for 
negotiation. Even if in a sector like the nuclear one, famous for
5 For a comparison between Italy and the Federal Republic of 
Germany see, Huber and Liberatore, 1990. On regulatory networks, 
with specific reference to the German case, see Huber 1991.
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its rigidity, the room for negotiation is usually quite 
restricted.
Figure 1, here
b. The Chernobvl fallout.
b .1.Chronicle
In the late afternoon of the 28th of April 1986 the first 
news indirectly referring to the Chernobyl catastrophe were 
received in Italy from Sweden: in that country abnormal increases 
of radioactivity had been registered. The Italian Minister of 
Civil Protection was the first who took action. He consulted 
ENEA-DISP and ISS and -as a precautionary measure- decided to 
organize, for the following day, a meeting of the CGR and EMERCOM 
(Operative Committee for the Emergency), a commission formed by 
members of the Ministries of Agriculture, Defence, Health, Home 
Affairs, Navy, Public Works, Telecommunications and Transport, and 
instituted in 1984 to assist the Minister of Civil Protection in 
protecting populations in case of calamitous events.
On the morning of 29th April the Italian newspapers carried 
on their front pages the first news indicating that a serious 
accident in the nuclear plant of Chernobyl had occurred. They 
also reported the reassuring statements of the Minister of Civil 
Protection, G. Zamberletti, and of the Director of ENEA-DISP, G. 
Naschi: according to them the situation in Italy was normal and 
the radioactive cloud was expected to remain in the north 
European area. But, as Naschi himself wrote later on (Naschi, 
1987) some monitoring stations had already registered in North /) 
Italy an increase in levels of radioactivity in the air.
At the meeting of CGR and EMERCOM on April 29 it was decided 
to check the national radioactivity monitoring network and the 
stations of ENEA, ENEL, ISPRA, PMP of Piacenza, Air Force, IFA-CNR 
and Fire Department (some days later joined by others PMP, CISE,
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Laboratories of eleven Universities, and other institutes) were 
required to intensify their work. During the same meeting the 
decision was also taken to establish a technical-scientific 
commission (including members of ENEA-DISP, ISS, Ministries of 
Home Affairs, Defence and Civil Protection) charged with 
evaluating the data provided by the various monitoring stations 
(Malandrino, interview; Tabet, interview).
Italian citizens who began that day reading quite confusing 
news about Chernobyl, had then the opportunity of listening to 
Nobel Prize physicist Carlo Rubbia during a TV program. He made 
no attempt to minimize the problem and explicitly mentioned the 
possibility that a meltdown had occurred and that this could 
involve severe and large-scale consequences.
On the 30th of April, the hypothesis that a meltdown had 
occurred became news. On the same day, the PMP of Piacenza, the 
ISPRA Research Centre and the Laboratory of Environmental 
Radiochemistry of the University of Bologna communicated the news 
that an appreciable increase in the normal levels of radioactivity 
had been registered.
But the statements of the Minister Zamberletti that were 
reported in the newspaper of the same day and that he himself made 
in response to the questions in the Senate also on the 30th of 
April (Camera dei Deputati, 1986: pp.11-16) were quite optimistic. 
According to Zamberletti the situation in Italy was perfectly 
"under control", the radioactive cloud was maybe going to arrive 
on the 1st of May and remain till the 3rd, but only on North Italy 
and without risks for the population. Even more optimistic 
comments were made in the same day by the Minister of Industry 
R. Altissimo in response to the questions in the Chamber of 
Deputies. The only negative element stressed by both Ministers 
was the deficient information coming from Soviet Union; but they 
did not mention that the deficiency in the information concerning 
the accident at Chernobyl could challenge the optimistic estimates 
they were presenting.
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On the 1st of May, Labour Day, the Trade Unions meetings did 
not pay attention to Chernobyl; but all the monitoring stations 
registered appreciable increases -especially in the North but also 
in the other areas- of the radioactivity levels in air (Iodine 131 
concentration in air doubled between April 30 and the first of May 
and Caesium 137 concentrations in air increased almost four times 
in the same short period, see ENEA-DISP a, 1986: fig.4.1).
On that day the radioactive cloud coming from Chernobyl was 
publicly declared to be on North Italy.
The 2nd of May had been a crucial day. In that day in fact, 
important measures were taken that started the emergency period, 
and the first contrasts became evident.
To be more precise, it has been argued that a real emergency 
-in a strict, technical/legal sense- never began because the 
average radioactivity remained at the level of the "attention 
threshold" and did not reach the "danger threshold" (Roberti, 
interview). On the other hand it has been pointed out that the 
contamination of vegetables due to Iodine 131 had reached in the 
North of Italy -and almost reached in the Centre- the reference 
levels of emergency (ISS, 1987: p.354) and that the activity of 
Iodine 131 in milk exceeded in the South and in the Centre and 
almost reached in the North the limit value of 500 bq/1 (ISS,
1986: p.349).
Anyway, starting from the 2nd of May, the practical (and 
symbolic) emergency began for the responsible authorities that 
had to make decisions, for the scientists and technicians 
collecting and evaluating data, for the citizens requested to 
comply with unusually severe measures, and for the mass-media 
looking for news to be offered to their public.
The decisive organizational measure decided by Minister 
Zamberletti on the 2nd of May was the centralization of all data. 
Laboratories and monitoring stations were requested to send their 
data -to be considered "confidential"- to ENEA-DISP; ENEA-DISP
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had to coordinate, make homogeneous and process the received data 
and had to present to the technical-scientific commission 
instituted by the Department of Civil Protection a daily 
tabulation including all the measurements made in the country. 
Moreover the Minister of Civil Protection -and only he- had the 
power to make public the selected data that were circulated in the 
form of "daily averages estimates" firstly divided in three big 
geographical areas: north, centre and south Italy.
This measure had some practical and political reasons, and a 
quite deficient legislative base. The practical reasons were 
mainly the necessity to collect a huge quantity of data in the 
shortest possible time and to avoid confusion in circulating data; 
the political reason was the authorities' need not to alarm people 
in relation to what was going on, and in relation to the risks of 
nuclear power in general and of Italian nuclear p1ants_more in 
particular. When this measure and the measures (to be examined 
later) decided by the Minister of Health started to be 
implemented, the emergency began. And to initiate the emergency 
was a political (scientifically advised) decision.
The legislative base of this political decision included the 
part of DPR 185/1964 concerning the case of nuclear emergency and 
the Law 938/1982. DPR 185/1964 (and the Italian legislation more 
in general) does not provide for cases of nuclear emergency 
concerning all Italy and caused by nuclear plants sited outside 
the Italian territory. Therefore there is no precise definition 
concerning who are the responsible authorities in that cases. The 
decree only establishes that, in case the possible danger for 
public security regards more than a Province, a Committee within 
the Prefecture of the province where the accident occurred has to 
be appointed, and the Prefect is responsible for the coordination 
of the provincial emergency plans (art.118). Moreover (art.122) 
the Prefect must take all the necessary steps to protect public 
safety and has to communicate to the Ministry of Interior any 
accident that implies a radioactive contamination of the 
population; that Ministry has to apply the directives (provided
117
-art.88- by the Ministry of Health) concerning the health 
protection of workers and populations from the dangers connected 
to ionizing radiations.
It seems therefore that in the Chernobyl case, the central 
responsible authority to be referred to should have been the 
Ministry of Interior. But here Law 938/1982 comes on the scene.
It concerns "urgent interventions on behalf of populations 
affected by natural calamities and exceptional events" and 
establishes that the Minister of Civil Protection -after having 
consulted the involved Regions- takes steps to face the emergency 
(art.l.). Taking this Law as a reference point, the Minister of 
Civil Protection assumed the responsibility to take the steps he 
regarded as necessary: among them, the centralization of data 
collection and communication.
But, as far as health protection is concerned, we have 
already seen that -according to DPR 185/1964- the responsible 
authority is the Ministry of Health. And on the 2nd of May also 
the Minister of Health, C. Degan, took some very important 
countermeasures.
On the basis of the advice provided by the ISS, Degan signed 
an ordinance that forbade the selling of fresh wide leafed 
vegetables and to give fresh milk to children under ten years and 
to pregnant women. He also signed an ordinance (suggested by the 
technical-scientific commission appointed by the Civil Protection 
Minister) restricting the imports of fresh vegetables and animals 
from Ukraine and Eastern countries, and requiring a certificate 
for foodstuffs imported from other EC countries stating that those 
products were not radioactive.
The following days had been characterized by many polemics 
and conflicts concerning these countermeasures. Only the 
restrictions on imports, which was criticized by the authorities 
of some neighbouring states (mainly France), did not raise 
controversies within the country.
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While some local authorities not only tried to apply the 
countermeasures taken by the Minister of Health but also added 
other recommendations to be followed in their territory (for 
example, the suggestion to parents and school teachers not to let 
children play outdoor), the Ministers of Agriculture and Industry 
accused the Minister of Health of exaggerating dangers and to 
cause big damages to agriculture, foreign trade and to Italian 
economy in general by ordering superfluous countermeasures.
The different attitudes toward the countermeasures decided by 
the Minister of Health vrere dependent on different and sometimes 
conflicting institutional concerns (economy promotion vs. health 
protection) and on different and conflicting political and 
economic interests (the risk of losing legitimacy and money in 
case that measures would turn out to be pointless; the risk of 
losing legitimacy and human lives if the measures were not taken 
and afterwards this decision would reveal itself to be wrong; 
the risk of losing legitimacy and money if -independently from 
taking these measures or not- a strong opposition to nuclear power 
production would spread and lead to the suspension of the Italian, 
already unstable, nuclear policy).
But different attitudes toward these measures, and a big 
confusion among the citizens, were also provoked by the way the 
data were circulated and by the divergent evaluations made of 
them. Some scientists and the Greens argued that to circulate 
average estimates divided into three such large areas as North, 
Centre and South (only some days later regional data were 
diffused) was meaningless because very contaminated and scarcely 
contaminated areas were mixed in the same group. And they also 
pointed out that the official data available to the public were 
very deficient since they only took into account Iodine 131 and 
Cesium 137 and never mentioned other dangerous radioactive 
elements (De Sanctis, 1986). Moreover, the use of different 
measurements units, that is Curie (Ci) or Becquerell (Bq), 
provoked a big confusion in the collection and especially the 
communication of information: not only for citizens and
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journalists, but also for many scientists it was not easy to 
"translate" from one measurement unit to the other and fully 
understand what the given data meant (Mattioli, interview;
Roberti, interview; Tabet, interview).
As a consequence of divergent interests and evaluations, 
while in the opinion of the Ministers of Industry and Agriculture 
the countermeasures decided by the Minister of Health were a 
costly mistake, for others these measures were hardly sufficient 
to cope with the radioactivity level increase of those days.
Among the last ones, many anti-nuclear groups that organized 
demonstrations at nuclear sites and in several towns on the 3rd of 
May and in the following days.
On the 5th of May, after a meeting of the Ministers of 
Agriculture, Industry, Health and Civil Protection with the 
Secretary of the Cabinet, contrasts remained but the Minister of 
Health did not revoke the measures.
During the same day, the Minister of Industry was requested 
to answer some questioning in the Chamber of Deputies concerning 
the security of the Italian nuclear plants, and especially the one 
of Latina which is the only graphite plant (like the one of 
Chernobyl) in Italy. He maintained that the Italian nuclear 
Installations are completely different from the one of Chernobyl 
and absolutely safer than that (Camera dei Deputati, 1986: pp.22- 
24).
""TT.—'
On May 6, Italian citizens had the occasion to verify that 
not only between politicians, but also between scientists the 
disagreements can be very deep. At the end of a long and careful 
TV program where the Ministers of Health and Civil Protection, the 
directors of ENEA-DISP and ISS and some Italian scientists were 
invited, one of them, a famous physicist who had been one of the 
initiators of Italian nuclear research in the fifties and one of 
the founders of CERN -Edoardo Amaldi- harshly attacked the 
physicist and Greens' leader Gianni Mattioli. If someone had
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still some illusion concerning the purity of science and the 
neutrality of scientists, it is likely he/she lost it that night.
On the 7th of May, during a press conference, the Radical 
Party, Democrazia Proletaria, the Greens and several 
environmental organizations presented the proposal of some 
referenda against nuclear power production.
In the same day and in the following two, some motions were 
presented especially by left wing parties in the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Senate. The main issues included in the motions 
were: the prompt closing of the nuclear plants of Latina; a 
careful control of all the Italian nuclear plants; an improvement 
of the emergency plans; the establishment of a specific High Risks 
National Body; the proposal to organize a National Conference on 
Energy (Camera dei Deputati, 1986).
On Saturday 10, an impressive demonstration of 150.000- 
200.000 people (different newspapers gave different numbers) in 
Rome showed that the opposition to nuclear power in Italy was very 
widespread.
On May 13, the prohibition to sell wide leaves vegetables was 
revoked in some Regions of the Centre and South of Italy, while 
the prohibition for children and pregnant women to drink fresh 
milk remained in the whole Country.
In the meantime the disagreements between the EC member 
states regarding the measures to be taken were reported by the 
Italian newspapers together with news about the starting of the 
polemics about the management of the fallout in France and the 
debate on nuclear power in the FRG and in other countries.
Italian physicists were also interviewed concerning the future of 
nuclear energy; especially the opinions of Nobel Prize Rubbia, who 
is famous for his research on nuclear fusion and argued for the 
development of fusion as an alternative to current nuclear fission 
installations, were quoted by various journalists.
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On the 17th of May, the selling of wide leaves vegetables was 
allowed also in the Northern Italian Regions, while the 
restrictions on fresh milk were extended.
On the 20th of May, the emergency was officially closed by 
the satisfied remarks of both Degan and Zamberletti who stressed 
the efficiency and the prudence followed in the previous days by 
the Italian authorities.
b.2. Analysis
Different policy and social responses to Chernobyl emerged in 
different countries, therefore what happened in Italy cannot be 
regarded as the only possible response. What are then the 
elements that gave rise to the above mentioned course of action? 
The answer to this question is needed not only to 
explain/interpret the Italian response to the Chernobyl fallout, 
but also to understand why there had been different responses to 
the same threat in neighbouring EC member countries.
As I have already mentioned in the Introduction, my 
hypothesis is that there are reciprocal influences between what 
scientists (especially the ones within advisory institutions) 
select as relevant knowledge and information, what politicians 
wish to know and wish to let be known, what pressure social 
movements and interest groups are able to exert concerning the 
utilization and diffusion of knowledge, and what information the 
mass-media decide to stress or to minimize. Depending on the 
different shapes these interactions take, scientific and 
organizational uncertainties will be differently managed and 
different different responses will result.
In the attempt to shed some light on these interrelationships 
I concentrate the analysis of the Italian case (and also the 
following analysis of the German and French cases) on four 
elements: the role of the policy advice institutions in the
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collection, interpretation and selection of the relevant 
information; the use of that information by political decision­
makers for the management of the Chernobyl emergency; the pressure 
exercised by counter-experts and anti-nuclear groups in utilizing 
and diffusing information; the role of the mass-media as 
constructors of news and as means of communication.
Before examining these points, let us summarize the relations 
between the main actors (and actions) involved in the management 
of the Chernobyl emergency in Italy.
Figure 2 indicates the action-set, that is the organizations 
that formed a limited alliance for the limited purpose of managing 
the crisis, that emerged during the Chernobyl fallout. The figure 
also indicates the countermeasures decided.
It can be noticed that in face of an unprecedented/non­
routine event two Ministers (Health and Civil Protection) and the 
experts of three advisory and/or regulatory bodies (ISS, ENEA and 
ENEA-DISP) acted as leading institutional figures. This was due 
to their ability and willingness to assert their authority by 
imposing (mainly through scientific arguments) a specific 
definition of the situation -a nation wide public health 
emergency- and taking action.
The figure also points to the information and communication 
role played by an actor which is not included in legislative or 
administrative procedures, that is the mass media. The media 
proved in fact to be very important in the management of the 
emergency by transferring information from the institutional 
action-set of decision makers to non-governmental actors (the so- 
called, very differentiated, "public"), and by providing an arena 
and vehicle of communication between the institutional authorities 
and the wider society.
Figure 2, here
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b.2.1. Policy advisory institutions and information problems.
As we have seen already in the two previous paragraphs, the 
main_Italian policy advisory institutions in the field of nuclear 
risks are ENEA, ENEA-DISP, ISS, and CGR -nuclear risk section? and 
they are all __"in house" -within or dependent on Ministries- 
bodies. In the Chernobyl emergency period, these institutions 
were requested to work together in the technical-scientific 
commission appointed to evaluate data and to give advice to the 
governmental authorities (particularly the Minister of Civil 
Protection). They in fact cooperated within that commission, but 
they also operated separately both because of different 
institutional competences and because of some diverging opinions 
between them.
When, on the 29th of April 1986, the technical-scientific 
commission was appointed, one main difficulty became immediately 
clear: there were crucial lacks of information regarding the 
characteristics of the Chernobyl nuclear plant and the kind of 
accident that occurred, and therefore it was problematic to 
already understand the seriousness of the event. Given the 
impossibility to quickly obtain these information from the main 
source, i.e. Soviet Union, it was necessary to start from the data 
communicated by the Swedish authorities; data that had been the 
first (ex-post) warning for radiation experts of many countries 
about the potential scale of the fallout. On the basis of those 
data, all experts participating at the first meeting of the 
technical-scientific commission agreed that something serious had 
happened, but gave different evaluation about the possible 
consequences in Italy of the not yet known event (Tabet, 
interview). Some of them were inclined not to worry about those 
possible consequences and that position influenced the reassuring 
statements pronounced the following day by Ministers Zamberletti 
and Altissimo at the Senate and at the Chamber of Deputies.
Others stressed instead the necessity not to underestimate not 
only the possibility that the radioactive contamination registered
in Sweden could take place in Italy too, but also that it could 
affect population health. As a result of the discussion, the 
precautionary measure was taken to check the national monitoring 
network and to control the levels of radioactivity in air, water 
and soil.
In this respect, some other problems concerning data 
gathering (Finetti, interview; Roberti, interview) had to be 
faced: a) in spite of the fact that all the Italian monitoring 
stations within different institutions were requested and started 
to cooperate, their geographical distribution was not homogeneous; 
in general terms, in the South, in the Adriatic coast and in the 
Islands there were fewer monitoring stations than in the North, 
and in some regions there was no one. The national monitoring 
network had therefore to be completed (during and after the 
Chernobyl emergency) to make measurements in the whole Italian 
territory, b) Moreover, the measurements were made by 
differently equipped laboratories, which means that not all of 
them were able to monitor all the relevant radioactive elements 
and that the quality of the measurements also of the same elements 
were different.
This was a problem for ENEA-DISP that had to make the 
measurements homogeneous, to process them and to prepare the daily 
tabulation it was requested to submit to the whole technical- 
scientific commission. Consequently, only some radioactive 
elements have been taken into consideration in the average 
estimates calculated on the basis of the available measures. And 
this is a first element that may be considered important or 
unimportant for health protection, and that could be a matter of 
disagreement between experts depending on -wYiat. tVvey look f o r , on 
the theories they refer to, and on their "extra-scientific" 
attitudes. As previously mentioned, the selection of radioactive 
isotopes gave raise to controversies as several non governmental 
experts (including those of the Committee for the Control of 
Energy Choices) argued that also other isotopes, like strontium
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and ruthenium, that had been detected during the fallout should 
have been taken into more careful consideration.
Beside the selection of the radioactive elements to be taken 
into account, also a selection of the relevant "food matrix" was 
made. Since, for example, high concentrations of Iodine 131 and 
Cesium 137 have been found especially in milk and in wide leafed 
vegetables, and since these foods represent a remarkable part of 
the "normal"/average diet and milk represent the most important 
food for babies (a group especially at risk), these foods have 
been considered especially important by ISS experts. Also this 
selection was criticized by some non-governmental experts on the 
ground that especially in certain areas the "normal" diet includes 
a lot of meat or fish; however the very low levels of radiation 
detected in these foods and the restrictions on imports of several 
foodstuffs (regarded as likely to be contaminated) from Eastern 
countries made the food matrix a less controversial issue than the 
selection of isotopes to be taken into account.
Let us now see how these selections of information, together 
with other elements, influenced the decisions concerning the 
countermeasures to be taken.
b .2.2. Deciding about countermeasures: the interplay between 
knowledge and discretion.
Once measurements had been made, radioactive elements to be 
taken into account had been selected and average estimates had 
been calculated according to some implicit or explicit 
evaluations, the scientists within the advisory institutions 
(especially the ones of ISS and ENEA-DISP) were asked to assess 
the risks for human health and to suggest countermeasures. But 
(as it was already mentioned) the definition of a "safe threshold" 
and jof l^gw_" tiose of radiation, and the forecast of the possible 
long-term harmful. non sequences of - -low " ..doses of radiation on 
human health are very controversial matters. Even if the 
scientific uncertainties related to these matters are quite widely
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recognized, divergent attitudes were expressed by the experts 
concerning the way to cope with uncertainty in the Chernobyl case; 
and different evaluations have been afterwards expressed 
concerning the usefulness of the countermeasures adopted during 
the Chernobyl emergency period (ENEA-DISP, 1986b; ISS, 1987).
Xhft?je.sii{.ierent experts' opinions were referred to by_
Industry and Agriculture and the representatives of farmers 
maintained that to destroy huge quantities of milk, vegetables 
and other food was pointless given such uncertain evidence and so 
diverging experts' opinions concerning the risks for health due to 
the "low" doses of radiations that had been registered. But, on 
the other hand, the Minister of Health and the experts of the ISS 
strongly defended the necessity of taking the already mentioned 
precautionary countermeasures just because of the uncertainties in 
the definition of a "safe threshold".
At this point it is quite evident that the problem was no 
more the (trans-)scientific assessment of radiation risks for 
human health, but the need to manage scientific and organizational 
uncertainties to cope with an unexpected event. The decision to 
take or not some precautionary measures, and the choice among 
various possible measures, had to be made in conditions of 
uncertain knowledge and unclear definition of political 
responsibilities (which increased the inter-organizational 
uncertainty regarding the behavior to be expected by the various 
institutions involved) at the governmental level as well as 
regarding the relations between central and local authorities. 
Therefore both scientific knowledge and legal norms had to be 
interpreted; that is, discretion had been exercised by those who 
acted as the institutional protagonists of the management of the 
Chernobyl,fallout in Italy.
As already pointed out in the Chronicle, the legal gap 
regarding the measures to be taken in case of a radioactive 
fallout due to an accident occurred beyond the Italian borders was
Hi ffyrffint- « n t - . h n - H a n d  interest groups. For example, on the 
 one hand the Italian (but not only the Italian ones) Ministers of
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filled by interpreting and utilizing some existing norms. In this 
respect norms could be regarded both as constraints and as 
opportunities/resources. In fact, on the one hand, they limited 
(while keeping it rather broad) the scope of the authorities that 
could be eventually expected to take responsibility in an 
occurrence related to nuclear power utilization; and, on the other 
hand, those authorities who were willing to strengthen their power 
and/or were more sensitive to the issue of nuclear risks had the 
possibility to resort to norms that provide for health and 
emergency issues.
The framing of the fallout in terms of a nation-wide health 
emergency can be regarded as a way to manage the existing 
organizational uncertainties by using those norms that would allow 
the Health and the Civil Protection Ministers to take action in 
spite of oppositions by other central authorities. And it can be 
seen as a way to manage scientific uncertainties too by 
interpreting norms according to a precautionary approach that was 
already familiar to the advisory body of the Health Ministry and 
at the same time fit the Civil Protection Department emergency 
tasks (as well as the "emergency approach" of many Italian 
governmental policies).
As far as this last point is concerned, it can be argued that 
the resort to the precautionary approach by the Health Ministry 
and the ISS was not only due to the development of that approach 
in the field of radiation protection at the international level 
and within the ISS, but also to previous experience in the 
management of industrial hazards.
Ten years before Chernobyl the Health Ministry and the ISS 
had been involved in the management of the consequences of a major 
industrial accident, the one occurred in July 1976 at the ICMESA 
chemical plant at Seveso in the Lombardy Region. On that occasion 
delays in assessing the risk (also due to the secretive attitude 
of the plant management), in alarming the population and in taking 
measures such as evacuation (decided and implemented 16 days after 
the accident) caused exposure to dioxin -TCDD- and other chemicals
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through inhalation and ingestion of contaminated food; and this 
provoked the dead of animals and serious illnesses -including skin 
eruptions and malformations in children born in the following 
months- among the inhabitants of the Seveso area 6. Criticisms of 
public authorities' late reaction and complaints concerning the 
occurred damages to health and the environment that could have 
been eventually prevented by more timely and strict measures 
followed the accident. The echo of these criticisms and 
complaints sounded in the ears of those members of ISS who 
participated in the management of the Seveso crisis -but only 
starting from 12 days after the accident since previously only 
local and regional authorities were involved- for many years (see 
|; Zapponi et al., 1991). The need to avoid the repetition of that 
experience in the Chernobyl case was then among the background 
elements of ISS1 experts advice to adopt precautionary measures at 
a relatively early stage in the case of the Chernobyl fallout 7.
b .2.3.Chernobyl news and Chernobyl as a mass-media construction.
The mass-media played a crucial role in the shaping of the 
Chernobyl emergency in Italy. On the one hand, they performed the 
proper general function of any "medium", i.e. the communication 
function; and, on the other hand, they actively contributed in 
constructing "reality". These two aspects are strongly 
intertwined; however, for the sake of clarity, let me treat them 
sequentially starting from the last point mentioned above.
Italian mass-media have been severely criticized by some 
politicians, scientists and scholars in mass-media communications
6 On the Seveso accident see, Conti, 1977; Lagadec, 1981; 
Pocchiari et al., 1987; Zapponi et al., 1991.
7 In this respect it must be noticed that different units and 
individuals of ISS dealt with Seveso and Chernobyl, however these 
units and individuals are frequently in contact due to the 
relatively small size of the ISS and personal relationships 
(conversation with Prof. G. Zapponi of ISS).
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who maintained that journalists "distorted the truth", exaggerated 
the "facts" and reported false information from the scientific 
point of view (see, for example, Minerva, 1986; Pierantoni, 1987). 
It is true that, especially because the danger (radiation) was an 
invisible one, the media had a main role in making it "real" by 
mentioning it, by using written and spoken words as 
"radioactivity", "Iodium 131", "mealtdown", "cancer", and by 
showing photographs and documentaries about nuclear plants, about 
the big fire at Chernobyl, about technicians at work and about 
instruments for radioactivity measurements. The point to be made 
clear in this respect is that the media made "visible" the 
"invisible" not the "non-existing"; in other words, they shaped 
and constructed the perception of the danger, but they did not_^  
totally J* invented" the danger itself.
It is also true that sometimes journalists diffused incorrect 
information from the scientific point of view. This is due both 
to the lack of scientific competences by journalists and to the 
fact that many scientists do not put much effort in making 
technicalities and data (or better, numbers) intelligible to non­
specialists and in helping journalist in the difficult 
"translation" work from the scientific to the common language. 
Beside that some newspapers reported completely false news; this 
happened especially in the first days when some newspapers carried 
in their front pages the "news" that 2.000 people were dead near 
Chernobyl (II Tempo, 30 April 1986) or -to be even more shocking 
(and to better recall the anti-soviet campaigns of the cold-war 
period) that the dead were maybe more than 2.000 and that they 
had been buried in common graves together with the nuclear wastes 
(II Secolo XIX; quoted in Minerva, 1986). Even if the "news" was 
firstly circulated by (US) Press Agencies, this is not a good 
reason/excuse for reporting it without at least a question mark 
and without verifying its veridicality as it was done by certain 
newspapers.
Also concerning the role played by the mass media, it is 
worth noticing that the emergency had been an emergency especially
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thanks to the diffusion through the mass-media of the previously 
filtered (but still confusing) data concerning the concentrations 
of radioactive elements in the environmental media and in 
foodstuffs, and of the governmental prohibitions and 
recommendations to be complied with by citizens. But this crucial 
role played by the media cannot be regarded as a sufficient 
argument for concluding that the Chernobyl accident was an event 
of a "merely informative nature" because it was perceived by the 
public only by means of newspapers, radio and TV (Pierantoni,
1987), or that Chernobyl was merely "an opinion" because people 
had no knowledge of the "objective facts" (Minerva, 1986).
As far as the so-called "lay people" was concerned, something 
serious had happened that concretely endangered the lives of many 
people in Ukraine (and that unfortunately caused -and is going to 
cause- many deaths among the Ukrainian population); that there 
was an invisible cloud moving about in Europe full of an invisible 
and dangerous "substance"; that some quantities of that
"substance" were in the air, in the rain water, in the soil and in
some foods; that some scientists were of the opinion that to 
ingest even small quantities of that "substance" can provoke -or 
contribute to provoke- cancer and leukemia in the long-period; and 
that some authorities ordered not to eat and drink some food and 
recommended not to leave children play on the grass and to wash 
frequently their hands. These elements (that have not been 
"invented" by journalists) were the quite sound "evidence" 
available to the "lay people", and on the basis of this "evidence" 
was perfectly reasonable to have some fears. Moreover, newspaper 
articles (starting from the titles) frequently used the word 
"paura" (fear) to describe/construct as news the general attitude 
-in Italy and other countries- towards the fallout, in this way
favouring a sort of amplification effect s.
8 A study on the titles of five Italian newspapers during the 
first five days of the Chernobyl fallout shows that "paura" was 
the second most frequently used word after the word ”nube" -cloud-
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On the basis of the previous remarks, the communication 
role of the mass-media becomes evident: scientists and politicians 
were not allowed to discuss and decide in isolation; and this 
partially public dimension of the scientific debate and of the 
political decision-making process influenced them. Particularly 
it stimulated them to give explanations (even if controversial) 
about what was happening and about the need to take (or avoid) 
action. A feed-back process can be noted in this respect: the 
quality of mass-media communication and its effects on the public 
have been deeply influenced by the atmosphere of scientific 
(showed by the disagreements between experts) and organizational 
(showed by the conflicts between Ministries and between central 
and local authorities) uncertainty of those days; uncertainty that 
contributed to the diffusion of confusing news and to the 
spreading of fears among citizens. On the other hand, this public 
dimension of uncertainty and the worries it caused influenced the 
debate between scientists, so that critical points of view had 
more room.
The anti-nuclear movement played a particularly important 
role in putting forward critical points of view and in making them 
being widely known also through the media. "Counter-experts" like 
the scientists of CCSE were able to challenge with scientific 
arguments (beside ideological ones) those governmental or 
independent pro-nuclear experts who denied or played down the 
risks involved by the Chernobyl fallout and by nuclear power more 
in general. And the opinion of those counter-experts and other 
leading figures of the anti-nuclear movement were extensively 
reported by the Italian media 9.
(Pucci, 1990: p.14). On the issue of the "social amplification of 
risk" through information see, Kasperson et al., 1988.
9 Following an analysis regarding the way the Chernobyl event had 
been treated by 9 Italian newspapers, ecologists had been the most 
frequently covered actors -together with the Minister of Civil 
Protection and the Minister of Health- in the period from the end 
of April till the end of June 1986 (see Borrelli et al., 1988: 
pp.44-45).
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, This activism and visibility of the anti-nuclear movement, 
¡together with the (partially) public dimension of the scientific 
debate and the decision-making process, influenced the management 
iof the Chernobyl emergency so that a strategy aimed at avoiding 
the worst possible health and political effects prevailed on 
economic costs calculations.
b.3. Concluding remarks.
t Why at the end strict countermeasures were applied in onditions of scientific and organizational uncertainty and in ispite of the opposition of strong economic and political 
.organizations ?
On the basis of the analysis suggested above four 
interrelated answers may be suggested:
1) because the Ministry of Health is the only governmental 
authority which competences in the field of health protection 
against ionizing radiation are clearly defined by the Italian 
legislation. Given the general surprise caused by the occurrence 
of such an unexpected event as the mealtdown in the nuclear plant 
of Chernobyl, and given the gap in the Italian legislation 
concerning the definition of the responsible authorities and the 
procedures to be followed in cases of a radiological emergency due 
to an accident occurred outside the national borders, _the role of 
the Ministry of Health was the only clearly defined reference 
point. And the Minister of Civil Protection (who had at least 
the merit of assuming -in that confusing situation- the 
responsibility to face that exceptional event and to coordinate 
the emergency) took that into consideration and adjusted his 
behavior consequently.
2) Because the Ministry of Health has the necessary 
scientific and technical "resources" in that field, mainly its 
advisory body -ISS- which scientific expertise is widely 
recognized within the scientific community and by the political 
authorities. Given the scientific uncertainties concerning the
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effects of "low" levels of radiation on human health, these 
scientific and technical resources revealed themselves to be very 
important in orientating decisions. The cautious attitude of some 
leading ISS* experts (due to the precautionary approach developed 
in the field radiation protection and to previous experience such 
as the Seveso accident 1,_proved to be influential in framing the 
fallout as a publichealth problem and in orientating decisions 
towards the adoption of re1atively strict measures.
3) Because of interministry conflicts that revealed to be 
very important in the management of the Chernobyl emergency.
Such conflicts could have been paralyzing; instead they 
encouraged Ministers to take actions, and find some forms of 
adjustment, to assert in practice their ill-legally defined 
competences. Particularly the Minister of Civil Protection was 
able -while being a Minister without portfolio- to have a leading 
role by imposing, thanks to the ad hoc alliance (sometimes 
conflictual) with the Minister of Health, a definition of the 
situation as a case of emergency.
4) Because of the pressure of public opinion and the anti- 
nuclear movement. Italian citizens, who everyday read and 
listened to alarming and confusing news and which were awakened to 
the issue of the risks connected with nuclear power production by 
the campaigns of environmental/anti-nuclear groups, were very 
worried about what was going on. Therefore it was important to 
make citizens (electors..) feel that the authorities were doing 
all the necessary to protect the health of the population. Some 
politicians and some scientists argued that mass-media and the 
anti-nuclear groups exaggerated the dangers and that, also because 
of this, ordinary people had "irrational" fears. However, 
independently from judgements concerning the rationality or 
irrationality of such fears, the Italian authorities knew that one 
important political resource -legitimacy- was at stake, and that, 
because of this, people's fears had not to be underestimated.
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All these interrelated elements contributed in making 
relatively strict measures to be adopted to cope with the 
Chernobyl fallout in spite of (and even thanks to) scientific and 
organizational uncertainties and notwithstanding the opposition of 
powerful interest groups.
As we will see in the next chapters different patterns _of 
Iljinteractions between politicians, experts, anti-nuclear groups and 
i;' the media, and different access to and use of that crucial
resources which is information brought about different responses 
in neighbouring countries.
c. The years after.
After the emergency period immediately following the 
Chernobyl accident, remarkable events and changes occurred in 
Italy with respect to nuclear power.
A Parliamentary inquiry on the safety of Italian nuclear 
plants was conducted between May 1986 and January 1987; a National 
Conference on Energy -required by the Parliament and promoted by 
the Government- was held in February 1987; the same year, in 
November, three consultative referenda regarding important aspects 
of nuclear policy proved that large sectors of society were 
against such policy; a new National Energy Plan was adopted in 
1988; ENEA and ENEA-DISP went through a new and controversial 
reorganization process.
Why did these specific events and changes took place? Can 
they be interpreted as parts of a learning process in the field of 
nuclear risk management?
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c .1. Post-Chernobyl events. 
c.1.1. The Parliamentary inquiry.
An inquiry concerning the safety of Italian nuclear plants 
was conducted by the Commissions of Industry and Health of the 
Chamber of Deputies in the period May 1986-January 1987 (see, 
Camera dei Deputati, 1987). Such inquiry represented a first 
institutional arena where the positions of political parties about 
nuclear issues where discussed and adjusted in the light of the 
Chernobyl radioactive and political fallout. It can be argued 
-given the technical limits of a Parliamentary debate and on the 
basis of the fact that no final assessment/judgment about the 
safety or non safety of Italian plants was given- that the safety 
of nuclear installations was a topic for the process of political
adjustment more than the real aim of the inquiry.
The major conclusions of the inquiry can be summarized as 
follows: 1. nuclear plants need a social and institutional 
organization able to cope with the risk they involve; 2. Italian 
authorization procedures are consistent with international 
standards; 3. there are serious problems concerning the disposal
of nuclear waste and the decommissioning of old plants; 4. during
the Chernobyl fallout, the monitoring network proved to be very 
deficient; 5. during the Chernobyl fallout also problems 
concerning information and emergency planning emerged.
Recommendations were also given such as: improve the 
monitoring network, improve the diffusion of information 
concerning emergency measures, elaborate a national emergency plan 
beside the local ones, separate ENEA-DISP from ENEA, address the 
problem of waste disposal and decommissioning. While the 
suspension (decided since May 1986) of the siting procedures for 
new plants was taken for granted, no specific recommendation was 
given regarding the fate of the Italian nuclear plants which had 
been closed for inspection since May 1986. These recommendations 
can be regarded as resulting from a compromise between the anti-
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nuclear, but still in the phase of change, attitude of the 
Communist and Socialist Parties and the pro-nuclear, but less 
resolute than in the past, attitude of the Christian Democrats, 
just to mention the major parties.
c.1.2. The National Conference on Energy.
Requested by the Parliament in June 1986 and promoted by the 
Government, the National Conference on Energy held in February 
1987 was the main arena of debate offered by political 
institutions.
! jj Declared aim of the Conference was the evaluation of energy ,-phoices taking into account the safety of installations and the /protection of health and environment. Such evaluation was ' required by the Parliament in order to re-examine Italian energy 
policy in the light of the Chernobyl accident.
According to the Minister of Industry V. Zanone, who was 
responsible for its organization, the Conference should have been 
a technical-scientific forum without the participation of 
political parties; and actually a technical-scientific commission 
and three working groups were appointed and party representatives 
did not speak at the Conference (see, Conferenza Nazionale 
sull’Energia, 1987). However, conflicts regarding the composition 
of the commission and of the three working groups (one on economic 
aspects, one on health and environmental aspects, one on legal and 
institutional aspects) as well as the contents, participation 
procedures and timing of the Conference indicated that the 
Conference itself was becoming an arena for conflict and 
compromise between political -predetermined- positions rather than 
an arena for scientific debate (Ceri, 1987; De Paoli, 1987). And
Ithis is not surprising because, especially in the context of the ^uncertainties and fears connected with the Chernobyl accident, the debate on nuclear power and -more in general- on energy production 
was interwoven with the debate on risk acceptability and on modelsfof development and society.
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Disagreements emerged before and during the Conference on 
various points; for example, on the forecasts about energy demand, 
on the weight to be attributed to different kind of energy 
sources, on the evaluation of the risks for health and environment 
involved by different energy systems. However, aside from the 
explicitation of some of these disagreements by the Chairman of 
the working group on economic aspects, the conclusions drawn at 
the end of the Conference by the Chairmen of the three working 
groups and by the Minister of Industry seems to represent (as in 
the case of the Parliamentary inquiry) a compromise between 
different points of view. On the one hand the utilization of 
nuclear energy was regarded favorably but not firmly argued for; 
on the other hand the need was stressed to intensify research and 
action in the field of energy saving and renewable energies which 
are considered by some experts as alternative and by other experts 
as complementary to nuclear power. Moreover the importance of 
protecting health and environment and to improve the institutional 
framework for nuclear risk management (particularly by separating, 
as already recommended by the Parliamentary inquiry, the control 
and the promotion bodies) were also emphasized.
Some of these conclusions (for instance, those concerning 
energy saving) influenced the formulation of the National Energy 
Plan of 1988. However, more than providing scientific advice for 
policy making, the Conference offered another institutional arena 
(larger than the Parliamentary inquiry) for political adjustment. 
No specific decision followed the Conference which had rather the 
effect of attracting attention and spreading -also through the 
media coverage of the Conference itself (see, Borrelli et al.,
1988)- the debate on energy and technological risk. Debate which 
continued and became even more burning in the campaigns for the 
referenda which were held in November the same year.
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c.1.3. The anti-nuclear referenda.
The referenda proposed by various environmental and left-wing 
groups during the Chernobyl fallout were accepted by the 
Constitutional Court (which in the past had rejected other 
proposals of referenda on nuclear power) and were held on the 8th 
of November 1987.
The campaigns that preceded the referenda had been the 
largest arena of debate on nuclear power that was created in Italy 
and that was started (differently from the Parliamentary Inquiry 
and the Conference on Energy) "from below". Such campaigns and 
the actual referenda can be regarded as a sort of nation wide 
participatory experiment.
Differently from the Information Campaign on Nuclear Energy 
that was conducted in Austria before the referendum of 1978 on 
nuclear power (see, Nowotny, 1979; Nowotny, 1980), the debate 
which developed in Italy in the perspective of the referenda was 
not institutionally structured. While the Austrian Information 
Campaign was initiated by the Chancellor and organized by the 
ministerial bureaucracy (similarly to the Conference on Energy) 
according to the tradition of "reform from above", the campaign 
for the Italian referenda was initiated by environmental non 
governmental organizations and by left wing parties not 
participating in governmental coalitions. Beside that, while the 
Austrian Information Campaign attempted to be a mass but mainly 
scientific one and was structured through experts’ working groups 
and public meetings, the Italian debate started with a mass 
collection of signatures among citizens (needed to make the 
referenda acceptable according to Constitutional Law), it was 
explicitly political and developed through various channels like 
seminars and meetings organized by environmental associations, 
party meetings and media programs.
Due to its explicitly political nature and to the direct 
involvement of political parties, the Italian debate previous to 
the referenda resembled traditional electoral campaigns. However,
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similarly to the Austrian Information Campaign, scientific issues 
had to be addressed and experts -and controversies between 
experts- played an important role in shaping the debate. In this 
context, the presence of scientists among environmentalists 
allowed arguments against nuclear power not to be simplistically 
labeled as "irrational" by proponents of such technology. It has 
also to be noted that some of the scientists who have been arguing 
against nuclear power starting from the seventies, particularly 
those active in the Committee for the Control of Energy Choices, 
had become in the meantime Members of the Parliament in the Green 
List following the elections of June 1987, and this enhanced their 
political influence.
As far as the contents of the referenda are concerned,
Italian citizens were not explicitly asked to vote for the further 
development or for the abandonment -immediate or delayed- of 
nuclear power production, as it was the case with the referenda 
held in Sweden in 1980 (see, Jahn, 1989) that resulted in the 
decision to stop nuclear power production by 2010. Due to legal 
constraints, the questions submitted to Italian citizens were 
quite technical and regarded the abrogation of three articles (of 
two different laws) regarding respectively: 1. the possibility for 
CIPE (Interministry Committee for Economic Planning) to decide 
about the siting of nuclear installations in case local 
authorities had not made a decision within a certain time; 2. the 
economic contributions to municipalities and regions where plants 
are located; 3. the participation of ENEL to international 
projects in the nuclear field. The idea behind the proposition of 
these specific questions was to eliminate the possibility for 
central authorities to overcome through institutional or economic 
devices the opposition of local authorities and to prevent ENEL 
from participating to projects like the French fast breeder 
reactor Superphenix. But in more general terms, the referenda 
were meant to indicate whether the majority of Italian citizens 
were pro or against nuclear power.
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The majority of the voters who attended the referenda 
(abstentionism was quite high) voted for the abrogation of the 
mentioned articles and this result was due to the quite strange 
"coalition" that emerged in the occasion of the referenda: not 
only the Greens, the Radicals, Democrazia Proletaria and the 
recently "converted" Communist and Socialist Parties asked their 
electors to vote for abrogation, but also the Christian Democratic 
Party invited its electors to vote for the abrogation of the first 
two articles. Such situation can be explained by the willingness 
of the ruling party not to upset large sectors of public opinion, 
including its own electors, who changed attitude towards nuclear 
power following the Chernobyl accident 10.
Following the referenda, the sorts of the Italian nuclear 
plants remained "congealed” for a while 1 1 but the nuclear 
programme was put aside.
c.1.4. The National Energy Plan of 1988.
According to the National Energy Plan adopted by the 
government (without a previous discussion at the Parliament) in 
1988, the activities of promotion and development of nuclear 
fission reactors are suspended and nuclear energy is no more 
mentioned among the sources of electricity production; moreover, 
the participation to international collaborations on fast breeder j
reactors is suspended and only research in the fields of nuclear j
fusion and so-called intrinsically safe reactors is encouraged 
(see, Piano Energetico Nazionale, 1988: parts IV-V).
10 According to opinion polls by DOXA (quoted by Biorcio, 1988: 
p.33), while in Spring 1981 only 31,7 % of the Italian people 
interviewed were against nuclear power, in November 1986 the 
percentage of the interviewees who declared to be against nuclear 
power was 72,5%.
1^1 The decision to convert the Montalto di Castro plant was taken 
by the Parliament in summer 1988 and the decision to close the 
other plants was taken in July 1990.
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The Plan also acknowledges the need to diversify the sources 
of energy production and to promote energy saving in order to meet 
energy demand while protecting the environment and reducing the 
high dependency (around 80%) on imports, mainly oil imports. In 
this respect, the utilization of gas and fuel oil (even if the 
last one is very polluting) has been encouraged while the budget 
for the development of renewable energies and energy saving was 
cut in 1989 and only in November 1990 the programme for energy 
saving was finally approved; moreover it took until 1991 to pass 
two Laws (Law 9/1991 and Law 10/1991) aimed at encouraging energy 
savings and their implementation seems rather problematic (see, 
Ambiente Italia, 1991).
| In short, after saying "No thanks 1" to nuclear power, the
»energy challenge, that is the ability of defining a feasible, 
manageable and environment friendly energy policy, remains open.
During the Gulf/oil crisis started in August 1990, and 
especially during the war in January and February 1991, arguments 
for the restarting of nuclear power production were re-launched. 
However even the proponents of such arguments (for instance, the 
Minister of Industry C.Battaglia) acknowledge that nuclear fission 
is no more viable in Italy because of economic -beside societal- 
reasons, therefore they speak about launching a "new" nuclear 
option mainly based on intrinsically safe reactors (and fusion 
only in the long term). But even the former nuclear agency, ENEA, 
is not pursuing as its main aim the implementation of such "new 
nuclear option" which seems then not to have a very sound basis.
c.1.5. The reorganization of ENEA and ENEA-DISP.
The long and controversial restructuration process of ENEA 
and ENEA-DISP is a very interesting case of institutions' design 
and change in a specific policy, political and economic context. 
The vicissitudes of these two institutions are in fact strictly 
linked to the already mentioned fluctuations of Italian nuclear 
policy and to the still ongoing ambiguities of energy policy more
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in general; fluctuations and ambiguities which are due to 
contrasts and negotiations between different political and 
economic interests.
Following the Chernobyl accident, radical reforms of ENEA and 
ENEA-DISP have been suggested; mainly the separation of DISP from 
ENEA (in order to make the control body independent from the 
promotion one), and the change of the research and promotion 
activities of ENEA previously only (till 1982) or mainly (till 
Chernobyl) related to nuclear energy. However to convert the 
activity field of a research and promotion institution into others 
is not easy. And it is a very hard task to reform an institution 
with around 5.000 employees (around 500 in ENEA-DISP and the rest 
in ENEA); especially when different parties -mainly different 
Ministers, business groups and trade unions- have different 
interests and hold different points of view concerning the aims 
and features of the institution's reform.
As a result, a law for the reform of ENEA has been approved 
by the Senate only in November 1990 but strong oppositions (within 
ENEA itself, within political parties and by the Minister of 
Industry) to such law postponed till August 1991 its approval by 
the Chamber of Deputies. This situations obviously gave rise to 
a feeling of deep uncertainty among ENEA -and especially ENEA- 
DISP- members (Buonamici, interview; Finetti, interview; Roberti, 
interview).
The main points of the reform approved in 1991 (Law 282/1991) 
can be summarized as follows: a) change the name -but not the 
acronym- of ENEA from "Comitato Nazionale per la ricerca e lo 
sviluppo dell'energia nucleare e le energie alternative” (National 
Committee for the research and development of nuclear and 
alternative energy) into "Ente per le nuove tecnologie, I ’energia 
e l'ambiente” (Agency for new technologies, energy and 
environment); b) ENEA will remain under the Minister of Industry 
but such Minister will have to consult the Minister of Research 
and the Minister of Environment; c) ENEA will be organized into 
three departments: energy, environment and technological
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innovation; d) these departments will draw up program agreements 
with the Ministers of Industry, Research and Environment; e) ENEA
bodies on specific matters (the first one being the rational use 
of energy); f) the Safety and Protection Department -DISP- will
As it is easy to see, energy becomes -according to the 
reform- only one among three sectors of activity, and research on 
nuclear energy (nuclear fusion and intrinsically safe reactors) 
becomes only a subsector within the energy department. And this 
is a first thing that met the opposition of those who still hope 
in the possibility of launching again nuclear power production in 
Italy in a short-medium term. Moreover, the introduction of 
consultations and program agreements with other two Ministers is 
probably not so palatable for the previously only "king" of ENEA, 
i.e. the Minister of Industry. Finally, DISP remains within ENEA 
is spite of the recommendations of both the mentioned 
Parliamentary Inquiry and the Conference on Energy. More than 
that, the tasks and organization of DISP are not redefined in the 
changed context of energy policyi2 and this leaves DISP in a sort 
of unproductive nimbus.
It seems not too difficult to find out some of the reasons 
why these events and changes occurred after Chernobyl.
First of all, the seriousness and the public dimension of the 
catastrophe caused an increased politicization -and, so to 
say,"partyzation”- of issues which were already political but that 
till Chernobyl had not attracted too much attention from Italian
12 A proposal made by two Senators in 1988 to include DISP among 
the institutions responsible for the implementation of the Seveso 
Directive of major industrial hazards was rejected. And the 
proposal made by various politicians to establish an High Safety 
(or High Risk) Authority including DISP is still vague.
will promote consortia with local administrations and with private
ENEA.
c.2. Learning from Chernobyl ?
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political parties. Due to the need of political parties to adjust 
to the changed context, including shifts in public opinion, some 
arenas for debate (also regarded as ways of delaying decisions) 
had been created.
Even if the Italian nuclear programme had been weak, its 
abandonment was not a very easy matter; this is why decisions 
about Italian nuclear plants and about energy policy remained 
"congealed" for a while after the referenda and many of them had 
not been yet implemented. Finally the conflicts of interest which 
hamper the implementation of the new National Energy Plan also 
caused difficulties and uncertainties regarding the reorganization 
lof ENEA and ENEA-DISP, i.e. the largest Italian resource of 
technical-scientific expertize in the field of nuclear risk 
management.
Having spelled out some of the reasons why the mentioned 
changes occurred, the problem is to see whether they can be 
interpreted as parts of a learning process with respect to nuclear 
risk management.
In order to provide some hints to answer this question, two 
aspects will be distinguished: a. the changes in the framing of 
issues; b. the technical, organizational, legal and/or policy 
adaptations.
c .2.1. Changes in the framing of issues.
As far as this aspect is concerned, two points deserve 
attention. On the one hand, the post-Chernobyl Italian debate was 
framed (especially on occasion of the anti-nuclear referenda) 
according to the far from new dichotomy "yes or no to nuclear 
power". On the other hand, some shifts/changes of emphasis within 
such dichotomy can be noticed.
First of all, yes-or-no arguments were not only based on a 
general reasoning regarding the intrinsic nature of nuclear power 
technology but also on the issue of its context-specific
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manageability. The argument of the non-manageability of nuclear 
power in Italy (due to the lack of credibility of Italian nuclear 
policy, to the crisis of ENEA, to economic constraints, etc.) was 
mainly put forward by previously unconditionally pro-nuclear 
political parties and experts 13 that modified in this way the 
absolute yes/no dichotomy by emphasizing the conditions for 
deciding whether to say yes or no. With respect to this frame- 
shift the importance of fora such as the National Conference on 
Energy and the Referenda campaign must be stressed. Those fora 
provided in fact the opportunity for circulating arguments firstly 
in form (even if not in substance) of experts/"neutral" debate (at 
the Conference) and then in form of political debate (during the 
Referenda campaign) with multiple stakes, like the continuation of 
the nuclear programme, political credibility, and others. Such 
differentiated and broad communication process favoured partial 
reframing and gradual adjustments regarding nuclear issues.
Another aspect of the partial reframing of the yes/no 
dichotomy that characterized part of the Italian after-Chernobyl 
debate is the increased attention towards the need to acknowledge 
the limits (including ethical limits) of science and technology. 
Such attention can be especially found in the debate within the 
environmental movement and that part of the women movement that 
focused on the issue of the "coscienza del limite" -awareness of 
the limit- (see, Leonardi, 1986; Donini, 1990). Also in this 
perspective the conditions for answering yes or no to nuclear 
power are emphasized, but in a more radical way in comparison with 
the position that stressed contingent (and eventually country 
specific) factors. Especially during the referenda campaign this 
"radical" argument partially complemented and partially challenged 
as too weak the jcontingent" argument on manageability, in this 
way deepening the crisis of the "optimistic" -all under control-
13 See, for instance, the remarks by the economist P.Baffi who 
chaired the working group on economic aspects of the National 
Conference on Energy (Baffi, 1987; Conferenza Nazionale 
sull’Energia, 1987).
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arguments on nuclear power. Those arguments were attacked not 
only on practical but also on theoretical ground.
•I Summing up, shifts in the existing frame of nuclear debate ¡1
* rather than a change of frame occurred. But this only partial ji 
refraining had far from marginal consequences since it was used by 
important actors to adjust their position in occasions such as 
the referenda. Whether the modified frame was used because of 
conviction or convenience is not of importance here. What is 
important is that such frame was persuasive enough to be regarded 
or presented as a basis for changing views and positions on 
nuclear power.
c.2.2. Policy, organizational, legal, technical adaptations.
Several kinds of adaptations were made in the years following 
the Chernobyl accident, including a "core" policy change and 
some "peripheral" one.
Policy change.
Following the Referenda, a "core change" in Italian nuclear 
policy took place, i.e. the abandonment of nuclear power as a , 
source of electricity production. In that way nuclear policy as a 
specific component of energy policy dissolved, and it only 
survives as a sector of research policy relatively to nuclear 
fusion and intrinsically safe reactors. The failure of the 
attempts to re-launch nuclear power during the Gulf crisis and war 
indicates that the core policy change that emerged from the post- 
Chernobyl events described above, and from the mentioned partial 
reframing of.nuclear issues, is likely to be a long-term change.
The core change in nuclear policy influenced the peripheral 
(legal, technical and organizational) adaptations that were made
14 The distinction between core and peripheral policy change is 
due to Majone, 1989.
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regarding various aspects of nuclear risk management, i.e. reactor 
safety, radioactivity monitoring, emergency planning, information 
and communication is. These adaptations may be summarized as 
follows.
Reactor safety.
The safety of nuclear installations had been a major issue 
following the Chernobyl accident but no major adaptations were 
made in this field in Italy. On the one hand, this is due to the 
diffused opinion among nuclear engineers (in Italy and abroad) 
that Western reactors are much safer than the Russian ones and 
that there are so many and important differences between the RBMK 
reactors and the reactors more common in Western Countries (mainly 
LWR and PWR), that no particular lesson can be drawn from 
Chernobyl regarding the safety of nuclear installations. On the 
other hand, the phase-out of nuclear power production involved a 
decreased attention on reactor safety issues. Several inspections 
were made by DISP and OSART teams (Operational Safety Review 
Teams) of the IAEA to verify the safety of Italian nuclear plants 
and some improvements were suggested; but the temporary 
"congealment" of decisions regarding Italian nuclear plants 
favoured an atmosphere of "wait and see" that made these 
suggestions useless. During the Parliamentary debate that 
resulted in the decision to close definitively the Caorso and 
Trino Vercellese plants (see, Camera dei Deputati, June 1990) some 
Deputies stressed the risks connected with this situation, mainly 
the possible underestimation of safety measures in the no more 
operating but still dangerous plants. The situation did not 
improve very much following the Parliamentary decision: while 
being officially "closed", Italian nuclear plants are still not 
really so because there are serious difficulties regarding the 
decommissioning process (Buonamici, interview) and the safety of 
no more operating reactors remains problematic.
15 Another important aspect, i.e. international cooperation, will 
be addressed in chapter 7.
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Radioactivity monitoring.
Some technical and organizational adaptations had been made, 
during and following the Chernobyl fallout, concerning the 
extension and organization of the Italian monitoring network.
The gaps in the national monitoring network had been 
partially filled during the fallout. However the problem of 
constituting an homogeneously distributed and functioning 
monitoring network remained open.
In March 1987, following a directive of the Health Ministry, 
Regional monitoring networks started working; but several 
laboratories did not work properly and this prevented the 
publication of a six-monthly report on environmental radioactivity 
in Italy (Naschi, 1987). The problem is not yet solved due to 
Regional disparities in the working of the Health Service (Risica, 
interview; Tabet, interview).
Emergency planning.
As previously mentioned, the Parliamentary inquiry conducted 
after Chernobyl recommended the elaboration of a national 
emergency plan to supplement the existing (and insufficient) 
provincial emergency plans. This recommendation can be regarded 
as resulting from the diffused perception/definition of the 
Chernobyl fallout as a case of nation wide (beside transboundary) 
emergency. But it must be also added that, independently from 
judgements regarding the "objective" validity of this perception, 
the idea of establishing a national emergency plan seems 
reasonable given the presence of many nuclear plants in 
neighbouring countries and the seriousness of the effects that a 
nuclear fallout may cause in a densely populated country like 
Italy.
In 1987 a working group directed by the Minister of Civil 
Protection -with the participation of experts of DISP, ISS and 
other institutions- drafted a national emergency plan (Tabet, 
interview). However such plan was not approved -nor made public- 
due to contrasts concerning the establishment of the National 
Service of Civil Protection. A bill on such Service was approved
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(after a very long debate) by the Chamber of Deputies and by the 
Senate but it was returned to the them by the President of the 
Republic, F. Cossiga, who refused to sign. This because, according 
to the message sent to the Parliament by Cossiga (Camera dei 
Deputati, 1990), such bill would introduce -among other things- 
overlaps of responsibilities between the Ministry of Interior and 
the Minister (without portfolio) of Civil Protection, and it would 
concentrate in the hands of a central authority some 
responsibilities which are peculiar of the Regions. Without 
entering upon the substance of Cossiga's arguments, it can be 
noticed that interministry and centre/periphery relations are 
crucial and controversial elements in defining which authority 
should be responsible and which procedures should be followed in 
declaring and managing an emergency.
Information and communication.
Informing the population about measures to be taken and 
communicating between different sectors of society about risk 
proved to be crucial elements in the management of the Chernobyl 
emergency. Without repeating the discussion on this matters, it 
can be just mentioned that contrasting tendencies -towards 
centralization (by the Minister of Civil Protection) and towards 
differentiation (by local authorities, environmental groups and 
the media) of information- emerged.
In the following years a tendency toward centralization can 
still be found in the proposal to reinforce the central role of 
the Minister of Civil Protection in case of emergencies, including 
information aspects. On the other hand, differentiation of 
information sources did practically occur in occasion of the 
National Conference on Energy, and even more in the perspective of 
the referenda. Beside the public relation and information 
activities performed by central and local institutions, media 
surveys and information campaigns by environmental groups have 
been conducted.
150
c.2.3. Concluding remarks.
On the basis of the discussion suggested above, an answer 
regarding the possibility to interpret the changes that occurred 
after Chernobyl as parts of a learning process can be offered.
In terms of those cognitive processes that are regarded as 
crucial components of learning by most literature on the subject, 
a partial refraining of issues took place in the post-Chernobyl 
I /debate on nuclear power. The previously existing no/yes
I dichotomic frame conditioned the reframing of issues in the light
[ of the Chernobyl experience; however, this did not prevent a new
emphasis on the practical manageability of the nuclear technology 
and the limits of science to emerge.
Partly as a consequence of the reframing of nuclear issues
and partly as a consequence of organizational (as in the case of 
the reorganization of ENEA) and bureaucratic dynamics (as in the 
case of the abandonment of nuclear power), various kinds of 
policy, technical, organizational and legal adaptations were made. 
It is worthwile to stress that, beside peripheral adaptations, a 
core policy change was made. This can be explained by the 
patterns of interaction between the relevant actors and their 
interpretation (and use) of the Chernobyl experience, and by the 
impact of certain anti-nuclear arguments in a situation where 
nuclear policy and the related "policy paradigm", as Peter Hall 
calls it (Hall, 1990), were already rather weak. Such impact was 
in fact greater than in other situations (especially France) where 
nuclear policy is practically and symbolically very strong and 
therefore offers more resistance to anti-nuclear arguments.
Both reframing and adaptations were the results of the 
interactions and communication between various actors who played 
differently important roles depending on the issues at stake and 
the available fora for action and debate. For instance, the anti- 
nuclear movement was a crucial actor with respect to the anti- 
nuclear referenda but not regarding the reform of ENEA. Important 
elements that entered the communication between the actors had
been not only the reflection on -and different interpretations of- 
the Chernobyl event, but also the (different) evaluations of 
previous organizational performance (by specific organizations 
like ENEA and ISS) and policy (nuclear policy).
In short (a longer discussion of this issue will be offered 
in the last chapter), one can argue that the changes occurred 
following Chernobyl can be interpreted as results of learning 
processes where reframing and adaptations took place on the basis 
of experience, reflection and communication.
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BONN ODER DIE LAENDER ?
CHERNOBYL IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.
a. Background.
Nuclear power has been a very hot issue in the Federal 
Republic of Germany 1 , especially since the early seventies; and it 
became even more heated following Chernobyl.
The presence of both a big nuclear industry and a strong anti- 
nuclear movement make the German nuclear controversy particularly 
tough. Moreover, the evolving of such controversy and the 
management of nuclear risk are influenced by peculiar features of 
the German federal system as well as by the role of expertise in 
technology policy decisions.
In order to put in context the response to Chernobyl in the 
FRG, a brief analysis of the German nuclear policy, the anti- 
nuclear movement and the legislative and institutional framework 
is sketched below.
a.i. Nuclear policy.
The development of German nuclear policy began in the second 
half of the fifties z. For ten years following the defeat of the
5
1 My analysis regards only the former West Germany since the idea 
is to compare and understand the responses to the fallout in 
countries that were both neighbouring and members of the same 
transnational (EC) Community. Reference to some of the problems 
that emerged with respect to nuclear risk management in the 
reunified Germany is made in the last part of the chapter 
dedicated to "The years after".
2 For a detailed account of the development of German nuclear 
power policy see Kitschelt, 1980; Radkau, 1983. Useful
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Nazi regime, the FRG was not allowed by the Allies to build a 
nuclear industry nor to promote research in the nuclear field.
And when a nuclear policy was started, in 1955, it was allowed to 
develop exclusively the civilian utilization of nuclear energy. 
Utilization which was regarded as a very important element of the 
post-war German economic reconstruction.
The absence of military goals together with the strong 
committment of the Federal Republic to market economy (constantly 
reinforced by comparison with the centrally planned system of the 
Democratic Republic of Germany) favoured the development of a big 
private nuclear industry and a direct involvement of the public 
sector only with respect to the regulation of such industry and 
the development of nuclear research.
In 1955 the Federal Ministry for Atomic Energy was 
established and the following year a commission was appointed to 
advise this Ministry. Such commission -the German Atomic 
Commission (DAtK)- was formed by eight scientists (among them the 
well-known physicists Otto Hahn and Werner Heisenberg), two 
representatives of the administration (one being the minister 
himself), thirteen representatives from large industrial 
corporations, two from financial institutions and two from trade 
unions. The presence of industry, finance and trade unions 
representatives within the DAtK shows that such commission was not 
merely required to provide scientific advice to the Ministry but 
it functioned as a forum for the negotiations between interest 
groups.
In this regard it is interesting to notice that the 
collaboration of labour and capital in the so-called 
Sozlalpartnerschaft (social partnership) that characterized the 
post-war economic and social history of the FRG, also applies to 
the nuclear sector. The Federation of German Trade Unions (DGB) 
strongly supported (till Chernobyl) nuclear power, even if some
information can also be found in Hatch, 1991; Metz, 1981; Nelkin 
and Poliak, 1981.
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unionists in the social service sector expressed an anti-nuclear 
attitude starting from the mid-seventies (Jahn, 1989). While this 
attitude seemed to become dominant in April 1977, when DGB adopted 
a declaration favouring a moratorium on nuclear power, this was 
not the case; the declaration was in fact reversed few months 
later (Hatch, 1991).
With respect to the role and collaboration between interest 
groups in the nuclear sector, it must be mentioned that an 
influential lobby group, the German Atomic Forum -DAtF- was 
created in this first period of german nuclear policy development 
(in 1959) and is still active. The DAtF is a non governmental 
organization formed by managers, politicians and scientists and it 
is aimed at coordinating promotion and public information efforts; 
in Radkau's words (Radkau, 1983: p.148), it acts as a sort of 
public relation agency of nuclear interests.
On the governmental side, some important institutional 
changes had been made.
In 1962 the Ministry for Atomic Energy became/was replaced by 
the Ministry for Scientific Research, while competences concerning 
the regulation of nuclear power were concentrated within the 
Ministry of Interior.
In 1958 the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) was appointed by 
the Minister of Interior -taking some experts from the DAtK- to 
advise him and to provide recommendations in the fields of reactor 
safety and radiological protection. The RSK is formed, as a rule, 
by 18 members, mainly experts in physics and engineering. Later 
on, in 1974, the Radiological Protection Commission (SSK) was 
established -also by the Minister of Interior- to deal 
specifically with radiological protection matters. The SSK is 
composed, as a rule, of 15 members, mainly covering the fields of 
radiology, genetics and biophysics. The members of both the RSK 
and the SSK are appointed for a period, renewable, of three years 
but they can be dismissed prematurely by the Minister of Interior 
on not specified "special grounds"; the commissions1 members are
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committed to confidentiality about the issues discussed in 
sessions and to secrecy about matters being the subject of 
licensing procedures (SSK, 1968: pp.90-91).
Beside the Ministry's of Interior "in-house" advisory bodies, 
other scientific institutions (partially financed by the Ministry 
of Research and Technology) provide advice to Federal and State 
authorities; among them the Society for Reactor Safety (GRS), the 
Society for Radiological Research (GSF), the nuclear research 
centres of Julich (KFA) and Karlsruhe (KFK), and various 
University departments. Moreover, the technical norms relevant 
for the implementation of reactor safety and radiation protection 
measures are set by other two organizations: the Nuclear 
Technology Committee (KTA), a governmental body, and the German 
Institute for Norms (DIN), an institute mainly financed by 
industry.
It is worth noticing that differently from many other 
countries (including Italy and France) radiation protection is 
competence of the Ministry of Interior instead of the Ministry of 
Health. Since 1962 -till Chernobyl- the Ministry of Health had 
been however responsible for the publication of an yearly report 
on the measurements made and the actions taken by the Federal and 
State authorities to protect the population against ionizing 
radiation, with special reference to the contamination due to the 
weapons tests' fallout.
Coming back to nuclear power development in the FRG, as in 
the Italian case the production of different prototypes to select 
the technology more appropriate to national needs was initially 
suggested. This proposal, made within the framework of the first 
nuclear programme (1956-1962), the so-called Eltviller programme, 
was not applied since the immediate construction of light-water 
reactors was favoured in practice. The first commercial reactor, 
Kahl on Main, was in operation in 1961: it was built by the German 
AEG electronics industry that worked with a license of the US firm 
General Electric.
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The second (1963 to 1967), third (1968 to 1972) and fourth 
(1972-1976) nuclear programmes sustained and expanded the initial 
policy choices. Moreover, a rapid expansion of nucler power was 
included among the goals of the overall energy policy in the 1974 
revision of the energy programme formulated within the Federal 
Economic Ministry; revision that emphasized the need to increase 
nuclear power production to reduce the FRG’s dependence on 
imported oil following the oil crisis of 1973. By 1977 fourteeen 
nuclear plans were operating in the FRG, seventeen were under 
construction and others were planned.
The market leader in the field of nuclear plants construction 
has been the German corporation Siemens. After creating, in 1969, 
a joint enterprise (the KWU) with AEG, Siemens bought out the AEG 
share in 1977; through KWU, Siemens controls also INTERATOM, 
engaged in the development of experimental plants including fast- 
breeder reactors. Beside Siemens, also US (General Atomic, 
Babcock and Wilcox) and Swiss (BBC) corporations play a role in 
the German market.
Public authorities are shareholders in the big electricity 
generating and supplying utilities, and Federal and Länder (State) 
representatives are present in the administrative boards of the 
major utilities. However they do not influence very much the 
utilities' strategies; on the contrary, energy policies planned by 
the Federal and Länder governments are usually based on the 
forecasts prepared by these firms.
The increases of nucler power production planned in the 
mentioned nuclear and energy programmes was hampered by the rising 
of a strong anti-nuclear movement and (also due to the pressures 
form that movement) by more complex licensing procedures. Only 
seven other plants (out of the 17 under construction in 1977 and 
others planned in the following years) were completed by 1986.
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a.2. Anti-nuclear opposition.
The first anti-nuclear mobilization in the FRG can be traced 
back to the late fifties. In 1958 the "Kampf dem Atomtod” (Fight 
against the nuclear death) was launched by various left wing 
groups, the Social democratic party (SPD), the trade unions and 
several scientists (Metz, 1981). This campaign was aimed at 
opposing the military use of nuclear energy and the localization 
(within the framework of NATO agreements) of nuclear weapons in 
the FRG. No concern for the civilian utilization of nuclear power 
emerged at that time^ and this is not surprising giving the lack of 
operating nuclear plants in the fifties.
But starting from the early seventies, after ten years of 
nuclear power development, a new anti-nuclear opposition grew in 
the FRG and expressed concern for the risks involved by the 
utilization of nuclear power for energy production. A series of 
heated disputes regarding the siting of nuclear plants took place, 
the most important ones being those in Wyhl and Brokdorf (see, 
Nelkin and Poliak, 19S1: cap.5; Rucht, 1980).
The choice of Wyhl as a site for a nuclear plant was a rather 
myopic one. The government of Baden-Württemberg selected Wyhl in 
1973, immediately after the project to build a plant few 
kilometers away (in Breisach) had to be abandoned due to the 
strong opposition of local residents and anti-nuclear activists. 
Citizen initiatives immediately formed in Wyhl and in 1974, when 
the licensing procedures were started, they organized a mass 
demonstration and raised their objections through the public 
hearing. In February 1975 the Administrative Court advised 
suspending construction until it could evaluate complaints, but 
the utilities proceeded. As a consequence several protestors 
occupied the plant site and fifty of them were arrested by the 
police. Few days later around 20.000 people occupied the site and 
the police withdrew. The occupation, during which also a "popular 
university" was created, lasted till January 1976 when the 
authorities agreed to consider the expertize provided by citizen
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initiatives and to wait for a final court decision before starting 
construction again. In March 1977 the Administrative Court 
decided to ban construction.
Also in Brockdorf the anti-nuclear opposition was expressed 
through mass demonstrations, participation to the public hearing, 
appeals to the court and site occupation. But this time the State 
government of Schleswig-Holstein and the police decided to show 
their strenght. Hundreds of people were wounded and arrested 
during an attempt to occupy the site in October 1976 and during a 
mass demonstration, which became a sort of battle, in November the 
same year. According to Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Poliak (1981: 
p.64), the course of events in Brockdorf was due to contradictory 
perceptions of political authorities and the anti-nuclear 
movement; while the latter drew encouragement from the Wyhl 
experience and tried to repeat it in Brockdorf, the former 
"learned" from Wyhl that no other site occupations should be 
allowed if nuclear programmes were to be fulfilled. But while 
police's interventions were able to prevent site occupation in 
Brockdorf, they could not prevent mass mobilization and appeals to 
the Court. The conjunction of these two elements proved to be 
important since mass mobilization created the condition for making 
the arguments against siting being carefully heard in the Courts, 
and these arguments in turn influenced Courts' decisions. In 
February 1977, just before another planned demonstration in 
Brockdorf, the Administrative Court decided to withdraw the 
license on the ground that inadequate provision had been made for 
waste disposal.
( Beside organizing demonstrations 3 and making appeals to the Courts, the anti-nuclear opposition developed a crucial resource,I i■i.e. expertise. Starting from the early seventies a network of
3 Several demonstrations (for example, against the siting and 
location of the fast breeder reactor at Kalkar, the reprocessing 
plant at Wackersdorf and the nuclear waste repository at Gorleben) 
took place in the seventies and in the eighties, both before and 
after the Chernobyl accident.
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"counter-experts" was established to challenge utilities and 
governmental experts during public hearings, in the Courts and in 
the media. In the early seventies such counter-experts were 
mainly scientists working within the University, particularly in 
the Universities of Bremen, Freiburg and Heidelberg. Since 1977 
some independent/alternative research institutes were also 
created, the first one being the Öko-Institute in Freiburg. In 
addition to conducting research on nuclear matters, these 
institutes have been working also on other environmental issues 
providing expertise to the whole environmental movement and the 
Greens.
Die Qriinen party was created at the Federal level in 1980 
(see, M. Schroeren, 1990) and entered the Federal Parliament 
(Bundestag) in 1983 receiving well over the 5% threshold 
established by the German electoral system to obtain seats at the 
Parliament. The Greens had been also present in the Länder 
Parliament (Bundesrat) and in some Länder governments. During the 
Chernobyl fallout a member of the Green Party, J. Fischer, was 
Minister of Environment in the State of Hessen, runned at that 
time by a SPD-Greens coalition.
a.3. Legislative and institutional framework.
The regulation of nuclear power in the FRG is based on the 
Atomgesetz (Atom law) and its ordinances, the most important one 
being the Strahlenschutzverordnung (Radiation protection 
ordinance)4.
Adopted in December ^ 1959 and modified in 1976, the Atom law 
is ajjned at promoting nuclear power and,^at the same time, 
providing for nuclear safety. With respect to this second aspect, 
the Atom law provides for licensing procedures to be followed with
4 For a careful discussion of nuclear legislation in the FRG see 
Huber, 1991: cap.2. About the Strahlenschutzverordnung see also 
the Introduction by Hans-Michael Veith to the 1989 edition of the 
text.
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respect to the storage and transport of radioactive materials, the 
construction and siting of nuclear plants, and the disposal of 
nuclear waste.
Since the early seventies, two decisions are guiding the 
interpretation of the Atom law. In 1972 the supreme administrative 
court ruled that of the stated goals of the Atom law safety must 
take precedence over the promotion of nuclear power. Moreover, in 
1976 the legislature introduced an amendment to the Atom law 
providing that a nuclear facility may be licensed only after all 
safety precautions have been taken according to the "Stand von 
Wissenschaft und Technik” (the state of science and technology). 
These provisions give the German Courts the possibility to 
consider substantive issues about safety -beside procedural ones- 
during the licensing process 5. Both proponents and opponents of 
nucler power try then to provide scientific arguments on these 
issues when defending their case in the Court.
The issue of safety cannot but be linked to the one of 
radiation protection: no installation can be considered safe if 
health and environment are endangered by radiation. As it was 
already mentioned in previous chapters, this raises controversial 
questions about the possibility to define a safe threshold and 
evaluate health risk in the long term. In the FRG radiation 
protection provisions are established by the Radiation protection 
ordinance. The first Radiation protection ordinance was adopted 
in 1960 * and was aimed at incorporating into Federal legislation 
the basic norms established by art. 33 of the Euratom treaty.
This ordinance (followed by a second one in 1964 and updated in 
1980 and 1984) sets the limit values to the dose levels for 
workers, population and the environment, limits that cannot be 
exceeded by utilities applying for a license and by operating
5 On this point see, Nelkin and Poliak, 1981: cap.11.
6 This ordinance was based on the previous Röntgenverordnung 
adopted in 1941.
166
installations ». These limit values are valid and homogeneous for 
the whole FRG. However they can be regarded as preventive ones 
and not valid in case of an actual radioactive contamination as 
the one caused by the Chernobyl accident. This is why other 
limits were suggested by radiation protection experts during the 
fallout, and why some Länder decided to set different limits from 
the ones recommended by the Federal authorities.
The distinction of competences between Federal and State 
authorities with respect to nuclear matters represents a special 
case of Federal-State relations. According to the general 
principles (established in the Basic law) on which the German 
Federal system is grounded • , the Federal Government and Parliament 
have the bulk of legislative power, but the implementation of both 
Federal and State laws is responsibility of the State authorities. 
With respect to nuclear power this would mean that Länder 
authorities should be responsible for licensing, and that the 
licensing procedures must be followed according to the criteria 
(for example, regarding safety requirements) provided for in the 
Federal legislation, i.e. in the Atom law and in the connected 
ordinances. Instead, the State authorities act in this field on 
the basis of the Bundesauftragsverwaltung which means that the 
main responsible for deciding about licensing is the Federal 
Government that delegates part of this competence to the State 
authorities and, in case of contrasts, prevails in the decision 
process.
However, the State authorities are responsible for two 
aspects that turned out to be particularly important during the 
Chernobyl fallout: radioactivity monitoring and emergency 
management. .As far as monitoring is concerned, there are official
7 Other ordinances and decrees provide for more specific/sectoral 
aspects like the radiation treatment of foodstuffs.
8 Interesting analyses regarding the development and the features 
of the German federal system can be found in Ellwein and Hesse, 
1987; Johnson, 1973; Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975; Meny, 1990.
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measuring laboratories designated by the State governments; these 
laboratories are required to send their results to the Federal 
guiding agencies (like the German Weather Service) for the 
surveillance of radioactivity, however they do not depend on such 
agencies (SSK, 1988b). With respect to the second point, a 
recommendation 9 was issued in 1975 by the Ministry of Interior 
that is also responsible for civil protection and comprehends a 
civil protection department. The mentioned recommendation deals 
with catastrophe management -which is instead responsibility of 
the States- and gives the State administrations a common 
framework to guide action in case of accident in a German nuclear 
plant. While providing for several steps to be taken (from the 
alarm to be given by the plant operator to the decontamination 
procedures), this framework recommendation leaves room for local 
variations. Especially in the case of a nuclear accident not 
provided for by this provision as well as by the whole German 
legislation, that is an accident occurred outside the borders and 
causing a transboundary fallout.
On the basis of this short account of the institutional and 
legislative framework relevant for nuclear risk management in the 
FRG, figure 3 indicates the relations between the responsible 
authorities, the main scientific advisory bodies and industry. As 
in the case of the corresponding figure for the Italian case 
(figure 1), figure 3 does not include other actors that are very 
important in influencing the debate on (and actual development of) 
nuclear power but that are not part of the organization of nuclear 
safety as defined by law. Also in the case of the FRG a plurality 
of related actors, or interorganizational/regulatory network, is 
involved in nuclear risk management. In such network, the 
"centre-periphery" dimension and the role of the industry appear 
more important that in the Italian case, while the inter-ministry 
relations are relatively simpler in the German context. We will
9 ’Rahmenempfelung für den Katastrophenschutz in der Umgebung 
kerntechnischer Anlagen", March 1975.
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see in the next chapters how the network functioned and how it 
changed during and following the Chernobyl accident.
Figure 3, here
b. The Chernobvl crisis.
b .1. Chronicle
On the 28th of April 1986, after receiving the news regarding 
abnormal increases of radioactivity in Sweden, the Federal 
Minister of Interior, F. Zimmermann, called for periodic 
measurements of air contamination by Federal and State monitoring 
institutions. Data were then to be centralized within the 
Lagezentrum (situation centre) of the Interior Ministry.
The following day, the first news on the Chernobyl accident 
were reported, even if less space was dedicated to them by the 
German newspapers in comparison with the Italian ones. In the 
afternoon the Federal Minister of Interior stated, after a meeting 
with the Radiation Protection Commission (SSK), that there was no 
danger for the FRG because Chernobyl was far away. He did not 
mention that, in spite of the distance, increases of radioactivity 
in air were being detected in the meantime by monitoring stations 
in (West-) Berlin and in Brunswick, a town in the north of Germany 
(SSK, 1988b: p.33). Zimmermann also asked the Reactor Safety 
Commission (RSK) to prepare an analysis and evaluation of the 
Chernobyl accident with special reference to the problem of the 
safety of German nuclear plants. A preliminary report prepared by 
the RSK in collaboration with the GRS was presented the 18th of 
June. It concluded that in the light of the Chernobyl accident 
no special measures were needed to improve the safety of German 
nuclear installations (RSK, 1986). The final report issued two 
years later confirmed this conclusion (RSK, 1988).
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News and comments about Chernobyl filled the frontpages of 
the newspapers published on April 30th. Beside emphasizing the 
appeals for help from the USSR and the peculiarities of the Soviet 
reactors, some newspapers briefly mentioned that small increases 
of radioactivity had been detected at the border between the FRG 
and Denmark (FAZ, p.3). At the same time, remarkable increases in 
ground contamination were detected in the South of Germany by 
scientists of the University of Konstanz (Hohenemser et al.,1986). 
A Deputy Speaker of the federal government, N. Schäger, diffused 
another reassuring statement about the absence of health hazard 
for the inhabitants of the FRG.
On the lrst of May the controversy on German nuclear policy 
rekindled. The Greens launched a new anti-nuclear campaign 
characterized by the motto "Tschernobyl ist überall" (Chernobyl is 
everywhere) and the SPD called for a stop of nuclear power 
development while the CDU accused the anti-nuclear opposition to 
spread panic.
In the meantime also a "monitoring controversy" started: 
officials in the state capital of Baden-Württenberg, Stuttgart, as 
well as in Bonn were skeptical about the measurements and reports 
made by independent experts in the South East of Germany. It was 
not until the 5th of May that the University of Konstanz group was 
officially designated as a monitoring station by the state 
government of Baden-Württemberg. More in general, the 
communications between the measuring laboratories of the Länder 
and the guiding monitoring agencies runned by the Federal 
government had been rather problematic during the fallout (SSK, 
1988b: p.28).
On the 2nd of May, the Federal authorities decided, on advice 
of the SSK, to control and limit the imports of fresh foodstuffs 
from eastern European countries, excluding the German Democratic 
Republic. Moreover the SSK recommended a limit value of 500
Becquerel/litre Jodite 131 for milk. This recommendation did not 
prevent Länder*s authorities from referring to lower limit values 
and implementing stricter measures in comparison with the ones 
decided at the Federal level. On the same day, for instance, the 
County president of Konstanz (a member of the CDU) asked the dairy 
industry not to process supplies of milk with contamination 
exceeding 100 Bq/litre and the Minister for Environment of Hessen 
(a member of the Green Party) recomended the citizens of his State 
not to drink milk.
These were the first signs of a problem that characterized 
the Chernobyl emergency in the FRG: the conflicts between the 
federal authorities and some Länder in deciding about 
| countermeasures.
Two days later the SSK recommended additional limit values 
for leafy vegetables (250 Bq per kilogram of iodine-131) and 
other fresh food (100 Bq per kilogram of cesium-137).
Starting from the Bundestag's session held also on the 4th of 
May, the information policy of the Federal government was heavily 
criticized by the SPD and the Greens for being secretive and 
incomplete regarding disclosure of data on the fall-out (officials 
within the Ministry of Interior were bound to "confidentiality" 
j rules) and for being too much reassuring on the "absolute" safety 
I of German nuclear plants. Beside that, the SPD argued for a 
moratorium and for a gradual abandonment of the german nuclear 
programme, while the Greens suggested an immediate "Ausstieg" and 
th£ anti-nuclear movement organized mass demonstrations in 
Hamburg, Berlin, Stuttgart, München, Hannover and at the 
Wackersdorf site asking for the closure of all german plants. The 
Minister of Interior and the Prime Minister H.Kohl (both member of 
the CDU) defended instead the federal management of the Chernobyl 
fallout and the overall German nuclear policy. Concerning the 
issue of safety of nuclear installations, the Prime Minister 
suggested to held in Bonn an international meeting on nuclear
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safety with the participation of all countries producing nuclear 
power.
In the meantime different and sometimes conflicting 
recommendations were given to the population concerning both 
behaviors and limit values. To let children play outdoor was 
declared unadvisable by the authorities of Hessen while it was 
regarded as safe by those of Baden-Württemberg where radioactive 
contamination was higher. The State authorities of Berlin, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Hessen set lower limits than the ones 
recommended by the SSK -Hessen, for instance, set a limit value 
of 20 bq/1. Jodine 131 for milk- and also the government of 
Nordrhein-Westfalen complained that the thresholds recommended by 
the SSK were too high.
In the attempt to control such situation (and while anti- 
nuclear demonstrations were multiplying), on the 8th of May the 
Federal government required the State governments to stick to the 
new advice of the SSK that suggested to have a normal lifestyle 
and a normal diet. The reassuring statements of the government 
and the SSK were debated, and in many case criticized, during 
public meetings and in media reports regarding the issue of short- 
and long-term risk due to radiation.
On May 15 and 16 the SSK debated the potential health impacts 
of the Chernobyl accident in the FRG, including the effects upon 
pregnancies. With respect to this point, a particularly sensitive 
matter of public (particularly women) concern, the SSK argued that 
there was no health risk for the fetus. In April the following 
year the SSK had to address this problem again (and reached the 
same conclusion) due to a report of the Institute for Human 
Genetics of the Free University of Berlin which linked the 
observed rise in the incidence of mongolism in Berlin to the 
radiation exposure caused by the Chernobyl fallout (SSK, 1988b).
172
While the debate on nuclear policy (extensively covered by 
the media) was becoming increasingly "hot", also due to the 
closeness of some State elections, the Federal government decided 
-on the 21st of May- to provide for financial compensations for 
the farmers damaged by the restrictions imposed as a consequence 
of the Chernobyl accident.
The 4th of June 1986 can be regarded as the symbolic end of 
the Chernobyl emergency. On this date, i.e. 40 days after the 
Chernobyl accident, it was officially announced the establishment 
of a new federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection and 
Nuclear Safety. Such Ministry was given the task to deal with the 
consequences of the Chernobyl fallout and with environmental 
problems more in general.
b.2. Analysis
On the basis of the reconstruction offered above, it can be 
noticed that there are both similarities and differences between 
the Italian and the German response to the Chernobyl fallout.
But before examining the similarities and differences between the 
two cases and "test" the hyphothesis I previously suggested (see 
Introduction and cap.2) it can be useful to summarize the 
relations between the main actors -and actions- involved in the 
management of the Chernobyl fallout in the FRG.
Figure 4 indicates (as does figure 2 in relation to the 
Italian case) the action-set that emerged during the fallout and 
the countermeasures that were taken. It can be noticed that the 
Minister of Interior took a leading role at the Federal level.
This was not only due to the concentration of responsibility in 
the field of nuclear regulation -together with the presence of a 
civil protection department- within the Ministry of Interior. It 
was also due to the possibility for such Ministry to rely on 
specialized technical personnell (like the staff working in the 
Lagezentrum) and on an influential in-house advisory body such as
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the SSK (Landfermann, interview). On the other hand, the SSK was 
the only scientific body having both the competence and the 
authority to issue official recommendations, i.e. the only legally 
and politically feasible measures that could be taken (beside 
import restrictions) by the Federal authorities in the given 
circumstances. Also Länder authorities -advised by experts from 
local scientific institutions (including University departments 
and the environmental institutes)- had been crucial actors in 
deciding about measures to be taken. Federal and State 
authorities (as well as the respective advisory bodies) in several 
cases disagreed about the definition of the situation: the first 
ones treating the fallout as a nation-wide problem to be dealt 
with in a homogeneous way at the federal level, the second ones 
emphasizing local differences concerning the degree of 
contamination and/or their competences in the field of catastrophe 
management.
It is worth pointing out that through the presence of a 
Minister of Environment of the Green party in a State government 
(Hessen) and through institutionalized (mainly through the 
environmental institutes) counter-expertise, the anti-nuclear 
movement had been not only an external (within the general 
"public") but also an internal actor in the institutional 
management of the Chernobyl fallout.
The figure also includes the media that played a main role 
(as in the Italian case) both in the diffusion of information and 
in the communication process between the actors involved in the 
decision making process and the different sectors of society.
Figure 4, here
^-When comparing the actor-set that emerged in the FRG (figure 
4) and the one that emerged in Italy (figure 2) during the 
Chernobyl fallout, and taking into account the "Chronicle" 
sketched above, some of the similarities and differences between
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the responses adopted in the two countries to cope with that event 
can be singled out.
The main similarities can be summarized as follows: 1. in 
both countries political and administrative authorities reacted 
quickly and countermeasures were taken in a relatively short time 
(monitoring was intensified as soon as the news from Sweden 
arrived and both the decision of the Italian Health Minister to 
restrict the selling of milk and vegetables and the first 
recommendation of the SSK were made on the 2nd of May); 2. the 
media covered the news about Chernobyl since April 29 emphasizing 
not only what was happening "there" (the accident and its 
consequences in Ukraine) but also "here" (the fallout in Italy and 
in the FRG); 3. independent or "counter"-experts challenged the 
official ones in public; 4. the anti-nuclear movement was very 
active and visible (particularly through mass demonstrations); 5. 
the political parties debated the future of nuclear policy and 
some of them (the Communist and the Socialist Parties in Italy, 
the Social Democratic Party in the FRG) changed their previous 
pro-nuclear position.
On the other hand, differences can be found regarding the 
following points: 1. the political authorities which had a leading 
role in copying with the fallout (the Minister of Health and the 
one of Civil Protection in Italy, the Federal Minister of Interior 
and the Länder authorities in the FRG); 2. the different 
organization -and level of cohesion- of the "in-house" advisory 
bodies (in the FRG the SSK acted as the most important scientific 
advisory institution while in Italy the relevant advisory 
institutions were three -ISS, ENEA and ENEA-DISP- and did not 
always agree); 3. the type of radiological protection measures 
which were adopted (in the FRG recommendations were given about 
activity levels to be taken into account while in Italy a 
Ministerial decree forbade the selling of certain foodstuffs) and 
the way they had been implemented (while in the FRG there had been 
remarkable differences in the way Federal recommendations had been 
accepted and implemented in the Länder, in Italy the measures
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decided at the national level were generally applied at the local 
and regional level even if additional measures were decided in 
several cases).
j In few words, both in Italy and in the FRG similar forms of
scientific and organizational uncertainties were met but they were 
Udealt with in a partially different manner.
In order to understand why this was the case, it is now time
to analyse which shape took the relations between experts,
politicians, the anti-nuclear movement and the mass media and how 
did such relations influenced the response to Chernobyl in the 
FRG.
b.2.1. Interpreting scientific information to provide policy 
advice.
As it was already mentioned, the SSK had a leading role in 
providing political authorities with policy relevant -and usable- 
knowledge. More than that, the SSK directly formulated the
countermeasures (which took the form of recommendations) to be
taken. This process of formulation -while uncontroversial within 
the SSK- was not easy. Beside that, in some cases both its 
premises and its conclusions were criticized by external experts.
Also in the FRG the actual composition of the radioactivity 
emission was not known by the end of April-beginning of May 1986 
due to restrict information from the USSR. The first 
recommendations of the SSK had then to be formulated on the basis 
of the results of radioactivity monitoring in the FRG and in some 
other affected countries. Unfortunately also in this respect 
restriction of information proved not to be a peculiarity of the 
USSR; in fact the German authorities were not allowed to know the 
results of monitoring from the neighbouring Eastern countries and 
France (Oberhausen, interview). Even if in the FRG no serious 
gaps were found in the monitoring network (as it was instead the 
case in Italy), additional laboratories had to be integrated into 
the monitoring programme at the federal and state level. The
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areas of emphasis in the monitoring programme were selected by 
each state in a partially divergent manner (SSK b, 1988: p.30) in 
this way adding inhomogeneity to the already not very homogeneous 
distribution of laboratories specialized on different monitoring 
domains (air, water, food, etc.). Beside that, the communication 
of data between the state laboratories and the federal guiding 
agencies were problematic due to the great volume of work arising 
from the event. In these conditions, the experts of the SSK (like 
their collegues in other affected countries) had to make choices 
concerning the isotopes and the relevant food matrix to be 
selected in order to formulate their recommendations.
The need for specific recommendations arose from the fact 
that it was not possible to apply in a direct manner the dose 
limits set down in the Radiological Protection Ordinance. Such 
limits were of concern in planning the construction and operation 
of installations and the technical measures against accident; but 
they did not refer to actual accidents. Taking this legal "gap” 
into account, the SSK inspired its recommendations to the 
principle that, "(..) also in a crisis of this type, the radiation 
exposure to persons should be held (...) at such a low level as 
can reasonably be attained" (SSK a, 1988; p.48). Obviously 
principles can be interpreted and applied in different ways.
After specifying that according to Section 45 of the Radiological 
Protection Ordinance a thyroid dose of 90 mrem per year is not to 
be exceeded for a population in the vicinity of nuclear 
facilities, the SSK decided (unanimously) that a standard value of 
3 rem (3 rem = 3000 mrem) of thyroid dose was acceptable for 
infants "under prevailing conditions" (SSK a, 1988; p.50). The 
limits to activity levels in milk and other foodstuffs were set on 
the basis of this decision.
While the limits set by the SSK had been lower -and therefore 
more protective- than those applied in other countries (like ♦ 
France) io, they were criticized by many German scientists outside
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the governmental advisory bodies. Among them, called by the SSK 
"would-be" or "self-appointed" experts (SSK b, 1988: p.vii and 
p.236 ), one can mention the scientists working within the Öko- 
Institute of Freiburg who argued against the decision to consider 
"acceptable" the limits set by the SSK (SZ, 10.5.1986) and those
of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research of
Heidelberg (IFEU, 11.5.1986) who recommended the adoption of limit 
values also for meat and to pay attention to contamination of 
breast milk, an issue lately addressed by the SSK in its 
recommendations of May 15-16.
Independently from judgements regarding who was eventually 
right -the experts within the SSK or their critics- on a "purely" 
scientific ground, it is interesting to point out that the last
ones exercized a sort of non-official "peer review" on the work of
governmental experts. In this way non-governmental scientists 
stimulated (or even obliged) the members of governmental advisory 
bodies to give reasons for their advice both in their documents
(land directly in public, particularly through the mass media. In 
other words, what could have been a close and technocratic 
I decision making process was instead a partially public and 
adversarial one. This element, together with the environmental 
awareness -and worries- widespread among the German citizens, also 
encouraged a relatively strict application of the Vorsorgeprinzip 
(precautionary principle) by the experts of S S K in setting limit
It is worth noticing that the polarization between 
governmental (mainly the members of SSK) and non governmental 
experts that characterized the interpretation and utilization of
10 France initially set a limit value of 3700 Bq/1 and then 2000 
Bq/1 of Iodine 131 in milk, while the limit of 500 Bq/1 set in the 
FRG was/is adopted also in Italy. Interestingly enough the 
"record" of the higher admitted limit values for Iodine 131 
belongs to UK (14000 bq/1 for adults, 5200 for children and 2000 
for babies) followed by Poland (10000 for adults and 1000 for 
children). The lowest limit values are set in Greece (250) and 
Austria (370). For a complete "list of numbers" see SSK, 1988 b; 
p.186).
values
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knowledge for policy purposes during the Chernobyl fallout is 
rather unusual in the German context* A context (usually referred 
to as "corporatist system") where decisions are usually made 
thorugh negotiations between interest groups and where experts 
linked with the most powerful interest groups, in the nuclear case 
those working within the nuclear industry, play an important role_ 
in policy decisions. During the fallout, the nuclear industry 
took part in the debate only indirectly, that is through those 
members of governmental advisory bodies (SSK and RSK) who are also 
members of bodies aimed at promoting nucler power such as the 
German Atomic Forum u.
The relatively low profile kept in public by German industry 
experts concerning the management of the Chernobyl fallout can be 
attributed to the predominance of health protection and emergency 
management aspects in deciding about measures to be adopted. This 
predominance meant, on the one hand, that public authorities were 
responsible according to the law, and were held responsible by 
citizen initiatives, for taking action; on the other hand, the 
nuclear industry and its experts had no interest in getting 
publicly involved in controversial health and emergency management 
issues and thus avoided to do so. Also the matter that was most 
important for them, that is the "defence" of German plants against 
the argument put forward by the anti-nuclear movement that all 
nuclear plants are unsafe, was mainly dealt with by the RSK, i.e. 
a governmental advisory body, and by (nuclear) research
I institutions such as the Karlsruhe and the Jtilich centres. This can be regarded as an indicator of both government and nuclear | industry willingness to keep the reactor safety issue as "neutral" 
as possible against its "politicization" by the anti-nuclear 
movement and to cope with the generalized distrust towards nuclear
1 industry by the German public 12.
11 For instance, Prof.R.Neider of SSK (source, Die Grünen im 
Bundestag informieren: SSK, Bonn). On the affiliations of members 
of SSK and RSK over time, see Buber, 1991: cap.5 and Anhang IV.
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Given the low profile kept in public by industry experts, the 
polarization between governmental experts and counter-experts 
emerged X3. And the fact that in the Chernobyl case the latter 
(and the anti-nuclear movement) played a major role in framing the 
scientific and political debate and in contributing to the 
formulation of the corresponding policy options represented a 
challenge to corporatists arrangements. In face of an 
unprecedented event and in dealing with a single issue,_a more
pluralistic process seemed to prevail 1«.
b.2.2. Federal and state countermeasures, or the political 
management of uncertain knowledge.
Beside the disagreements between official and counter­
experts, problems arose concerning the utilization of scientific 
advice -and by whom- to take practical actions at the national as 
well as at the local level.
At the national level, no significant inter-ministry conflict 
took place and the Minister of Interior emerged immediately (due 
to the already mentioned reasons) as the chief federal authority 
responsible for the management of the fallout. He relied on the
advice of its advisory bodies and tried to utilize the
recommendations of the SSK to impose a definition of the situation 
as a nation wide problem to be dealt with in a centralized and 
homogeneous way. The Minister of Health, especially through its 
Institute of Radiation Hygiene, played a role only in the 
coordination of monitoring activities and in supporting the 
recommendations of the SSK.
12 On this last point see the survey made by Peters et al., 1987 
(also quoted in the next paragraph).
13 This polarization indirectly included industry since several 
counter-experts and the Greens (Lindemann, interview; Wollny, 
interview) accused governmental experts to be on the side of the 
nuclear industry.
14 On the prevailing of pluralist politics over corporatist 
arrangements in German nuclear policy see also, Hatch, 1991.
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The most important inter-organizational uncertainty to be 
dealt with in the German case was not the one between different 
Ministries as in the Italian case, but between Federal and State 
authorities (and in some cases also between State and local 
authorities).
While most Länder followed the recommendations issued at the 
federal level, some did not; moreover, in some cases there had 
been differences in the adoption and implementation of 
countermeasures also within the same State. Generally these 
federal/state and intra-state differences were not linked to 
differences in the problem, i.e. different levels of radioactive 
contamination, to be dealt with. In fact stricter measures 
(including lower limit values) with respect to the federal ones 
had not been adopted in the States most affected by the fallout 
(like Bayern) but in areas where the radioactive contamination had 
been relatively low (like Hessen). Let us see some reasons for 
this.
j Access to scientific expertise had been an important
determinant of administrative action. The lack of independent 
scientific institutions or in-house advisory bodies to resort to 
was a main element that made most Lander authorities follow the 
recommendations of the SSK (Prokop et al., 1989: cap.2, par.4).
On the other hand, the availability of/access to expertise from 
local universities and research centres increased the rapidity and 
duration of administrative measures at the state level (Czada, 
1990).
But an even more important element to be taken into 
consideration is the way scientific advice -when available- was 
utilized* In Konstanz, for instance, the County President 
accepted the advice of independent experts -who discovered and 
stressed the high contamination of the Konstanz area- in order to 
act quickly and in a "legitimate" way (thanks to the independence 
of experts), and thus responding to the citizens initiatives which 
were starting in his town. In these circumstances he took 
measures (the 100 Bq/1 limit value for I 131) that were not looked
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favourably by the State (Baden-Württemberg) and the Federal 
government, even if he was a member of the party (CDU) ruling both
11 these governments. In general, however, the way scientific 
(i advice was used to take action was very much influenced by 
political considerations. In the State of Hessen especially 
restrictive measures were taken mainly because of the Green 
affiliation of its Environment Minister; in this case, the most 
precautionary criteria in the selection and interpretation of 
scientific evidence were looked for and applied. Similarly, the 
Länder runned by the SPD were more critical towards the measures 
decided by the SSK and the Federal Minister of Interior and 
defended their right to act autonomously; the advice of counter­
experts was in this case useful in issuing different or additional 
countermeasures. Most Länder ruled by the CDU were instead 
"faithful" to the federal recommendations and to the overall 
management of the Chernobyl emergency and did not look for -or did 
not listen to- scientific advice coming from non-official sources.
It can then be concluded that inter-organizational 
uncertainties concerning the responsibilitie of Federal, State and 
local authorities where managed through party politics channels 
and through the resort either to official or to non governmental 
experts by the various political and administrative actors.
Two issues were at stake in the federal/state and intra-state 
controversies that characterized the response to Chernobyl in the 
FRG. On the one hand, whether it is preferable to have a 
centralized or a decentralized disaster management, and how the 
two levels could be possibly be coordinated. On the other hand, 
whether there are "objective" criteria t o b e  followed in the 
political management of scientific uncertainty, i.e. in selecting 
and utilizing experts* conflicting advices to make policy 
decisions. These issue were addressed in the months that followed 
the accident.
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b.2.3. Mass media and public opinion.
The German mass media covered extensively the news about 
Chernobyl during the fallout and in the following months.
A content analysis of the German press (Merten et al., 1990) 
shows that the thematic bandwidth of the reporting on Chernobyl 
centers around the event and its direct consequences (44.7%), 
followed by the nuclear power controversy and energy policy 
(28.6%), and that the geographical focus shifted in few days after 
the accident from the Chernobyl area and its surroundings to the 
FRG (Mertens et al.,1990: pp.5,8).
The mentioned study also indicates that generally the German 
media oscillated between offering alarming or reassuring 
information and that they reported much more diffuse (like 
opinions) than concrete (i.e.factual) information (Merten et al., 
1990: pp.8-9). These two phenomena can be regarded as reflecting 
the contradictory information (also concerning the countermeasures 
to be taken) coming from Federal and State authorities, experts 
holding different scientific views, nuclear industry and anti- 
nuclear groups.
With respect to experts as (contradictory) sources of media 
information, it has to be mentioned that difficulties were met -as 
in the Italian case- in the process of communication among 
experts, journalists and the public. The official spokesmann and 
chairmann of the SSK during the Chernobyl emergency complained, 
for instance, that "if you say no acute risk, you will be 
translated by the journalists no risk" (Oberhausen, interview).
On the other hand, the journalists had a difficult time in 
"translating", selecting, organizing and reporting scientific- 
technical matters (including the often not explicit or rather 
subtle points of disagreements between different experts) 
according to both the rules of scientific and media communication.
Interestingly enough, a survey conducted 6-7 months after 
Chernobyl (Peters et al., 1987) shows that in spite of the 
contradictions in the information provided by different sources,
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all these sources -with the exception of the nuclear industry 
(regarded as not credible)- were considered more or less equally 
credible. While discarding too radical judgements about 
information sources (which were regarded as completely credible 
or, on the contrary, completely untrustworthy by less than 10% of 
the interviewees), the majority of interviewees said to consider 
them partly credible (Peters et al., 1987: p.19). Also 
journalists were included among these partly credible sources 
(beside acting as "vehicles" or "translators") of information. On 
the other hand, the perception of the threat linked with Chernobyl 
was highly influenced by the contradictory and, at the same time, 
partly credible information spread by the media. As emerges from 
the same survey, a considerable proportion of the interviewees 
answered "don't know" -in this way expressing subjective 
uncertainty- to the questions about possible damages to personal 
health and to the health of one's own children as well as 
concerning the presumable number of fatalities in the FRG owing to 
the reactor disaster at Chernobyl (Peters et al., pp.9-11). Also 
in the FRG then, the pro and cons of pluralistic and contradictory 
information were experienced.
The mass media played an active role in reporting news about 
the accident, its consequences and the measures decided by the 
federal and state authorities. Moreover, they provided an arena 
of communication between different sectors of society concerning 
risk and safety issues, energy policy and other related socio­
political problems. And this public dimension, together with the 
pressures exercized by the anti-nuclear movement, the informal 
"peer review" provided by counter-experts and the competition 
between the major political parties (CDU and SPD), favoured a 
relatively high degree of responsiveness (for example, in terms of 
the precautionary measures taken and the explanation of reasons 
for issuing them) of political authorities and their advisers.
However a diffused "half-trust" attitude towards the various 
information sources and a "don't know" feeling (that contrasted 
with the impressive quantity of information disseminated by the
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media) were experienced by lay people. These reactions were the 
result of the oscillation between alarmistic and reassuring tones 
together with the diffusion of "contradictory certainties" 
expressed by different sources (no danger/serious danger, German 
plants are absolutely safe/no nuclear plant is safe, ect.) 
accompanied with scarce and uncertain evidence (about the causes 
of the accident, about the composition of the radioactive "cloud”, 
about the risk for health due to low doses of radiation, etc.).
Forms of centralized risk communication have been suggested 
in the FRG to deal with these problems. They will be discussed in 
the following pages.
b.3. Concluding remarks
Summing up, the German response to the Chernobyl fallout can 
be understood on the basis of the patterns of interactions between 
policy makers, experts, the anti-nuclear opposition and the media, 
and the way information and knowledge (resources that proved to be 
crucial in the Chernobyl case) were utilized in defining the 
problem and responding to it. These elements also explain the 
similarities and differences between the German and the Italian 
cases.
Regarding the first point, relatively (in comparison with 
other countries) strict and timely precautionary measures were 
taken at the Federal level due to:
a. the advice of governmental experts (mainly those of SSK) who 
adapted existing norms -i.e.the Radiological Protection Ordinance- 
to the Chernobyl case on the basis of the principle that also in 
crises of that type radiation exposure should be kept as low as 
can be reasonably (a key word in evaluating options) attained.
b. The activism of the anti-nuclear opposition (including a 
political party, the Greens, sitting in the Bundestag and 
participating in some State and local governments) and several 
counter-experts who constantly "monitored" and challenged SSK’s 
recommendations.
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c. The initiatives decided by some State authorities that could
undermine the authority of the Federal Minister of Interior in the
field of nuclear policy in case he would not be able to take a
leading role in the management the crisis.
d. The media coverage of the event as a domestic -beside foreign- 
problem and the visibility given by the media to conflicting views 
expressed by different experts and politicians.
Also the inhomogeneous implementation of Federal 
recommendations can be explained by the above mentioned elements, 
but "filtered" through party politics since the way experts' ||
advice was utilized and the way public concerns were dealt with j(
were heavily influenced by the competition between political 
parties.
As far as differences and similarities between the Italian 
and the German cases are concerned, the main differences are 
mainly due to two elements: the different features of centre- 
periphery relations in the two countries (German Länder have much 
more responsibilities and authonomy than the Italian Regions), and 
the quasi-monopoly of responsibility in the field of nucler policy 
within one Ministry (the Ministry of Interior) in the FRG against 
the fragmentation of responsabilities between different Ministries 
(Industry, Health, Civil Protection, Interior) in Italy. The 
similarities can be instead regarded as the result of the 
following factors: a. the bargainings between governmental 
authorities (between different Ministries in Italy, between 
Federal and State authorities in the FRG); b. the presence in both 
countries of a strong anti-nuclear movement; c. the public 
dimension of both scientific and political uncertainties and 
controversies (and the corresponding need for experts and 
politicians to make arguments and take actions to preserve their 
credibility in the eyes of the public is) through media coverage.
15 On the issue of credibility in the context of the response to 
the Chernobyl fallout in the FRG see, Krohn and Weingart, 1986.
As we will see in the next chapter, an almost successful 
attempt to partially hide and partially play down uncertainties 
-due to very different patterns of interaction between policy 
makers, experts, anti-nuclear groups and the media- brought about 
a very different response to the Chernobyl fallout.
c. The years after.
Following the immediate response to Chernobyl, remarkable 
changes occurred in the FRG with respect to nuclear risk 
management. A new Ministry was established only forty days after 
the accident, a new law in the field of radiation protection was 
passed some months later, new framework recommendations concerning 
catastrophe management were adopted in December 1988. Other 
changes aimed at standardizing legal and institutional settings in 
the field of nuclear regulation are in progress following the 
German reunification. Beside that, also changes in the nuclear 
policy debate took place. The Greens formulated a programme for 
an immediate opting out, while the SPD announced a programme for a 
gradual abandonment of nuclear power during its Congress in summer 
1986 and presented a bill on the same subject in February 1987.
However there had been no substantial changes in German nuclear J 
policy. f'
c.l. Post-Chernobyl events 
c .1.1. The Ministry for Environment.
The establishment of the Federal Ministry for Environment,
Nature Protection and Reactor Safety (Bundesminister fur Umwelt, 
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, BMU) was a direct political 
consequence of Chernobyl. Since its announcement in the 
newspapers on the 4th of June 1986, it has been widely recognized«
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that the quick creation of the Ministry for Environment was a 
tactical move of the Federal government -mainly of Chancellor
H.Kohl- to contrast the SPD opposition and gain credibility in the 
eyes of the public. Especially following the criticisms (not only 
from the opposition) addressed against the restrictive information 
policy and the authoritarian management of the emergency by the 
Minister of Interior.
Even if tactical rather than substantive reasons underly the 
creation of the new Ministry, it has to be noted that such 
Ministry -while not being among the most powerful and rich ones 
(as it is always the case with Environment Ministries)- is not 
merely a "façade". Beside being responsible for important 
matters, the new Ministry is in fact expanding its funding and 
personnel and developing in-house technical resources.
The BMU assumed responsibilities previously resting on three 
different Ministries: reactor safety and radiation protection from 
the Ministry of Interior, nature protection activities from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, radiation higyene and control of food 
contamination from the Ministry of Health. These fields of 
activity are dealt with by different sections of the BMU, with the 
section on nuclear safety and radiation protection working in 
relative isolation from the others (Landfermann, interview).
Concerning radiation protection, the BMU is responsible for 
the publication of an yearly report (till Chernobyl prepared by 
the Health Ministry) on radioactivity levels in the environment 
and in food. Moreover, in November 1989 aJFederal Office for. 
Radiation Protection was established within the BMU. Such office, 
that includes the Institute of Radiation Hygiene previously within 
the Ministry of Health and a section on plants safety which 
substitute the GRS, conducts and coordinates research and 
monitoring activities; moreover it organizes the meetings of the 
advisory commissions (SSK and RSK).
16 See, for instance, the first page of Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung of the 4.1.1986 and Weidner, 1989. Interviews confirmed 
this view.
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The creation of the new Ministry and its subsequent 
development may have had one unintended side effect, i.e. the 
institutionalization of citizens'concerns about the safety of 
nuclear facilities within the government, as indicated by a 
statement by CDU's leader and Minister for the Environment 
K.Töpfer who said that it was part of his task to create a future 
without nuclear power (see, Batch, 1991: p.93). Even if this 
statement (as any statement) can be just a component of a symbolic 
politics 17, the possibility that institutional conflicts may arise 
between a Ministry having the task of guaranteeing environment 
protection -including protection from ionizing radiation- and 
supervising nuclear safety and Ministries (beside interest groups) 
aimed at promoting nuclear industry and/or research should not be 
underestimated. And those conflicts could involve and involve 
serious consequence for the overall German nuclear policy.
c.1.2. The Radiation Protection Precautionary Act.
In December 1986 the Strahlenschutzvorsorgegesetz i» (Radiation 
Protection Precautionary Act) -StrVG- was passed.
Also the StrVG can be regarded as a direct consequence of 
Chernobyl. Not only because this act is aimed at complementing 
the already mentioned Radiation Protection Ordinance by 
establishing tasks and responsibilities in case of nuclear 
accidents, including those occurring outside the FRG. But also 
because it addresses specifically the issue of the distinction of 
federal and state responsibilities in the field of monitoring and 
information and in setting limit values in cases of nuclear 
accidents.
17 On the creation of the BMU as part of the "renaissance der 
symbolischen Umwltpolitik” see Weidner, 1989. Also on the BMU, 
but from a different perspective, see also Pehle, 1988.
18 See, Strahlenschutzvorsorgegesetz, Kommentar von Dr.jur.
H.Roewer, Heymanns Verlag KG, 1988.
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According to the StrVG, both the responsibility for 
evaluating and disseminating data and for issuing limit values 
rest on the Federal Ministry for Environment. The clear intention 
underlying the Act is then to solve the problem of possible 
federal-state conflicts in these fields (like those experienced 
during the Chernobyl fallout) by centralizing responsibility.
In this respect it can be argued that it is certainly useful, 
especially in emergency situations, to have a centralized source 
of data: this allows decision-makers to have a basis to guide 
action, and gives citizens the possibility to ask for information 
by knowing where most data are actually gathered. However, as 
far as the second point is concerned, citizens should have not 
only the possibility to ask but also to obtain access to data 
(including raw data) otherwise the source cannot be regarded as 
reliable and trustworthy. Because of this, and also due to 
technical problems that can hamper the quick centralization of 
data in case of unforeseen and catastrophic events, it seems 
advisable not to undermine but to take benefit from a plurality of 
independent and decentralized sources.
Moreover, the decision to centralize within a Federal 
Ministry the responsibility for setting limit values and issuing 
recommendations to be followed by the States rises controversial 
questions. For instance, whether centralized and homogeneous 
measures or decentralized and differentiated ones should be 
preferred -especially in the first days, when local conditions can 
be very important- in case of a radioactive fallout.
c.1.,3. Framework recommendations in case of nuclear accidents.
The previously mentioned Framework recommendations for 
disaster management in case of nuclear accidents, firstly issued 
in 1975, were updated in December 1988 19 .
19 Rahmenempfehlungen für den Katastrophenschutz in der Umgebung 
kerntechnischer Anlagen, 1.12.1988, GMB1,1989.
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While not modifying most of the already detailed provisions 
(from alarm to evacuation) contained in the original 
recommendations, in the introduction of the updated version it is 
emphasized that the plans, recommendations and measures for 
disaster management have to be agreed upon at the federal and 
state level according to the new provisions of the StrVG.
Also this emphasis on federal-state coordination can be 
regarded as a result of the Chernobyl experience. However the 
form of this coordination, which favours (being based on the 
StrVG) a center-focused relation, raises again the issue of the 
preferability of centralized and homogeneous or decentralized and 
differentiated disaster measures in case of fallout.
c.1.4. Adaptation to the new political situation.
Since the beginning of 1990 a commission formed by officials 
and experts of East and West Germany has been discussing the 
problems of nuclear safety and radiation protection within the FRG 
and the GDR, and then in the reunified Germany (Landfermann, 
interview).
First of all it has been decided that, starting from the 1st 
of July 1990 until the reunification, the Atom Law and the 
Radiation Protection Ordinance and Act would be valid also in the 
GDR. Beside the extended validity of the FRG's legislation also 
in the GDR, also some specific measures had been taken. For 
instance, following an analysis of the safety of nuclear plants in 
the GDR, the decision was made to shut-down four of them within 
1990. A radiation protection project was also launched regarding 
workers and population exposition to radon in the South of former 
GDR where there are mines of uranium.
Many other problems are being faced in harmonizing nuclear 
risk management regulations and practices in the context of the 
reunified Germany especially due to the different economic 
conditions between the Ländern that belonged to former West and
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East Germany and the differences (and deficiencies) in the 
administrative setting.
c.1.5. Nuclear policy debate.
Following Chernobyl, an increased anti-nuclear attitude 
spread among the public in the FRG as well as in many other 
countries 20.
With respect to political parties not only the Greens, who 
always opposed nuclear power, but also the SFD asked for a 
modification of German energy policy and the abandonment of 
nuclear power over a transition period 2 1. The Greens suggested an 
immediate withdrawal from nuclear energy (see, Das Parlament, 
31.5.1986) while the SPD formulated a plan for a gradual 
withdrawal and presented a bill on this subject (Deutscher 
Bundestag, Drucksache 11/13, 19.2.87). Immediate withdrawal was 
favoured in 1987 by 9% of a survey's respondents (Peters et al., 
1987: 16) and gradual withdrawal by 31%; moreover, 31% of 
interviewees were against the building of new nuclear plants.
As far as other political paries are concerned, CDU and FDP 
maintained their support to nuclear power but started experiencing 
internal conflicts on this issue 22.
20 Regarding the increased opposition to nuclear power after 
Chernobyl in eleven countries (including the FRG, France and 
Italy) see Hohenemser and Renn, 1988: p. 11.
21 Oscillations and internal conflicts regarding nuclear issues 
characterized the SPD before Chernobyl; in some States (for 
instance, Hessen and Schleswig-Holstein) SPD representatives took 
a stand against nuclear power already in the early eighties but 
this was not the official position of the party. The Direction of 
SPD called for a cjradual abandonment of nuclear power in the 
evening of 29 Aprxl 1986 and this policy orientation was confirmed 
during the SPD congress held in Summer 1986 (see, Hatch, 1991; 
Krohn and Weingart, 1986).
22 Beside the mentioned remarks by CDU's leader and Minister for 
Environment K.Töpfer, it can be remainded that following Chernobyl 
a group against nuclear power was formed within the CDU
(Christlische Demokraten gegen Atomkraft) and that the FDP's
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In spite of increased anti-nuclear opposition and 
controversies within the parties supporting nuclear power, no 
substantive changes occurred in German (Federal) nuclear policy; 
the SPD bill was rejected and the FRG (before and even more 
following the reunification) remains among the larger producers of 
nuclear power. However, some Ländern governments initiated steps 
to shut down the reactors operating in their territory (Schleswig- 
Holstein, Hamburg) or refused to issue licenses for new plants 
(for instance, North Rhine-Westphalia refused to license the 
Kalkar fast breeder reactor) and important projects such as the 
Wackersdorf reprocessing plant were cancelled for economic and 
political reasons 23.
c.2. Learning fron Chernobyl?
The differences between the changes that occurred in Italy 
and in the FRG as a consequence of Chernobyl are remarkable.
First of all, an increased anti-nuclear opposition (including 
the changed position of some previously pro-nuclear parties) was 
experienced in both countries. But while such opposition had a 
direct impact on Italian nuclear policy, it did not cause major 
changes in the German one.
Moreover, and partially as a consequence of the previous 
point, different kinds of legal, organizational and technical 
adaptations had been made.
Reasons for these differences can be found in the patterns of 
interactions between actors -also due to the different weight of 
nuclear policy in the two countries and the difference between the
General Secretary H.Haussmann called for a graduated Ausstieg 
(see, Hatch, 1991).
23 Giving as reasons the rising estimated costs for the facility, 
the uncertainties surrounding the license process and the 
continuous anti-nuclear opposition, the German companies concluded 
an agreement with the French company COGEMA to reprocess their 
fuel (see, Der Spiegel, April 1989; Hatch, 1990).
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Italian and the German administrative structure- and in some 
different features of these actors in Italy and the FRG.
Interactions between actors had been significantly marked by 
-and channelled through- party politics since in both countries 
the nuclear issue had been a political issue already before 
Chernobyl and even more after the accident, when the debate 
regarding the continuation or suspension of the nuclear programmes 
rekindled.
Conflicts between parties had been stronger in the German 
case where the nuclear issue represented a more important point of 
party competition, especially between CDU and SPD, than in the 
Italian case where even the ruling Christian Democratic party that 
always supported nucler power took a moderately "critical” 
position in the occasion of the anti-nuclear referenda (see 
cap.4). This different degree of conflict between parties can be 
understood on the basis of the different weight of the nuclear 
issue and the different composition of governmental coalitions in 
the two countries.
Concerning the first point, it is self-evident that the large 
nuclear programme of the FRG had a more important economic and 
political weight than the very limited Italian one due to the 
following elements: the greater economic resources allocated for 
the German programme, the higher percentage of electricity 
produced through nucler power in the FRG, the presence of both a 
strong nuclear industry and a complex network of nuclear 
technical/scientific bodies (see figure 3) that would collapse or 
need radical restructurations in case the German nuclear programme 
would be suspended. With respect to the second point, it must be 
noticed that in Italy the Socialist Party -that took an anti- 
nuclear position following Chernobyl 2*- had been within the
24 It is worth noticing that in this respect the Italian Socialist 
Party (PSI) was influenced by the position taken by the SPD; it 
was in fact after the SPD Congress in Summer 1986, and making 
explicit reference to it, that PSI Direction announced its shift
194
governmental coalitions during and following the accident, while 
in the FRG the parties opposing nuclear power (SPD and Greens) 
were located outside the federal government in 1986 and lost also 
in some state elections in the following years. As a consequence, 
the "strategic strenght" of anti-nuclear positions within the 
party system was higher in the Italian context.
Another actor that played an important role in the political 
debate that followed the Chernobyl fallout had been the anti- 
nuclear movement. Such movement had been very strong and visible 
in Italy and even more in the FRG before, during and after 
Chernobyl; moreover, in both countries the anti-nuclear positions 
are represented within the party system by Green parties and, with 
a different degree of commitment, by other parties. But (a part 
from the above mentioned differences regarding the strenght of 
anti-nuclear positions within the German and Italian party 
systems), while in the FRG the anti-nuclear movement appealed 
frequently to the Court starting from the early seventies, it 
could not organize -due to legal constraints- a national 
referendum like the one promoted by the Italian anti-nuclear 
organizations. Therefore, while the latter could take advantage 
of a nation-wide forum of debate as the referenda campaign and 
could exercize a remarkable political pressure through the 
referenda regarding the Italian nuclear programme, the German 
anti-nuclear movement could not challenge the German programme as 
a whole by using a legal (consultative) instrument. But it 
continued to influence the shape of the nuclear debate and 
contributed to the abandonment or delaying of some projects, like
Wackersdorf and Kalkar, following Chernobyl.
As far as this last point is concerned, it must be also
mentioned that the abandonment of specific projects and the
continuation of others and of the overall nuclear programme is 
made possible by the federal structure of the FRG. Due to such
from "critical" support to opposition to nucler power (see Ceri, 
1987).
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structure, the government of a Land cannot take decisions 
regarding the overall German nuclear policy but can boycott/delay 
certain projects that are favored by the Federal government 25.
The main point to be made on the basis of the remarks offered 
above is that a similar general 26 framing of the problem in terms 
of continuation or suspension of the nuclear programmes, gave rise 
to different "answers" in the Italian and German context due to 
the different power of pro- and anti-nuclear positions within the 
political (party) sphere. In turn these different "answers" (the 
abandonment of the nuclear programme in Italy, its continuation 
-while with difficulties- in the FRG) gave rise to different kinds 
of legal, technical and organizational adaptations.
In the following an interpretation of the changes that 
occurred in the FRG as a consequence of Chernobyl (including the 
mentioned adaptations) is offered to understand whether they can 
be reagarded as results of a learning process.
c.2.1. Changes in the framing of issues.
As in the Italian case, the post-Chernobyl debate was framed 
in the FRG according to the far from new dichotomy "yes/no to 
nuclear power". Besides, in both cases some shifts of emphasis 
regarding the issue of the "manageability" of nuclear power 
occurred within that general frame. However, differences can be 
noticed regarding these shift of emphasis or even "sub-frames".
During and following the Chernobyl fallout, especially 
governmental authorities (at the federal and state level) but also
25 It can be noted that, while not being a federal system, also in 
Italy local authorities played a main role -before Chernobyl- in 
hampering the implementation of the national nuclear programme. 
This was due to the relatively important weight (more important 
than, for instance, in the French case) of Italian regions.
26 Within this general frame, some "sub-frames" can be 
distinguished. See next paragraph, "Changes in the framing of 
issues".
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experts, anti-nuclear groups and the media pointed to two 
problems: the distinction of responsibilities in case of major 
accidents and the management of information.
In face of the controversies between federal and state 
authorities with respect to the measures to be taken, opposing 
arguments for centralization or decentralization of 
responsibilities were suggested. The first ones (put forward by 
federal authorities and some experts 27) stressed the need for 
centralized responsibility at the federal level to avoid that 
different and uncoordinated measures are taken within the country 
as happened during the Chernobyl fallout. Others (including some 
state authorities, other experts 28 and the Greens) emphasized 
instead the need for decentralized responsibility on the basis of 
various arguments such as the local variations that occurred 
during the Chernobyl fallout and that could occur in similar 
cases, and/or the risk that too many competences are concentrated 
at the federal level.
Also the information management problem was framed in terms 
of centralization vs decentralization. The arguments for 
centralization being based on the assumption that contradictory 
information is bad and should be avoided, the arguments for 
decentralization assuming instead that pluralistic information is 
better than clear but one-sided information.
In other words, the shift towards management aspects within 
the general frame "yes or no to nuclear power" involved in the FRG 
the emerging of a "sub-frame" -also dichotomic- regarding the 
preferability of centralized or decentralized nuclear risk 
management. It can be noted that the emerging of such "sub-frame" 
was influenced by the general federal/state dichotomic frame 
characterizing German policy making; in other words, two previous
27 This view was expressed, for example, by Mr. Landfermann and by 
Prof. Oberhausen during interviews done within the framework of 
this study.
28 As a case in point one can mention the experts of the 
University of Konstanz (see Czada, 1990).
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frames (rather than one as in the Italian case) conditioned the 
reframing of nuclear issues in the FRG.
c.2.2. Policy, legal, organizational, technical adaptations.
Differently from the Italian case, no "core policy change" 
occurred in the FRG.
However, the abandonment of the Wackersdorf reprocessing 
plant project and the very likely abandonment or radical change - 
for example, to use it for research rather than for energy 
production- of the Kalkar fast breeder reactor seems to involve an 
(implicit) policy change. A change that can be regarded as 
"peripheral" but at the same time could imply a "weakening of the 
core". In other words, a trade-off seems to be ongoing where 
specific and especially controversial projects are discontinued in 
order to smooth the opposition to the nuclear programme as a whole 
and to continue operating the "normal" plants. While 
"peripheral", since the continuation of the nuclear programme is 
pursued as a main policy goal, this change might affect the core 
of nuclear policy by introducing limitations and specification as 
regards the type of projects that can be regarded as "safe" in 
economic and political terms.
Beside this change, other peripheral adaptations (legal, 
organizational, technical adaptations) were made concerning 
various aspects of nuclear risk management. They can be 
summarized as follows.
Emergency planning and information procedures.
The already mentioned legal adaptations, mainly the adoption 
of the StrVG and the new version of the framework recommendations 
in case of nuclear accidents, provided for a center-focused 
coordination of emergency measures and for the centralization of 
information.
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Monitoring.
The monitoring network was extended by including other 
stations and laboratories within the federal and state monitoring 
programmes. Data are centralized within the BMU. The recently 
established Federal Office for Radiation Protection of the BMU 
evaluates them and publishes radiation exposure reports (initially 
-i.e. in the first months after the Chernobyl fallout- these 
reports were published monthly, then every three months and then 
once a year).
Reactor safety.
No major adaptations were made in this field because German 
governmental experts (mainly those of RSK) agreed with most 
experts of Western countries that an accident like the one 
occurred at Chernobyl could never happen in a LWR or PWR reactor; 
as a consequence no significant changes in design or in safety 
measures were considered necessary in German nuclear plants in the 
light of the Chernobyl accident.
c.2.3. Concluding remarks.
On the basis of the previous discussion, it can be argued 
that learning in terms of (partial) reframing of issues, self­
reflection and consequent adaptations took place.
Such learning developed on the basis of reflection on 
experience (regarding both an external event, i.e. the Chernobyl 
accident, and the performance of specific organizations and/or 
politicians) and asymmetrical (also depending on the specific 
issues at stake) communication between the main actors involved.
Previous policy, bargainings and conflict between political 
parties and the federal/state dychotomy characterizing German 
policy making provided both a basis and a constraint to the 
reframing of nuclear issues and the adoption of certain 
organizational, legal and technical changes. A basis because they 
provided some instruments to identify "post-Chernobyl problems" 
and to design some possible solutions, constraints (which are not
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to be regarded as necessarily negative features) because they 
limited the scope of what was conceivable and/or feasible.
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PAS DE NUAGES ICI !
CHERNOBYL IN FRANCE.
a. Background.
Differently from the Italian and the German cases, the first 
response to Chernobyl in France was a no-response: no information 
was spread concerning the extension of the fallout on the country 
and no precautionary measure was taken. The radioactive cloud 
that was being detected and was raising concern in the 
neighbouring countries seemed to have stopped at the French 
borders. However, two weeks after the accident French citizens 
discovered that they had been affected both from the radioactive 
fallout and from restriction of information.
In order to understand the French management of the Chernobyl 
fallout -and its differences and similarities in comparison with 
the Italian and German cases- it is necessary to examine the 
development of the French nuclear programme, the role and scope of 
the anti-nuclear opposition and the peculiarities of the 
institutional and legal context.
a.i. Nuclear policy.
The first five-year nuclear plan was approved by the French 
Parliament in 1952. However, its institutional premises can be 
traced back to 1945 when the Commisariat à 1'Energie Atomique
6
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(CEA) was established to promote research and development in the 
nuclear field i.
The CEA, at that time under the authority of the President of 
the Council of Ministers (and then, since 1969, under the 
Ministry of Industry), was given administrative and financial 
autonomy and was directed -with respect to scientific matters- by 
the famous physicist Frédéric Joliot. Few years after the 
creation of CEA, the issue of the military uses of nuclear energy 
caused a serious crisis within the Commisariat: its scientific 
director, Joliot, had to resign in 1950 due to his involvement in 
the Communist Party and in the movement Partisans de la paix -both 
opposing the development of nuclear weapons- and to his public 
statements against the construction and utilization of the atomic 
bomb.
Even if the military orientation of French nuclear policy was 
not yet an explicit point of debate when the first nuclear plan 
was launched in 1952, Joliot correctly foresaw such orientation.
In 1956 a military department (Direction des applications 
militaires) was established within CEA and the freedom of France 
to develop nuclear weapons was proclaimed by the head of 
governement, Mollet, during a parliamentary debate on Euratom 
(Goldschmidt, 1980: p.151). Since then, the French programmes 
concerning the civilian and the military utilization of nuclear 
energy have been following distinct but linked paths z. The second 
five-year plan, for instance, included the decision to build an 
enriched uranium plant (the Pierrelatte plant) wich would benefit 
both electricity production and military weaponry. Moreover, the 
decision to build plutonium-producing reactors, the choice (within 
the second five-year plan) of the graphite-gas reactors and, more
1 Concerning the development of French nuclear policy see, M. 
Davis (1988); J.C.Debeir, J.P. Deleage and D.Hemery (1986);and 
B.Goldschmidt (1980).
2 While being a crucial issue, the linkage between civil and 
military utilization of nuclear energy will be just briefly 
touched because only indirectly relevant for the analysis of the 
French response to Chernobyl.
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recently, the development of the fast breeder reactor Superphenix 
were intented to satisfy both civilian and military purposes 
(Davis, 1988; Schneider, 1987). Beside that, a substantial part 
of CEA's budged comes from the Ministry of Defence: around 60% of 
the total CEA’s budget in 1964 and 49.4% in 1987 (Gilpin, 1968; 
Davis, 1988).
In spite of the opposition of some leading figures (as shown 
by Joliot's affair), the development of a military nuclear 
programme did not met mass dissent. As we will see later on, a 
strong anti-nuclear opposition emerged only in the seventies; and 
while being concerned with both the civilian and the military 
nuclear programmes, the anti-nuclear movement organized its 
activities mainly with the respect to the first one. According to 
Robert Gilpin, one reason for the lack of significant dissent with 
respect to the development of the military plan could lie in the 
tacit assumption made by many French people that a nuclear weapons 
capability is both a prerequisite for political independence and 
an essential tribute to modern nationhood; in other words, a way 
to preserve and promote the country's grandeur (Gilpin, 1968: 
p.282-284). On the other hand, the issues of national independence 
(this time with respect to energy production) and national 
technological progress explicitly underlies also the development 
of the civilian nuclear programme, the largest in Western Europe. 
In arguing for nuclear power production, governements leaders - 
from De Gaulle to Mitterand- frequently stressed the necessity to 
achieve independence from imports and to promote national science 
and technology (Fagnani and Moatti, 1984).
This emphasis on the national dimension of the nuclear 
effort, together with the important role of the public sector (for 
instance, through nationalized industries) in French economy, can 
explain the leading role taken by the state in building the 
country's ambitious programme covering all aspects of the fuel 
cycle. In this respect, CEA plays a fundamental role. As 
previously mentioned, CEA was established as a governmental body 
having the task to promote research and development in the nuclear
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field. This is done through various CEA's research centres 3 and 
through a direct industrial involvement of CEA which is a major 
shareolder of Framatome (the company that builds reactors) and 
controls through its industrial branches -particularly Cogema- the 
whole fuel cycle, from enrichment and fuel fabrication to 
reprocessing and waste management (CEA, 1987).
Besides CEA and its branches, a crucial actor of French 
nuclear development is Electricité de France (EDF), a public 
industrial and commercial body established according to the 
nationalization law of 1946. EOF, which acts under administrative 
surveillance of the Ministry of Industry, is the operator of all 
French nuclear plants and distributes 96% of all the electricity 
produced in the country.
The activities of CEA and EDF have been coordinated, since 
1957, by a governmental Advisory commission on the production of 
electricity from nuclear sources (PEON). However in the sixties 
there had been conflicts between CEA and EDF regarding the choice 
of reactors, CEA being in favour of continuing the development of 
graphite-gas reactors while EDF was willing to introduce PWRs on 
licence of the US firm Westinghouse. Once President De Gaulle (who 
always supported CEA) left office in 1969, EDF -supported by the 
new President Pompidou- succeeded in introducing PWRs.
Since then CEA and EDF have been collaborating in developing 
the French nuclear programme. Following the end of the guerre des 
filières between these two organizations and the oil crisis of 
1973, the Council of Ministers decided -in 1974- to extend and 
speed up the nuclear programme. The decision, especially pushed 
by the Prime Minister Messmer in consultation with EDF, was 
debated at the Parliament only one year later and without voting 
(Colson, 1977). The "aggressive" nuclear programme designed in 
1974 was continued also when the Socialist Party, previously 
critical towards French nuclear policy (the tout nucleaire
3 Within CEA there are five Nuclear Research Centres (CENs), 
dealing with both civil and military aspects, as well as seven 
Centres depending on DAM, the military department.
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policy), came to power in 1981. While introducing some 
procedural transparency in the decisional process (for instance, 
in 1981 the new nuclear plan was debated and voted by the 
Parliament and Local Information Commissions were established), 
the Socialist government pursued nuclear expansion in line with 
the choices of the previous conservative governments.
In 1988 nuclear power provided 72% of French electricity -the 
largest proportion in the world- produced by 53 reactors 
(Cartigny, 1988).
a.2. Anti-nuclear opposition.
In 1970 the first local anti-nuclear association (Comité de 
sauvegarde de Fessenheim et de la Pleine du Rhin) was established 
to oppose a proposed plant in Fessenheim in the region of Alsace 
at the border with the FRG. The following year another group was 
promoted by a teacher, Emile Premillieu, and a journalist, Pierre 
Fournier, against the siting of the Bugey plant. Also in 1971, 
the first anti-nuclear mass initiatives were held: a peaceful 
march at Fessenheim, an anti-nuclear festival that attracted 
around 15.000 people near Bugey and an international meeting in 
Strasbourg with the participation of activists from several 
countries 4.
Starting from 1972, some environmental groups organized at 
the national level (especially Les Amis de la Terre) and the 
counter-culture press (maily Charlie Hebdo, Survivre et Vivre and 
La gueule Ouverte) took a leading role in promoting nationwide 
anti-nuclear campaigns. Beside opposing the siting of nuclear 
plants for energy production, they also organized initiatives 
against the military programme; for instance, a protest expedition
4 Information and analysis regarding the French anti-nuclear 
movement can be found in Chaudron and Le Pape, 1979; Nelkin and 
Poliak, 1981; Rucht, 1989.
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took place in 1973 near the area where the French nuclear weapons 
tests were performed.
In 1975 two important groups joined the anti-nuclear 
opposition. 400 scientists signed a widely circulated appeal 
against nuclear power and some of them established the Group of 
Scientists for the Information on Nuclear^Energy (GSIEN), based in 
Paris and with members in several other towns. The GSIEN, still 
one of the most active public-interest science groups in France, 
has been publishing (since its foundation) a periodical entitled 
La Gazette Nucleaire. Also in 1975, the French Democratic Labour 
Confederation (CFDT) -linked with the Socialist Party- published a 
book, L'electronucleaire en France, aimed a t  diffusing information 
(the book was prepared by CFDT’s members working within the CEA) 
against the restrictive information policy of the government 
(CFDT, 1975î Préface). In the book a very critical position was 
expressed concerning the extension of the French nuclear programme 
as adopted by the Ministerial Council's decision of 1974. While 
not opposing nuclear power per se, CFDT opposed Jthe mentioned 
programme due to the serious and various risks (economic, 
environmental, health, political, social risks) it involved and 
suggested to slow down -instead of speeding up- the programme and 
to pay more attention to safety and information aspects (CDFT, 
1975; Tassar, interview). On this ground, and also to oppose 
privatization projects in the reprocessing sector, in 1976 CFDT 
organized a long (four months) strike at the reprocessing plant of 
La Hague 5.
It is worth mentioning that the other main labour 
organization, the General Labour Confederation (CGT), linked with 
the Communist Party, always and strongly supported the civilian 
nuclear programme regarded as necessary to provide workplaces and 
to push economic growth. In spite of the previously mentioned
5 An interesting analysis of the La Hague case, with special 
respect to the (fatalistic) response of the local population to 
the huge project imposed from "Paris", can be found in Zonabend, 
1989.
209
opposition of the Communist Party to the military utilization of 
nuclear energy, this party and the CGT are not only reluctant to 
connect civilian and military aspects but also less sensitive than 
CFDT to safety aspects. As a consequence they never joined the 
anti-nuclear opposition.
Anti-nuclear mass demonstrations continued in the meantime 
(again in Fessenheim and Bugey and against the proposed nuclear 
plants near Braud-et-Saint Louis and Flamanville) and culminated , 
in the largest demonstration of all at the site of the Superphenix | 
fast breeder reactor in Creys-Malville in July 1977. Such |
demonstration followed an unsuccessfull attempt by the ecologists ■ 
to stop the project by appealing to the court and other t
initiatives, including an appeal against Superphenix signed by I
i1.300 scientists and technicians of the European Centre of Nuclearj 
Research, CERN. Around 60.000 peoples (coming also from the FRG, 
Italy and Switzerland) participated in the demonstration which 
ended in clashes with the police; several hundred demonstrators 
were wounded and one of them, Vital Michalon, died the next day.
The violent repression of the Creys-Malville demonstration 
caused both depression and divisions (mainly concerning the need 
to continue or abandon the practices, like demonstrations, that 
could involve direct confrontation with police) within the French 
anti-nuclear movement. Movement that was also confronted with the 
growing pervasiveness of nuclear power in the French economy and 
society. Such pervasiveness is expressed in a very clear way in 
the words of an inhabitant of La Hague (but the same is true in 
many other areas), "COGEMA c'est une affaire de famille, mon père, 
ma tante, mon cousin, mon frère y sont..Alor moi aussi je cherche 
à y entrer 6” (in Zonabend, 1989: p.67). These elements, together 
with the very limited impact (especially in comparison with the 
German case) of resorting to the courts due to their inability to
6 "COGEMA is a family business; my father, my aunt, my cousin, my 
brother are all there...Thus I also try to get in"
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confront the administration on substantive grounds (Nelkin-Pollak, 
1981: chapter 11) brought about a decline of the movement.
When the first government with a majority of the Socialist 
Party was formed following the Presidential election of François 
Mitterand in 1981, the already weakened anti-nuclear opposition 
appeared to be almost totally soothed by the pacification -and 
cooptation- policy pursued by the socialists (Fagnani and Moatti, 
1982).
Even the birth of the Green Party in 1984 did not "reanimate" 
the anti-nuclear movement. Beside being on the fringe of the 
political arena (Les Verts entered the European Parliament -but 
not yet the French one- in 1988 and succeeded in national 
elections only in 1992 even if divided in two lists), the Greens 
adopted a rather pragmatic attitude and did not emphasize very 
strongly -at least till Chernobyl- their opposition to the nuclear 
programme, i.e. the "holy cow" of French energy, economic and 
defence policy. It is also worth pointing out that while some 
leaders of the previously or still existing anti-nuclear 
associations joined Les Verts, others joined the Socialist Party 
and where integrated in the governmental establishment. Brice 
Lalonde, former leader of Les Amis de la Terre and then apponted 
as Minister for Environment, being the most famous case in point.
The weakness of the anti-nuclear movement due to the above 
mentioned factors (the divisions following the repression at 
Creys-Malville, the unsuccessfull attempts to resort to the 
courts, the pervasiveness of nuclear power, the "pacification" and 
cooptation policy started in the early eighties by the Socialist 
government) became especially evident when the Chernobyl accident 
occurred.
a.3. Legal and institutional framework.
No framework law (like the Italian Law 1860 of 1962 and the 
German Atom Law of 1959) regulates nuclear power production in
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France. This exceptional situation (France is the only "nuclear" 
OECD country lacking such a law) creates difficulties with respect 
to the division of competences between different Ministries, the 
Parliamentary control and the role of the Courts (see CFDT, 1975; 
Colson, 1977; Nelkin and Poliak, 1981). Each Minister can in fact 
emanate decrees -eventually contrasting- with respect to his/her 
specific competence (health, environment, transport, industrial 
safety, etc.). Decisions are taken by the Executive while the 
Parliament -in the rare occasion it debates or even votes them- 
cannot evaluate the overall nuclear policy on the basis of a 
framework law. Finally, the Courts cannot base their judicial 
review on a comprehensive law and limit themselves to the 
consideration of specific procedural aspects; mainly whether 
applications for construction permits are prepared according to th 
relevant decree on nuclear installations.
Several decrees form the basis of French legislation on 
nuclear matters. The most important ones are the Decree n.63-1228 
of December 11, 1963 (updated in March 1973, April 1985 and 
January 1990) on nuclear installations, the Decree n.66-450 of 
June 20, 1966 (updated in April 1988) on radiation protection 
principles and the Decree n. 67-228 of March 15, 1967 (updated in 
October 1986) on the the protection of workers from ionizing ~ 
radiation.
The decree on nuclear installations establishes the licensing 
procedures. According to the updated version of the Decree, the 
operator, i.e. EDF, must submit a provisional safety report to the 
Central Service of Nuclear Safety Installations (SCSIN), a 
technical body of the Ministry of Industry established in 1973 and 
presently formed by around 50 persons. SCSIN prepares an 
authorization decree specifyng the technical norms -designed by 
one of the permanent experts groups within SCSIN- to be followed 
by the operator; SCSIN also ask for a report by the Institute for 
Nuclear Safety and Protection (IPSN) of CEA. After conferring 
with the Minister of Health (who has the right to give a binding 
avis conforme) and asking for advice the High Council on Nuclear
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Safety (CSSN) and the Interministry Commission on Basic Nuclear 
Installations (CIINB), the Minister of Industry and the State 
Secretary for Environment and the Prevention of Technological and 
Natural Hazards give the authorization. Once the installation is 
in operation, inspections are made by members of SCSIN (often 
accompanied by engineers of ISPN) and/or members of the Regional 
Directions of Industry and Research (DRIR), i.e. SCSIN's regional 
branches (see, SCSIN, 1989).
According to the Decree on radiation protection principles, 
the yearly equivalent doeis for the population should not exceed 
the limit of 5 rem recommended by the ICRP in 1962. The Decree 
also establishes that, in case of accidents involving the risk of 
population exposure to ionizing radiation, the Central Radiation 
Protection Service (SCPRI), a technical body of the Ministry of 
Health established in 1956, suggests the health measures to be 
adopted (see, Moroni et al., 1988). SCPRI is also responsible 
for environmental monitoring activities; it coordinates around 130 
monitoring units in the whole national territory and has one 
laboratory, in Vesinét, where samples are analysed. Since 1968, 
the monitoring of radioactivity levels in food is also performed 
by the Central Service of Food Hygiene, a technical body of the 
Agriculture Ministry, and its 19 regional sections. Also the 
plants' operators -EDF- and CEA's institutes (particularly IPSN) 
and research centres perform monitoring activities, and their data 
must be sent to SCPRI where they are centralized and evaluated. 
Beside that, SCPRI is the only institution responsible for the 
diffusion of the monitoring data, and for informing the population 
in case of accidents. Or better it was. Due to the information 
problems that emerged during the Chernobyl fallout some changes 
were in fact made with respect to data collection and diffusion.
To conclude with SCPRI, such service is also responsible, 
according to the Decree on the protection of workwrs from ionizing 
radiation, for individual and collective dosimetry and for 
verifying the health protection measures within nuclear 
installations.
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With respects to accidents at French nuclear plants (also in 
France the possibility to cope with the consequences of an 
accident occurring abroad had not been taken into account by 
legislators), a departmental 7 plan -plan Orsecrad- is provided for 
by an interministerial instruction of 1963 (Deslandes, 1988).
According to the plan, EDF can adopt an Internal Emergency 
Plan (PUI) for each plant and must inform the Prefect of the 
affected department about the nature and the possible evolution to 
the accident. The Prefect, who works in strict collaboration with 
the Department of Civil Protection of the Interior Ministry 8 and 
is advised by SCPRI about the measures to be taken, adopts the 
measures regarded as necessary to guarantee civil protection and 
public order. He is also responsible for coordinating information 
and assistance exchanges with neighbouring departments and 
countries.
On the basis of this account of the legislative and 
institutional framework, figure 5 summarizes the highly 
differentiated interorganizational/regulatory network of nuclear 
risk¡management in France,
As we will see in the next paragraph, the action-set that 
emerged during the Chernobyl fallout can be regarded as a drastic 
"semplification" of the network represented in figure 5. ---
Figure 5, here ---
7 France is divided in three kinds of administrative units: 
regions (22), departments (95), communes (36.000).
8 Such Department operates through a Stable Control Unit (within 
the Prefecture) aimed at centralizing information as well as 
through Operational Units having the task to collect measurements 
made in the affected area.
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b. The Chernobvl fallout
b .1. Chronicle
Chernobyl reached the front pages of French newspapers on the 
30th of April. Beside the first news concerning the accident, the 
opinions of some french experts were reported: according to them, 
there was no risk of radioactive fallout in France. With respect 
to reactor safety, a representative of EDF -M.J.Leclerc- pointed 
out that la plupart (most) of French plants have external 
confinement systems.
On the lrst of May the SCPRI announced that a negligible 
increase of radioactivity in air had been detected in the south­
east of France and stressed that this was not relevant for public 
health (see, WISE, 1986). The same opinion was expressed by 
experts of CEA and EDF.
On the 2nd of may and in the following days criticism of the 
attitude to secrecy, regarded as a peculiarity of the Soviet 
sources, were made by French journalists and public authorities.
Beside reporting news from Ukraine, newspapers also published 
articles -usually interviews with representatives of EDF- on the 
safety of French nuclear plants. In the meantime, the regional 
sections of the Central Service of Food Hygiene were asked by the 
Central Service to increase their "attention".
On the 3rd of May, the newspapers reported that radioactivity 
levels had increased in the neighbouring countries. They also 
briefly mentioned that small increases, to be regarded as not 
dangerous for health, had been detected by the Laboratory of 
Marine Radioactivity of the IAEA based in Monaco.
In the following days, news regarding the countermeasures 
decided in some Western European countries -including the
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neighbouring Italy and FRG- were reported. These measures were 
attributed by French commentators to panic and to governmental 
weakness in face of environmentalists’ pressures. At the same 
time a not too heated debate on the safety of French plants began.
The CFDT and the Greens criticized the statements made by the 
general safety inspector of EDF, Pierre Tanguy (see, Le Monde, 
4.5.1986, p.6) who maintained that an accident like Chernobyl 
could never happen in the French graphite-gas reactors, not to 
speak about the PWRs. The Greens, Les Amis de la Terre and other 
environmental associations also started denouncing the silence of 
French authorities with respect to the exact extent of the fallout 
on the country.
In its communiqué of May 5 the director of SCPRI, Pierre 
Pellerin, set a limit value of 3.700 bq/1 for milk. This value 
was a very high one in comparison with the limit -500 bq/1- 
recommended by the EC Commission the following day (Recomendation 
of the EC Commission, 6.5.1986), limit value already adopted in 
the FRG and Italy and never applied in France.
Moreover, while also the limit set by SCPRI was considerably 
exceeded in Corsica, no measure was taken even in that area (see, 
La Gazette Nucléaire, 1987). It is interesting to notice that the 
first measures concerning milk contamination in Corsica were made 
by SCPRI only on May 12 and revealed a concentration of 4.400 
bq/1. According to calculations put forward by the director of 
IPNS (Response to Dr. Denis Fauconnier of 8.12.1986, published in 
Le cri du rad, 1987: p.17), the initial average concentration had 
been 15.000 bq/1 and the tyroid dose absorbed by a child in the 
first two weeks of May 1986 was around 9 rem. That is almost the 
double of the maximum yearly limit value (5 rem) set by the ICRP 
and referred to in the French Decree of 1966 on radiation 
protection principles.
With respect to radioactive contamination in other French 
areas, a study on the Var basin -in the south of France- by the 
CEN of Cardache (partially reprinted in, La Gazette Nucléaire,
1988) reveals -to give an example 9- that Caesium contamination 
above 60.000 bq/m2 had been detected. This would have justified 
the inclusion of France among the EC countries classified as 
including highly contaminated areas (> 10.000 bq/m2 ) in the report 
prepared by the British National Radiological Protection Board for 
the EC Commission (NRPB, 1986). Instead in the contamination map 
draw in that report, and based on data provided by national 
authorities, the highly contaminated areas stop at the south and 
east borders of France.
On the 6th of May the Ministry of Agriculture declared in a 
press release that the controls made by some EC countries (like 
Italy and FRG) with respect to French foodstuff were absolutely 
unjustified given the fact that France had been totally spared by 
the fallout.
Three days later, France restricted imports of foodstuffs 
from Eastern countries.
During an OECD meeting held in Paris also on the 9th of May, 
the director of IPSN, François Cogné, was asked by journalists 
(see, Le Monde, 11-12 May, p.6) why in France, differently from 
most neighbouring countries, no protective measures had been 
decided. He answered that this was consistent with a 
recommendation given by the experts of the WHO three days before 
and stating that no measure was reasonable under the value of
2.000 bq/1 in milk or rain water. Cogné did not mention the value 
of 3.700 bq/1 set by SCPRI, and appeared sure that the value of
2.000 bq/1 had not been met in France. Asked by the Paris office 
of WISE whether WHO issued such recommendation, the WHO's office 
of Geneva answered that this was not the case (WISE, 1986b).
9 Another study (unfortunately not available) -also by the CEN of 
Cardache- on the Moselle Valley (at the border with the FRG) 
probably shows that contamination levels in that Valley were 
similar to those detected in the bordering German area (see, La 
Gazette Nucléaire, 1988).
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Beside that, in the report of the WHO meeting held on May 6 
in Copenhagen, it is written that as far as countermeasures are 
concerned "..differences may then only reflect ways of applying 
the limits. For example, in some countries 2.000 bq/1 is used as 
an action level for 1-131 in milk.." (WHO, 1986: p.26). It is 
worth pointing out that there is a significant difference between 
an example and a recommendation.
On the 10th of May the director of SCPRI showed during a TV 
programme the maps of radioactivity levels in France between the 
30th of April and the 5th of May. He noted that such levels were 
400 times higher than the ones detected before Chernobyl, but 
emphasized once again that they did not involve any health risk.
When asked by Monique Sené, president of GSIEN and a guest of 
the same TV programme, why such data had not been disclosed 
earlier, Pellerin answered that there had been two weekends and 
that SCPRI was not a public relation agency (see, WISE, 1986).
| In the following days the information policy of French
¡Authorities was harshly criticized by environmental groups and by 
> many journalists: the front page of Liberation of May 12 is 
dedicated to Le mensonge radioactif (The radioactive lie) and Le 
Monde of May 13 denounce la Desinformation nucléaire (Nuclear 
disinformation). The accusations previously addressed against the 
secretive attitude of Soviet authorities were now directed also to 
the French ones.
The Minister of Industry, Alain Madelin, tried to find remedy 
for this situation. On his initiative an Interministry 
Information Structure was established on the 14th of May to 
guarantee "transparency of information". However, only 
journalists had access to such Structure. Few days later, a phone 
line called Spécial Tchernobyl was open at the Industry Ministry. 
Around six operators were instructed to reassure the public by 
answering "tout va bien"(everything is okay) or that "les mesures
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sont prévues, et il vaut mieux ne pas y penser” (measures have 
been taken, and it is better not to think about it, quoted in Le 
Monde, 21.5.1986). The Minister of Industry also announced that, 
starting from the 13th of May, the selling of spinach from Alsace 
was forbidden. But this protective measure, the only one adopted 
French authorities, raised even more suspicion and questioning 
about the reasons why just the spinach from Alsace had been 
"incriminated". Symptoms of diffused worry and distrust 
appeared: for example, the selling -and the price- of many 
vegetables decreased in few days even if declared safe by public 
authorities (see, Le Monde 20.5).
During a programme broadcasted on May 18, the Minister of 
Environment Alain Carignon suggested to re-establish the 
Information Council on Nuclear Safety that had been created in 
1978 and abolished in 1982. Such Council had the task to advice 
the government about information policy.
The end of May was the beginning of new worry for French 
citizens due to disclusure of information on two accidental 
events. The first one was an accident occurred in April 1984 at 
the Bugey plant and the second one was the irradiation suffered by 
five workers of the reprocessing plant of La Hague on the 20th of 
May 1986. These news contrasted with the reassuring statements 
given by governmental experts and by representatives of EDF io 
about the safety of French plants.
On the 24th of May around 5.000 people -greens, environmental 
associations, extreme leftist groups- demonstrated in Paris 
against nuclear power. The number of participants, which was far 
from impressive in comparison with similar demonstrations held the
10 An important exception must be mentioned at this point: Pierre 
Tanguy, general safety inspector of EDF, admitted that the Bugey 
accident was due to une erreur de conception (design mistake) 
concerning the plant's control system (quoted by Le Monde, 23 May 
1986) .
219
same month in Italy and the FRG, showed that the French anti- 
nuclear movement was rather weak. However the demonstration also 
indicated that, in spite of their attempts to understate the 
extent of the Chernobyl radioactive fallout, the French 
authorities and nuclear industry were not completely spared by the 
Chernobyl political fallout.
b.2. Analysis
Before analysing the reasons for the peculiar response to 
Chernobyl in France and for its similarities -but especially 
differences- in comparison with the Italian and German cases, it 
can be useful to look at the action-set that emerged during the 
Chernobyl fallout. Figure 6 shows the main features of such 
action-set.
Figure 6, here
On the basis of this figure and the chronicle reconstructed 
above, some interesting elements can be noticed.
First of all, the action set that emerged in France during 
the Chernobyl fallout represents a drastic semplification of the 
interorganizational network for nuclear risk management shown in 
figure 5. Beside that, such action set is much "simpler" (fewer 
actors involved, fewer measures taken) than the action sets that 
emerged in Italy and the FRG in the same period.
A  technical body (SCPRI) -rather than one or more political 
authorities- had been the central actor of the French governmental 
xesponse to ChernQbyl. It was the director of SCPRI, P. Pellerin, 
rather than the Minister of Health the person who took 
responsibility -at least in the eyes of the public- for taking 
decisions; including the decision to retain information.
Differently from Italy and the FRG, in France there had been 
no involvement of the Civil Protection authorities. Moreover the 
local authorities and the Prefects did not take any action (a part
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from the Prefect of Alsace who eventually ratified a measure put 
forward by the Minister of Industry), nor in collaboration nojcuLn 
contrast with the central authorities.
This was consistent with the general attitude -by French 
governmental authorities and experts- to define the Chernobyl 
fallout as an "external" problem having an absolutely negligible 
"internal" impact.
With respect to the broader social response to Chernobyl, 
critical attitudes toward the government and the nuclear industry 
had been weaker in France in comparison with Italy and the FRG, 
and the anti-nuclear movement only became visible almost a month 
after the accident. During the fallout (the situation changed 
afterwards) also counter-experts played a much more marginal role 
in France than in Italy and Germany.
Moreover, the role of the media had been quite problematic. 
For two weeks (a long period, especially for actors expected to 
give "news") the media were vehicles of almost no information on 
the fallout in France. Furthermore, they were only scarcely able 
to be arenas of communication between different sectors of 
society.
Beside the above mentioned aspects, a main difference between 
the French case and the Italian and German ones must be pointed 
out. That is, the difference concerning the countermeasures taken 
in the three countries.
In contrast with the restrictions on the selling and 
consumption of milk and vegetables adopted in Italy and the FRG, 
only the ban of Alsace spinach, that is a marginal and tardy 
protective measure, was decided in France. Even if it can be 
reminded that also imports’ restrictions were implemented, it has 
to be pointed out that this measure regarded that "outside world" 
which had not been spared -as was instead declared to be the case 
of France- by the radioactive fallout. Monitoring and data 
centralization were performed also in France, but gaps and delays 
(at least if it is true that the first measures in Corsica were
made by SCPRI only starting from the 12th of May) were more 
remarkable there than in the FRG and Italy. This in spite of the 
fact that Italy (also due to the presence of few nuclear plants in 
the country) was certainly less equipped than France in this 
respect, and that Federal/State cleavages made sometimes difficult 
the collection and organization of data in the FRG. Even more 
important, as far as the information to the population (but also 
to neighbouring countries) was concerned, France was a unique case 
of almost total blockage of such information.
In order to understand why the institutional and social 
response to Chernobyl in France was characterized by the above 
mentioned features and why did it differ almost totally from the 
response to the same event in the neighbouring Italy and FRG, it 
is necessary to analyse the relations between experts, 
politicians, the anti-nuclear movement and mass media.
Particularly it must be examined how was scientific evidence and 
information selected by experts, how was it utilized by 
politicians, how was it asked and/or produced by anti-nuclear 
groups, and how was it worked out and diffused by the media in 
farming issues and in making decisions or non-decisions.
b .2.1. Science as power.
The French governmental experts who took a leading role in 
the response to Chernobyl managed scientific uncertainty by 
denying it. They seemed to be absolutely certain that 
radioactive contamination was negligible and that no health risk 
was at stake.
As an example of this "abolition of uncertainty", one can 
take a statement by the director of SCPRI. With respect to a 
controversial (trans-)scientific issue like the health risks due 
to low doses of radiation, Pellerin declared without esitation 
that "In my opinion, the concept of the absence of a thresold 
belongs to the cathegory of imaginary problems..." (interview by
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Alexandre Sidorenko published on 1.9.1989 in Biélorussie 
Soviétique and quoted in La Gazette Nucléaire, 1990). On the 
other hand, with respect to the (also very controversial) 
definition of "low doses", Pellerin aknowledged that such 
definition is a matter of convention. In fact he said (in the 
same interview), "The answer to this question depends on your 
profession (...). If you are a radiologist, one could calculate 
that a dose of 20 rad is a low one. But if you were an official 
of the radiological protection services, one would consider it 
dangerous, almost mortal".
This mix of certainty and conventionality has been crucial 
with respect to the experts' management of the Chernobyl fallout 
in France. On the one hand, scientists were -or pretended to be- 
sure that no uncertainty underlies the selection and 
interpretation of data, nor the assessment of health risk. At the 
same time, they defined themselves -beside being appointed as such 
within governmental bodies- as the experts having the authority to 
establish the relevant conventions. Mainly the conventions that 
regard the acceptability of risk and guide the decisions about 
countermeasures.
SCPRI's scientists appeared to be so certain about their 
knowledge and so confident about their authority to establish 
conventions 1 1 , that set limit values which were very high in 
comparison with those adopted in the neighbouring countries and* 
refused to re-examine their position in the light of the 
recommendations by the EC Commission. A relatively more prudent 
position was taken by IPSN as shown by the reference made by its 
director. Cogné, to the WHO’s meeting and its (supposed) 
recommendations. But IPSN's experts too did no express any doubt 
about the lack of health risk for the French population. With
11 Due to the refusal of the whole equipe of SCPRI to be 
interviewed, it is not possible to reconstruct the debate within 
SCPRI and see whether such certainty and confidence had been 
shared by all its members.
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respect to nuclear safety, also the engineers of SCSIN and EDF 
showed no uncertainty in maintaining that an accident like 
Chernobyl was impossible in France and that no specific measures 
were to be taken to improve the safety of French plants.
However, a report written by the general safety director of 
EDF, Pierre Tanguy in 1989, seems to indicate a changed -less 
certain and "optimistic"- attitude 12 (Tanguy, 1990).
I If one compares this sort of "monolithism" (at least in
[ public) of French governmental experts with the role played by 
i governmental experts in Italy and Germany, some interesting 
differences emerge.
In Italy disagreements between experts working within 
different governmental advisory bodies as well as between official 
experts and independent ones were experienced and expressed in 
public. Such situation did not prevent decisions to be made; on 
the contrary measures were taken and implemented in a relatively 
short time. In the FRG governmental experts, under the 
"leadership" of SSK, agreed about the interpretation of the 
available evidence as well as about the advice to be given. Deep 
controversies arose instead between governmental and independent 
experts. Also in the German case controversies favoured the 
adoption of protective measures and a relative openess of the 
decision process since governmental experts, challenged by 
counter-experts, had to justify/find arguments for their 
recommendations. In France not only governmental experts appeared 
to share the same certainties, but these certainties were 
challenged -during the fallout- by very few independent experts.
In this context, no protective measures were adopted apart from an 
"external oriented" (import restrictions) and an absolutely 
marginal one (the ban of Alsace spinach).
12 Unfortunately also members of EDF working in the field of 
safety refused to be interviewed, therefore the process leading to 
this changed attitude can be only partially induced from Tanguy's 
report. The report, meant to be confidential (but parts of it 
were quoted in newspapers), was obtained from sources external to 
EDF.
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This was not due (as maintained by French authorities and 
widely believed abroad) to the "objectively" different extension 
of the fallout in France in comparison with other countries? as 
previously mentioned, some French areas were as highly 
contaminated as some Italian and German ones. Rather it was due 
| to three main elements: 1. the presence of a closed scientific 
I nuclear community/corporation; 2. the centralized management of 
scientific information; 3. the closure of the political and 
administrative system with respect to nuclear issues.
As far as the first point is concerned, the training of the 
scientist working in the nuclear field is similar and is mainly 
done within the Ecole Polytechnique; in turn such school opens to 
its most successful students entry into a number of elite 
corporations called grand corps 13. Members of such corps lead 
all of most important organizations involved in French nuclear 
sector: for example, CEA is a "domain” of the engineers of the 
corps des Mines and EDF of the engineers of the corps des Ponts et 
Chaussées (Davis, 1988). In spite of its health oriented task, 
also SCPRI is lead by an engineer of the influential corps des 
Mines and previously working within CEA. A statement of Pel1erin 
can be taken as an example of the fact that the change of place 
and legal task does not necessarily cause a change of attitude, in 
this case toward a more "precautional" (in radiation protection 
terms) one. After being within SCPRI for already eight years,' 
Pellerin reccomended -in the Annales des Mines- "not to develop 
excessively safety measures in the nuclear plants in order not to 
create an unjustified anxiety" (article published in Annales des 
Mines, January 1974, and quoted in La Gazette Nucléaire, 1990).
13 Systematized by Napoleon, but already existing before him, the 
corps and especially the (most prestigious) grand corps were 
supposed to have a spirit of their own which would mark them 
differently from other branches and would give them a desire to 
excel. The 1945 reform of the civil service did not abolish the 
grand corps which are presently formed by few (but powerful) 
hundred members each (see, Blondel, 1974: pp.179-181). On the role 
of grand corps in French administration and politics see also, 
Crozier, 1963 and Hayward, 1982.
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In general terms, the similar training and the affiliation to 
similar elite corporations (an element that involves a certain 
closure of the scientific nuclear establishment) give raise to a 
rather homogeneous point of view among scientists working in the 
nuclear field.
Concerning the second point, the French response to Chernobyl 
was characterized by the legally formalized monopoly of monitoring 
data by one governmental service (SCPRI), the secretive attitude 
of such service’s director, the lack of access to data held by 
SCPRI and other governmental bodies, and the lack of independent 
monitoring units. Due to these conditions, SCPRI acted as an 
"absolutist" authority able to exercise its power both over other 
governmental scientific bodies and over independent scientists.
The first ones being legally bound to send data to SCPRI and not 
interfere with its recommendations/decisions in the field of 
health protection (Brenot, interview); the second ones lacking the 
means to challenge -through independently gathered data- SCPRI’s 
reassuring statements. If one links this power of SCPRI with the 
tendency shown by its members to understate the risk involved by 
nuclear power (for example, by indicating as "safe" limit values 
regarded as too high by many other scientists at the international 
level), it is not surprising that no protective measures were 
suggested by French governmental scientists.
b.2.2. The discreet charme of nucleocracy
The third element to be analysed in order to understand why 
no protective measures were taken in France is the closure of the 
political and administrative system with respect to nuclear 
issues. The strenght of the French nuclear industry and, more in 
general, the "untouchability" of nuclear power -regarder as a 
pillar of French economic, military and technological grandeur- 
are good reasons for hiding or understating any event that could 
raise doubts about the safety of nuclear technology. And this
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can be done only if the political and administrative system is 
able to keep everything (including dissent) "under control".
With respect to Chernobyl, the centralized and technocratic 
organization of the French bureaucracy had been initially 
successful in imposing a definition of the fallout as an 
"external" problem having a negligible "internal" impact. And 
therefore, in defining the situation in France as a "normal" one, 
as a "non-emergency".
Local authorities and even the usually powerful Prefects 
(that is the representatives of the central state at the local 
level) had no say: everything was decided in Paris. And this is 
consistent with the model of centre-periphery relations generally 
referred to as the French model; that is a model close to a 
hierarchical pyramid and characterized by a quasi-militar concept 
of organization (Mény, 1990: p.246). This model -together with 
the fragmentation of the French local system, the marginal role of 
local authorities with respect to nuclear issue and the lack of 
pressure from citizen initiatives- can explain the passiveness of 
French local powers during the Chernobyl fallout. However, the 
problem remains of explaining the decision process at the central 
level.
As previously noticed, a technical service -rather than a 
political authority- took a leading role in the first phase (till 
the 12-13 of May) of the management of the Chernobyl fallout.
This sort of delegation of authority from political to technical 
bodies is not peculiar to the Chernobyl case; in general, 
technicians have a very high influence within the French 
bureaucracy. The French public administration is run, starting 
from the Ministries, by people who are trained in the grandes 
écoles m and are members of grands corps: and the fact that 
technicians are in charge justify the widely used expression of 
"technocracy" (Blondel, 1974; Meynaud, 1960; Meny, 1990). Beside
14 With respect to the system of recruitement through the grandes 
écoles, a former student of the Ecole Polytechnique introduced the 
term Polytechnique mafia (quoted in Meny, 1990: p.284).
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taking some "weight" off politicians* shoulders, the creation of a 
sort of technical caste within the administration can also be an 
important tool for copying with internal and external pressures so 
that possible crisis can be controlled and eventually eliminated 
(Crozier, 1963; 1970).
According to some scholars, the role of technicians is even 
more important with respect to nuclear power, "It is not the 
government that designed nuclear policy, but the technical bodies 
of the state; especially the CEA, and -in second place- the EDF" 
(Debeir et al., 1986, p.310). Given the influence of nuclear 
technicians/experts both as a rather closed and (especially in the 
military sector) isolated caste and, at the same time, as a caste 
within the caste running the public administration, one can speak 
of "nucleocracy".
The delegation of responsibility to "nucleocrats" during the 
Chernobyl fallout is shown not only by the preeminent role of 
SCPRI's director, but also by the manner the official definition 
of the situation was built.
Concerning the first point, it must be pointed out that one 
reason given by the director of SCPRI for his secretive management 
of information was that he was not allowed to release certain 
data. Even if in other occasions, like the affair of the Mont 
Louis is of 1984, he did not resort to this argument and "gave good 
TV performances" (Brenot, interview), it is true that a Decree of 
1983 could be used by SCPRI experts as a ground for retaining 
information. The Decree 83-100 of 10.2.1983 establishes in fact 
that the people in charge for the control of nuclear materials are 
obliged (through an oath) not to disclose information known while 
in service. A juridical discussion of the relevance of this 
decree in the case of Chernobyl as well as the possible contrast 
between this decree and the decree of 1966 giving SCPRI the task 
to inform the population in case of accident goes beyond the scope
15 The French ship Mont Louis, that was carryng uranium 
exafluoride, sank near Ostende causing serious sea pollution.
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of the present work. What is of interest here is to notice 
that, whatever the case, the Minister of Health let the director 
of the technical service decide whether to speak or keep silence.
Regarding the way the official definition of the situation 
was built, for around two weeks politicians kept a low profile and 
let the experts of CEA, EDF, SCPRI, and SCSIN draw the picture of 
a country which political borders had been able to stop the 
fallout, where people were running no radiation risk and where 
nuclear plants were absolutely safe. Only when this reassuring 
picture collapsed (that is, following the media campaign started 
after Pellerin's disclosure of data about the fallout in France), 
some politicians tried to recover direct control over the 
situation.
The Minister of Industry was the most active governmental 
authority in this respect. First of all he tried to remedy the 
most evident and "hot" issue, i.e. information, by establishing 
the interministry information structure and the special phone line 
on Chernobyl. Then he decided a measure, the ban of Alsace 
spinach, aimed at showing that public authorities were taking care 
of public health. Interestingly enough, in this case the 
Minister of Industry took an action that was theoretically within 
the competence of the Agriculture Ministry and/or (in emergency 
cases) of the Prefects in collaboration with the Ministry of
fInterior. Even if the Alsace Prefect (Haut Rhin department) 
ratified the ban of spinach, the procedure was at least original 
(as remarked also in Le Monde, 15.5.1986, p.8).
The explanation for this can be twofold. On the one hand, 
the Ministry of Industry is the most important French governmental 
authority with respect to nuclear power and then prevailed over 
other Ministries such as Agriculture in taking decisions. On the 
other hand it was unthinkable, for practical and political 
reasons, to start emergency procedures with almost two weeks 
delay; therefore Prefects were only marginally involved and an 
unusual (in between routine and emergency) procedure was adopted.
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The tardy and partial information efforts and the decision to 
ban just the poor Alsace spinach were not effective in regaining 
credibility in the eyes of the public. As already mentioned, the 
selling of vegetables decreased in a few days in the month of May. 
Beside that, an opinion poll conducted in 1987 showed that 79% of 
interviewees held the opinion thet politicians tell lies with 
respect to nuclear issues (opinion poll made by Gallup in February 
1987 and quoted by Davis, 1988: p.8).
b .2.3. Nuclear disinformation
The French media had been full of Chernobyl news starting 
from the 30th of May. However they gave the "news" about the 
fallout in their country with almost two weeks delay. This was 
primarily due to the restrictive information policy by official 
sources (i.e. SCPRI) and the lack of independent (and able to make 
their voice heard) monitoring sources. Beside that, some 
observers suggest that two characteristic of the French mass media 
-i.e. the almost total absence of investigative journalism and the 
links between many journalists and the nuclear lobby- played a 
role too (Schneider, interview).
A brief examination of the articles published by the very 
influential French newspaper Le Monde, in the period 30 April-13 
May 1986 can be useful at this juncture.
First of all, the first news on Chernobyl reached the front 
page of Le Monde only on the 30th of April, i.e. one day later 
than the Italian La Repubblica and the German Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung. Underestimation of the event as "worthwile 
news"?
Beside that, the divide between what was happening "there" 
(Ukraine, USSR and, later on, neighbouring European countries) and 
"here" (France) was more remarkable in the French newspaper(s) 
than in the German and Italian ones. The news were only about 
"there" and also most comments were about the problems "there", 
especially concerning information problems. Brief references to
the situation "here" started appearing in Le Monde on the 2nd and 
the 3rd of May, when articles about "here" were already filling 
newspapers' half-pages in Italy and the FRG.
Reassuring statements by official sources were reported in 
all three countries; but while in Italy and the FRG public 
statements were given especially from politicians, in France they 
were reported almost exclusively from experts' sources.
Like the Italian and German newspapers, Le Monde emphasized 
energy policy and safety issues, and gave some room to the 
positions of the Greens and other environmental associations.
But, while reporting some criticism toward the non-disclosure 
of data, the newspaper's editorial line never raised doubts -till 
the 13th of the May- about the reliability of official sources.
On the contrary it suggested/supported the view that people and 
authorities of the neighbouring countries were irrational in 
asking for and taking protective measures. Panique générale en 
Italie is the title of an article published on May 6 (p.14) where 
the disagreements between different Italian Ministers are rightly 
pointed out but an anti-measures opinion is implicity favoured 
(for example, by reporting that even the Communist newspaper 
L'Unità was critical -without explaining why- toward the measures 
adopted and suggesting thet they could be revoked before their 
term). Also the reactions in the FRG are attributed to panique 
in the editorial Les retombées politiques de Tchernobyl ("The 
political fallout of Chernobyl", 9.5.1986) where the German panic 
is contrasted jpfith the French parfaite^sérénité justified by des 
raisons techniques. Technical reason regarded with suspicion 
outside the borders only due to the traditional incompréhension 
between the (emotional) FRG and the (rational) France. The 
article La France seule sereine (10.5.1986, p.l) emphasizes again 
the contrast between the serenity (term used also to denote 
"objectivity") of French (non)response in contrast with the 
response in Italy, the FRG and Holland.
Three days later, the editorial Désinformation nucléaire 
accuses the government for not taking the responsibility to inform
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the population about the fallout and provides the following 
comment, "Lorsqu'il s'agit de l'atome, les responsable français 
sont comme tétanisés. Prise entre les écologistes -devenus 
pourtant bien sages- et les "ayatollahs du nucléaire" -comme 
disent certain industriels pour désigner les ingèniers chargés du 
programme française, le gouvernement a fait le gros dos et s'est 
cantonné dans le silence, i*”
The problem is the following, why did Le Monde (and most 
French newspapers) realize only so late that governmental 
authorities were silent and that SCPRI's director was withholding 
data? Did journalists never have the curiosity to get "numbers" 
to verify the qualitative ("negligible level" and so on) 
statements by Pellerin?
French mass media can be hardly regarded as "worse" than the 
Italian and German ones as far as the usual timeliness, quality 
and pluralism of the information provided is concerned 17. It is 
then probably the case that some "case specific" (or "nuclear 
specific") elements prevented the "curiosity" of most French 
journalists to arise or to be expressed. These elements regard 
the specific sort of customers, sources and public the French 
media were working for/with during the Chernobyl fallout.
With respect to all three elements (but especially the 
customers * side), the pressure of -or direct links with- the 
powerful nuclear lobby had a "discreet" role in making the media
16 "When the atom is at stake, the French authorities suffer from 
lock-jaw. Caged between the ecologists -who became wiser in the 
meantime- and the ’ayatollah of nuclear power', as some 
industrialists calls the engineers responsible for the French 
programme, the government .. took refuge in the silence".
17 Studies concerning the features and the role of the mass media 
usually deal with problems like the ways of constructing the news, 
setting the agenda, etc. in a rather general, "supra cultural" 
perspective (see references of Chapter 7; for an informed 
bibliography see, Wolf, 1985: pp269-288). While this may represent 
a shortcoming of such studies, it is likely that in three 
countries sharing similar political and economic systems the mass 
media follow -broadly speaking- similar rules.
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keep a low profile with respect to news that could be dangerous 
for the French nuclear programme. For instance, in 
suggesting/imposing a reassuring (for the French) and indirectly 
pro-nuclear interpretation of the responses to Chernobyl in the 
neighbouring countries.
Regarding the information sources, the role of experts must 
be pointed out. Beside the diffused attitude to "delegate" 
problems to experts within the French society, a more general 
tendency to resort to experts by non-experts on scientific and 
technical issues made not only French but also Italian and German 
journalists rely on experts as main sources of information. The 
main differences being that in Italy and the FRG more room was. 
given (at least comparing the three mentioned newspapers) to the 
opinions of independent experts.
In turn this was dueT to iBe scarcity of independent experts 
in France (only few scientists of GSIEN provided counter-expertise 
during the fallout), and to the weakness of the antinuclear 
opposition. A main aspect of such weakness being, in turn, the 
underestimation by French anti-nuclear groups (till Chernobyl) of 
the importance to develop and utilize scientific expertise (Boyer, 
interview; Schneider, interview). This situation explains why in 
France -differently from Italy and the FRG- no effective pressure 
was exercized by NGOs to get a more comprehensive and precise 
information from governmental sources and from the media.
On the other hand, when the "sin" (secrecy) and the "sinner" 
(Pellerin) were "discovered", the media became highly critical 
(but also representatives of CEA-INPS, SCSIN and EDF criticized 
Pellerin) and gave more room to the opinions and initiatives of 
ecologists and counter-experts. In this respect, the media played 
a crucial role in "breaking" the official definition of the 
fallout as an external issue, and therefore a non-issue within the 
borders, and in favouring a shift from non-response to the 
adoption af some measures (tardy and symbolic but nevertheless 
measures)J
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The changed attitude of the media was not so much the result 
of a "discovery of the truth"; in fact, as mentioned already, the 
"truth" had not been intensely looked for by journalists. Rather 
it was due to the need/intention of the French media to dissociate 
themselves from the secretive management of the fallout by 
governmental authorities; secretive management which was being 
increasingly criticized both within the country (by independent 
experts, anti-nuclear groups, the CFDT, some politicians) and 
outside the borders (as reported, for example, by Italian and 
German newspapers). Since the media have the task to give 
information, to participate in the withholding of information 
contradicts the very function -and the credibility- of the media. 
Thus French media had no choice (which does not mean that several 
journalists were not also sincerely motivated in doing so) but 
start a "transparency campaign" and provide room for a more 
balanced communication between different points of view. This in 
turn favoured some governmental responses -even if tardy and 
merely symbolic- and some reactions from "below", from distrust 
implicitly expressed by consumers who avoided buying vegetables to 
explicit protests.
Information aspects proved to be crucial also in the medium- 
and long-term changes that occurred after Chernobyl.
b .3. Concluding remarks.
Arguments and evidence were presented in the previous 
paragraph to explain why the French response to the Chernobyl 
fallout was so different in comparison with the responses in the 
neighboring Italy and FRG.
The first point that emerged is that, contrary to what was 
maintained by French governmental authorities, the decision to 
take no protective measures was not due to the "objectively" 
different extension of the fallout. In fact, according to data 
gathered from CEA’s research centres and SCPRI itself, some French
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areas were as highly contaminated as some Italian and German ones 
(Corsica being the most striking case in point).
The reason why protective measures were not taken and 
information was withheld could be then the importance of nuclear 
power (and the nuclear lobby) in the French economy, politics and 
society. Certainly the size and pervasiveness of the French 
nuclear programme played a major role in making all those involved 
(from industrialists to politicians and even sectors of the 
public) to understate the seriousness of the Chernobyl fallout; 
however, this is not sufficient to explain the French response. 
After all, also the German nuclear programme and lobby are very 
important and the military utilization of nucler power, which is 
part of the French but not of the German programme, was not at 
stake in deciding about how to respond to the Chernobyl fallout.
The French response can be understood only by taking into 
account the relationships between experts belonging to a rather 
closed scientific community/corporation, politicians who often 
delegate responsibility to technicians, a weak anti-nuclear 
movement, and mass media that initially did not dare to challenge 
the official "truth". The patterns of interaction between these 
actors and the use they made (or were not able to make) of a 
crucial resource, i.e.information and knowledge, make us 
understand not only why protective measures were not taken and why 
a definition of the fallout as an "external" problem was 
successfully suggested/imposed for a relatively long period; it 
also explain why such definition of the situation was then 
challenged and some symbolic measures were taken after two weeks.
Also in the French case, the management of uncertainty had 
been at the core of the response of the fallout. But differently 
from what happened in the Italian and German context, where 
controversies among experts and politicians emerged and were made 
public through the media, in France uncertainty was mainly dealt 
with by denying it. For about two weeks scientific uncertainties 
regarding the possible consequences of the radioactive fallout 
were prevented from becoming an issue by stating that the fallout
235
did not affect France; this definition of the situation also 
prevented organizational uncertainties to arise since conflicts of 
responsibilities can hardly arise regarding non-actions or non­
decisions. When the "parfaite sérénité" allowed by such 
situation was troubled by the "discovery" that France had not been 
spared by the fallout, only one certainty remained. That nuclear 
secrecy was not a pecualiarity of the Soviet system.
c. The Years after.
The delayed/"second degree" responses to Chernobyl in France 
mainly concerned information problems.
The first initiative aimed at dealing with a major problem 
met during the Chernobyl fallout, i.e. "monopoly" of data, came 
"from below". An independent monitoring network, CRII-RAD, was 
established by the end of May 1986.
On the governmental side, some institutional adaptations were 
made to address information management issues.
Also the Parliament became active and commissioned to the 
Parliamentary office for the Evaluation of Scientific and 
Technical Choices a report on the consequences of Chernobyl. The 
Parliament also debated energy policy in 1989; however, in that 
occasion the members of the Parliament were not provided with a 
report (Rouvillois Report) commissioned by the government and 
moderately critical toward the French nuclear programme.
Last but not least, information issues (beside safety 
problems) were addressed also by EDF.
c .1. Post-Chernobyl events 
c.1.1. Independent monitoring network.
By the end of May 1986 some scientists working in 
collaboration with the University of Lyon established the CRII-
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RAD, Independent Commission for Research and Information on 
Radioactivity.
Main purpose of CRII-RAD is to break the SCPRI monopoly of 
data by performing independent monitoring and analysis and to 
diffuse as much as possible the results. Monitoring is performed 
by various decentralized CRII-RAD groups, 14 in 1989, and other 
associations collaborating with CRII-RAD, 14 in France plus one in 
Catalunya -Spain- also in 1989 (see, Le Cri du Rad, 1989). The 
central laboratory of CRII-RAD, based in Montelimar (South of 
France), carries out the analysis of the measurements. As far as 
the dissemination of data is concerned, information is diffused 
through public meetings, training-sessions, radio and TV 
broadcasting and a bi-montly magazine called Le cri du Rad.
With respect to both its scientific and information activities, 
CRII-RAD collaborates with other French independent experts, 
mainly those of GSIEN.
CRII-RAD has been supported by several elected 
representatives, local governments and journalists (Rivasi, 1990). 
Thanks to such support and to the quality of its work, CRII-RAD 
gained both a wide audience and official credibility.
Recently (since 1990) also the Ministry for Environment - 
which desires to participate more actively in the control of 
environmental quality, including radioactive contamination- 
started supporting CRII-RAD. This is also due to the still 
crucial centralizing role of SCPRI and the related interministry 
conflict. A conflict is in fact going on (Brenot, interview? 
Schneider, interview) between the Ministry of Environment, wanting 
data on radioactivity, and the Ministry of Health and its service 
which are unwilling to provide not only the public but also 
another Ministry with not already selected and organized data.
The present Minister for Environment tries then to find a remedy 
for this situation by resorting to data provided by CRII-RAD. 
Interestingly enough, a governmental authority has to rely on an 
independent information structure in order to obtain data that 
should be made available by another governmental body.
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c.1.,2. Institutional adaptations
Some institutional adaptations were also made after Chernobyl 
to deal with information and communication problems.
First of all, according to a Prime Minister Directive 
(Ministry of Industry, 1987: p.15) the information structure 
established within the Ministry of Industry in May 1986 with the 
task of coordinating public information (including information 
through the mass media) must be put into action again in case of 
accidents.
Moreover, a Decree adopted on the 2nd of March 1987 modified 
the composition (by including some journalists) of the National 
Council for Nuclear Safety (CSSN), an advisory body of the 
Minister of Industry, and renamed it National Council for Nuclear 
Safety and Information (CSSIN). Since 1987 CSSIN is then formed 
by 41 members: the previous 35 ones -representatives of various 
Ministries, CEA, EDF, trade unions, scientific institutions- plus 
6 journalists.
These adaptations show the intention by governmental 
authorities (especially the Industry Minister) to improve their 
management of information on nuclear matters through better 
interministry coordination and the inclusion of 
experts/practictioners in mass communications (that is 
journalists) as governmental advisers. However, this does non 
necessarily involve a more pluralistic and transparent information 
to the public.
Another institutional adaptation to be mentioned concerns 
SCSIN. Since June 1988, SCSIN -while remaining a technical body 
of the Ministry of Industry- is at disposal of the Ministry for 
Environment (Poyou, interview). The Minister for Environment is 
pushing for obtaining the control of SCSIN, but the opposition of 
the much more powerful (in economic and political terms) Minister 
of Industry makes this change very unlikely.
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c.1.3. The Parliamentary Office report and the Rouvillois report
Also in May 1986, the Parliament asked the Parliamentary 
Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices 
(from now on referred to as Office Parlamentaire) to provide a 
report on the consequences of the Chernobyl accident and the 
safety of French nuclear installations. Such report, completed 
in Decembre 1987, analyses the consequences of the accident in 
USSR and in France as well as the possible lessons to be drawn 
with respect to institutional and technical aspects.
Concerning the consequences of Chernobyl in France (Office 
Parlamentaire, 1987: pp.89-121), the report utilizes only data 
provided by SCPRI; interestingly enough, Corsica is never 
mentioned nor included in the maps and the studies of CEA -CEN of 
Cardache- are not taken into consideration. On the basis of 
SCPRI’s data, and on the basis of the argument that intervention 
levels (lower in other countries) are set on the basis of extra- 
scientific^resons, the decision not to take protective measures is 
substantially supported.
What is instead (even if moderately) criticized is the 
governmental management of information. But in spite of these 
criticisms, the report suggests to keep a centralized information 
structure in order to assure a coherence of the messages diffused 
(Office Parlamentaire, 1987: p.120). On the other hand, the 
report stresses the need not to leave information only in the 
hands of nuclear experts. In this perspective, the Office 
supports the decision to enlarge the CSSN, but notices that the 
silence of CSSIN about two accidents (at Creys-Malville and at 
Pierrelatte) that occurred just after its establishment raises 
doubst about its role (Office Parlamentaire, 1987: p.121).
Concerning the lessons to be drawn in France from Chernobyl, 
the report emphasizes that the double role of the Industry 
Minister and CEA, Jboth promoters and regulators (through SCSIN and 
IPSN, particularly with respect to licensing procedures) of
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nuclear energy should be addressed. In order to overcome such 
situation/ regarded as extremely negative, the Office 
Parlamentaire recommends the establishment of a Nuclear Safety and 
Information Agency (p.149, p.217). Such Agency has never been 
created. Other lessons to be learned, according to the Office 
Parlamentaire, regard the development of a "safety culture" in the 
management of nuclear installations (p.189) and the improvement of 
emergency management procedures both at the national and the local 
level (pp. 194-201).
Less than two years after the presentation of the report of 
the Office Parlamentaire, another report -this time on the 
perspective of the civil nuclear sector in France- was 
commissioned by the Minister of Industry to three experts 
(H.Guillaume, R.Pellat, P.Rouvillois). Such report, meant to be 
"confidential" was made public in March 1990 by CFDT in order to 
"break the conspirancy of silence" (CFDT, 1990; Tassar, interview) 
and to protest against the fact that even the Members of 
Parliament who discussed energy policy in Decembre 1989 had not 
been allowed to read that report.
The Rouvillois report, offers a substantially positive 
evaluation of the French nuclear programme but stresses two very 
sensitive issues, that is the surdimensionnement et rigidité of 
such programme (Rouvillois, 1989: p.32-57). With respect to the 
first point, especially EDF is called to account for its expensive 
overproduction of nuclear energy, in spite of the fact that EDF's 
energy consumptions forecasts are taken -according to some 
critics- as argent comptant (see Troglic, CFDT representative, 
quoted in Le Monde, 11-12 March 1990). As far as the second 
point is concerned, especially the double role of CEA, the 
rigidity of its structure and its influence on governmental 
decisions are considered alarming. In order to put remedy to this 
situation, the Rouvillois report suggests to reduce the personnel 
of CEA (21.500 employees in 1988), to distinguish more clearly the 
tasks of its main branches (industry, military application, 
research, control) and to put IPSN under the responsibility of
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SCSIN (Rouvillois, 1989: pp.103-104). Some steps, especially 
regarding the first point, have been taken by CEA; however, the 
reorganization of such an enormous, complex and powerful 
organization is a very difficult process (Brenot, interview).
c.1.4. EDF and the issues of information and safety
I On the 14th of February 1990, Le Canard enchaine publishedan
/article concerning an internal report by the General Safety 
^Director of EDF. P.Tanguy. The "scoop" of Le Canard (later on
I the news was published in other French and foreign newspapers) 
pointed to the fact that, according to Tanguy’s report, the 
probability fox a major nuclear^accident to occur in France js 
quelques pour cent dans les dix ans a venir.
This is in fact what is written in the report (Tanguy, 1990: 
p.7). Such worrying estimate, that contrasts with the previously 
accepted probabilistic assessment (1 on 1 million per year 
reactor), is argued for on the basis of the analisys of accident 
occurred at French plants and the examination of problems like the 
ageing of installations and various organizational/control 
difficulties.
In order to face the far from negligible risk of accidents, 
Tanguy suggests both technical and organizational measures. With 
respect to the second ones, he recommends -among other things- to 
improve internal communication procedures in order to develop a 
"safety culture" (p. 14) and to make visible all the decisions 
made by EDF in the field of safety in order to keep the consensus 
of politicians and the public (p. 3).
c.2. Learning from Chernobyl ?
Comparing the changes that occurred in France with those 
occurred in Italy and the FRG some interesting points emerge.
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In all these three countries the management issues were 
addressed, but at different levels and with different 
consequences.
In Italy the whole management of nuclear power technology was 
re-examined in various fora (parliamentary inquiry, national 
conference on energy, referenda) and was very much "politicized"; 
due to reasons already analysed, various "peripheral" adaptations 
and a "core" policy changed followed. In the FRG, especially the 
issue of the distinction of responsibilities between federal and 
state authorities in the management of nuclear accidents was 
addressed; organizational and legal adaptations were then adopted 
in the direction of a more centralized management at the federal 
level. In France the "hot" issue of information vs secretiveness 
in the nuclear field was regarded as crucial by governmental 
authorities and non-governmental organizations as well; the 
initiatives "from below" and the "cosmetic" institutional 
adaptations that were taken/made following Chernobyl deal 
exclusively with this aspect of nuclear risk management.
As it was suggested in the case of Italy and the FRG, to 
understand whether the changes made in France can be interpreted 
as parts and results of a learning process two main aspects will 
be analysed, i.e. the changes in the framing of issues and the 
adaptations which had been made.
c .2.1. Changes in the framing of issues.
Differently from the Italian and German case, the French
post-Chernobyl debate was only marginally framed according to the
dichotomy "yes/no to nuclear power"; the weakness of the anti- 
nuclear movement and the lack of anti-nuclear positions within 
political parties prevented a strong politicization of the debate 
based on such dichotomy.
Rather the (also not new) dichotomy secrecy vs 
information/transparency became central together with the linked
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issue of the credibility of institutions. A common frame -that is 
the need for information and transparency, also as a condition for 
credibility- was shared by actors holding different views 
regarding the yes/no dichotomy, from the Greens to critical 
supporters of nucler power (such as CFDT), the Director General 
for Nuclear Safety of EDF, and certain governmental authorities.
This emphasis on information aspects, was also not new. In 
fact (as mentioned earlier) jilready in the early eighties the need 
for transparency was acknowledged by the Socialist Party when it 
went to power. And this position allowed that party to change its 
previously very critical attitude towards the French nuclear 
programme without "losing face" thanks to the introduction of some 
procedural transparency.
It can then be argued that not only no new frame emerged 
regarding nuclear power and its management, but also no 
substantive shift or new emphasis within the existing frames 
followed the Chernobyl accident. Rather, a previously 
experimented emphasis on information aspects was suggested. The 
main difference being that this time such emphasis was put forward 
by several actors (rather than one) who partially introjected the 
already successful frame.
With respect to this point, the role of existing frames in 
constraining reframing must be stressed. In the French case, it 
can be also noted that not only the strenght of the nuclear policy 
paradigm,per se, but also the mentioned pervasiveness of nuclear 
power in the French economy and society produce a strong 
resistance to "radical" reframing.
c.2.2. Policy, organizational, legal, technical adaptations.
The emphasis on information aspects was reflected in the 
adaptations made in France in the months following Chernobyl.
No core policy change took place, and also the peripheral 
changes that were made were much more marginal than those adopted 
in the FRG and Italy. No new institutions (like the BMU) were
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established, but rather new units were formed within existing ones 
(mainly the information unit within the Industry Ministry); the 
reform of existing institutions, like CEA, is going on, but such 
process was not accelerated by the Chernobyl accident as it 
happened in Italy with the reform of ENEA. A new Law on the 
prevention of major -natural and technological^- hazards (Law 87- 
565 of 22 July(198^) was issued, but it does not deal with nuclear 
hazards.
The adaptations made in the field of nuclear risk management 
can be summarized as follows.
Reactor safety.
No major adaptations were made in this field since French 
experts agreed (as experts in other western countries) that an 
accident like the one occurred at Chernobyl could not occur in 
Western rectors due to the confinement system of LWR and PWR 
reactors. However, some measures were suggested by EDF's safety 
director to cope with the risks involved by the ageing of nuclear 
plants. In few cases reactors were temporarily closed due to 
incidents, the most famous one being the Superphenix that could be 
even closed for ever (as suggested by French newspapers on 
30.1.1992); and this caused tensions between the Division-of 
nuclear installations safety (DSIN) of the Minister of Industry 
and EDF (Poyou, interview; Le Monde, 30.1.92). Tensions that, in 
case they develop, could bring important shifts or even changes in 
French nuclear policy.
Radioactivity monitoring. ^
The main change in this field came from non-governmental 
experts who established an independent monitoring network to 
contrast the centralized and secretive management of data by 
SCPRI. Moreover, contrasts are going on between the Ministers of 
Health and Environment regarding the accessibility of raw data on 
radioactivity in the environment and the possibility to re-examine 
the distinction of competences between governmental bodies in the 
field of radioactivity monitoring.
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Emergency planning.
The emergency plans to be adopted in case of nuclear 
accidents at the departmental level (Orsecrad) -plans introduced 
in 1963 and modified in 1972 and 1981- were not modified after 
Chernobyl; for instance, by Law 87-565 of 22 July 1987. Such Law 
provides however for an integration of specialized emergency plans 
(like Orsecrad) and the specific intervention plans (Plans 
Particuliers d*Intervention, PPI) within the context of civil 
protection policy by the Interior Ministry. No debate, as in the 
Italian case, about national emergency plans in case of 
radioactive fallout emerged.
Information and communication.
This was the main point of debate in France following the 
Chernobyl experience and institutional adaptations were made (the 
establishment of a special unit within the Industry Minister and 
the inclusion of some journalists in its advisory body CSSIN) to 
improve the governmental management of information.
These ("cosmetic") adaptations do not affect the most 
important feature of the French information system in the nuclear 
field, i.e. the centralized management of data by SCPRI. However, 
they can be viewed as an attempt by the Industry Ministry to gain 
some control as far as the information to the public is concerned; 
and in case of different opinions about the kind of information to 
be released, contrasts between governmental authorities officially 
responsible for information aspects could arise.
Also in the field of information and communication the most 
remarkable change is represented by the establishment of an 
alternative monitoring network committed to "transparency".
c .2.3. Concluding remarks.
Also in the French case (as in the previous ones), it is 
possible to trace "learning" in terms of framing and 
understanding/reflection on issues and in terms of the adaptations 
made as a consequence.
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The much more limited extent of both reframing and actual 
adaptations can be explained by the strenght of pre-existing 
frames (policy paradigm) and consensus (among the main political 
parties and at the broader social level) regarding nuclear issues. 
Moreover, the resistance to change by hierarchical organizations 
such as CEA further constrained the scope of conceivable 
(according to dominant frames) adaptations. In this respect, the 
main feature of learning (in this case mainly governmental 
learning) in the French case seems to be the ability to learn not 
to give room to possible radical changes.
On the other hand, adaptations like the establishment of 
independent monitoring networks indicates the emergence, or re- 
emergence, of a movement willing to challenge the "ownership" by 
governmental authorities and experts of the problem of nuclear 
risks and to suggest different (from the dominant ones) ways of 
seeing how that problem should be dealt with.
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BONN, PARIS, ROME... AND BRUSSELS ?
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CHERNOBYL.
While showing that nuclear risks are transboundary, the 
Chernobyl fallout challenged the ability of the individual states 
and the international community to cope with this transboundary 
dimension.
As discussed in the previous chapters, in face of an accident 
occurring beyond the borders and causing a similar threat, 
different responses between and within neighbouring European 
countries emerged. These different responses were an indicator 
of the weakness of the existing international settings and 
agreements in the field of transboundary nuclear risk management. 
In particular the fact that Italy, France and the FRG are all 
members of such a strong setting as the European Community (EC) 
did not prevent different criteria being followed and different 
measures being applied.
Let us see why this was the case.
a. Background: the atomic onimminitv.
The Treaties establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were both 
signed in Rome in March 1957 by the foreign ministers of Belgium, 
Federal Repubblic of Germany, France, Holland, Italy and 
Luxembourg, joined in the following years by the other present EC 
Member States. Ratification of the Treaties was rapidly achieved 
and the EC institution were able to set to work in Brussels on the 
1st of January 1958.
Since its establishment, the EC has been fostering economic 
integration (more recently also political integration is being 
focused on) and has been developing a common legislative 
framework. In this respect it should be stressed that,
7
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differently from international organizations like the OECD or the 
UN, the EC can issue provisions wich are not only politically but 
also legally binding for its Members States 1 . However the 
responsibility for implementing EC provisions rests with the 
Member States, and inputs from and negotiations between Member 
Countries (especially within the EC Council) remain the "prime 
mover" of EC policy. In spite of this, the EC and its 
istitutions have a crucial and distinct role 2. In particular, 
the EC Commission may be viewed as a unique case of supranational 
regulatory body and the EC Court of Justice as a supranational 
instrument for ensuring observation of EC law by the Member 
States; moreover, proposals are being made to increase the power 
of another prominent EC institution, i.e. the European Parliament.
While bargainings or even conflicts frequently occur within 
and between these different EC institution (also as a reflection 
of different national interests), such institutions form a 
distinct political pole. The interplay between such pole 
-"Brussels"- and the Member States represents a fundamental 
characteristic of EC policy making.
By signing contemporaneously the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community and the Euratom Treaty, The Ministers 
of the first six Members Countries showed the intention to link 
economic development and nuclear energy. The reason why the 
European Economic Community was born as an "atomic community" too
1 According to Article 189 of the EC Treaty, the Community may use 
five forms of action: 1.regulations, which are binding in their 
entirety and directly applicable in all member state;
2 .directives, wich are binding only as to the result to be 
achieved, leaving national authorities to choose forms and methods 
of implementation; 3.decisions, which are binding upon those to 
whom they are addressed (member countries, legal persons, private 
institutions, etc.); 4.recommendations and options, which have no 
binding force; 5.resolutions and declarations, of a political 
nature.
2 There is a plentiful literature on the role of the EC and the 
working of its institutions. Interesting analyses can be found, 
for example, in Lodge, 1983; Pryce, 1973; Wallace et al., 1983; 
Rehbinder and Stewart, 1985; Majone, 1989.
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lies in the belief (especially strong during the nuclear euphoria 
of the fifties) that nuclear energy, as written in Euratom 
Treaty's preamble, "represents an essential resource for the 
development and invigoration of industry and will permit the 
advancement of the cause of peace".
Responsibilities concerning the promotion as well as the 
regulation of nuclear power are then accompanying the EC from its 
very beginning.
According to Article 2 of the Euratom Treaty, the Community 
must -among other things- promote research, facilitate investment 
and create a common market in the nuclear sector; but it must also 
establish uniform safety standards to protect workers and 
population health. This last point is specifically addressed in 
Chapter III of the Treaty on "Protection of Health and Safety".
Article 30 establishes that, "basic standards shall be laid 
down within the Community for the protection of the health of 
workers and the general public against the dangers arising from 
ionizing radiation". These standards are worked out by the EC 
Commission after obtaining the opinion of a group of experts 
(usually referred to as the group of experts art.31) appointed by 
the Commission's Scientific and Technical Committee. Firstly 
laid down in 1959, the basic safety standards were revised and 
modified in 1962, 1966, 1979, 1980 and 1984 taking into account 
the recommendations issued by the International Commission for 
Radiological Protection (ICRP). However, no revision of such 
standards followed the ICRP's recommendation of 1985 stating that, 
for members of the public, an annual dose limit of 0,5 rem (as set 
by the EC Commission in 1984) is only permissible for a limited 
number of years (see, EC Commission, 1986b and 1990).
Article 33 deals with the obligation of the Member States to 
ensure compliance with the basic safety standards by means of 
legislation, regulation or administrative action, while articles 
34 and 37 require that Member States obtain the opinion of the EC
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Commission before certain nuclear projects which may have 
detrimental health effects can be carried out.
With respect to monitoring activities, art. 35 and 36 require 
the Member States to monitor radioactivity in air, water and soil 
and to communicate the results to the EC Commission in order to 
demonstrate compliance with the basic safety standards; moreover, 
the Commission shall have the right of access to such monitoring 
facilities.
In case of urgency, the Commission has at its disposal a 
unique legal instrument which has no parallel in the whole of 
Community law (Grunwald, 1988: p.39). According to art.38, "In 
case of urgency, the Commission shall issue a directive requiring 
the Member States concerned to take, within a period laid down by 
the Commission, all necessary measures to prevent infringment of 
the basic standards and ensure compliance with regulations". As 
we will see later on, this article was never applied; not even in 
the case of the Chernobyl accident.
In spite of its optimistic start, the European Atomic 
Community has not been successful in its main aim -that is 
establishing a common nuclear market- because of the prevailing of 
national nuclear policies (Goldschmidt, 1980; Holdsworth and Lake, 
1988). And there are also difficulties in the formulation and 
implementation of the actions specified in Chapter III of the 
Euratom Treaty, i.e. health and safety standards, harmonized 
information and monitoring procedures and coordinated emergency 
measures 3. For instance, the lenght of time needed to agree on 
revisions of basic safety standards is so long that such revisions 
are already out of date before being implemented by the Member 
States 4. Beside that, while the communication of monitoring data
3 On this point see, EC Commission, 1986b; Grunwald, 1988; Leroy, 
1986; Liberatore, 1989.
4 A case in point is the revision of the 1976 directive on basic 
safety standards. Work was started in 1977 to draft amendments in 
the light of new ICRP recommendations. Altough the experts and
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is regarded as unsatisfactory by the Commission, the Commission 
itself has not been exercising its right of access to monitoring 
facilities for almost twenty years due to lack of resources (EC 
Commission, 1986b: p.6-7).
A crucial problem regarding the regulation in the nuclear 
sector, i.e. the regulation of radioactive waste disposal, is not 
covered by the Euratom Treaty. However, the EC Commission, 
beside promoting and conducting research activities in this field, 
is carrying on an action plan (1980-1992) aimed at examining the 
situation and suggesting solutions and measures to be taken at 
Community level (EC Commission, 1986a).
Another important aspect of nuclear risk management, that is 
the regulation in the field of plants safety, is beyond the scope 
of EC competence. Safety requirements for nuclear installations 
are established by each Member State and the EC Commission has a 
merely coordinating role in the attempt to harmonize criteria of 
reactor safety (Council Resolution of 22.7.1975, Official Journal 
C 185, 14.8.1975). Moreover, in spite of the general orientation 
of EC environmental regulation towards the setting of emission 
standards, at present there is no binding EC standard concerning 
radioactive emissions into air and water. And this is a major 
issue in the case of plants located in border areas like the 
French plant of Cattenom (see, Leroy, 1986).
Finally, as far as emergency management is concerned, apart 
from article 38 of the Euratom Treaty, it is worth noting that a 
systematic evaluation of the possible off-site radiological 
consequences of nuclear accidents was started with the MARIA 
project, Methods for assessing the Radiological Impact of 
Accidents, a project launched in 1982 within the 1980-1984 
radation protection research programme (see, EC Commission 1986c). 
A variety of countermeasures to reduce immediate exposure and
the Commission completed the work in 1978, the amendments were 
adopted by the EC Council only two years later and the new 
provisions became binding only in 1986. But in the meantime, in 
1984, a new directive had been approved (see, EC Commission, 
1986b, p.5).
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long-term doses following an accidental release of radioactivity 
were examined within the MARIA project. Beside that, in August 
1983 the Commission submitted to the Council a Communication and a 
draft Resolution (EC Commission, 1983) concerning emergency 
planning and contamination of rivers and seas. This resolution 
was never adopted and the Council maintained that the Commission 
should not duplicate work done in the Member States or in other 
international bodies. Such standpoint of the Council, which 
reflected the attitude of most Member Countries to limit EC 
copetence in the nuclear field, constrained the work that the 
Commission could undertake (EC Commission, 1986b).
This was the Community's regulatory "landscape" when the 
Chernobyl cloud arrived.
b. The Conmmni-hy and the cloud.
b.1. Chronicle
Three days after the accident at Chernobyl, the EC Commission 
started receving data on radioactive contamination from some of 
the Member Countries. On the 2nd of May 1986, that is a week 
after the accident, the Community system for rapid alert in cases 
of food contamination was put into effect.
On the same day, restrictions on consumption and internal 
trade of certain foodstuff began being applied in Member Countries 
like Italy and the FRG while no countermeasure were even taken 
into consideration in other Member Countries such a France.
Beside that, most Member Countries adopted imports' 
restrictions by the first week of May.
These different national measures, particularly those 
concerning intra-Community and external trade (that is, commercial 
policy measures that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
256
EC according to art. 113 of the EC Treaty), called for a 
"harmonizing word" from Brussels (Grunwald, 1988: p.34).
Such "harmonizing word" was uttered by the Commission on 6 
May by issuing a Recommendation (Recommendation of 6.5.86,
Official Journal L 118 of 7.5.86) calling on Member States to set 
certain maximum levels for Iodine 131 in milk and milk products 
(500 bq/1) and in fruit and vegetables (350 bq/1).
On 7 May the Commission also addressed external trade 
problems and issued a Decision (Decision of 7.5.86, Official 
Journal L 120, 8.5.86) banning imports of meat from Eastern 
Countries. This decision did not cover the whole range of 
contaminated products since the import of all relevant 
agricultural products could only be suspended by the Council.
This occurred on 12 May by way of a Council Regulation 
(Regulation of 12.5.86, Official Journal L 127 of 13.5.86) 
temporarily suspending the import of certain agricultural products 
originating in the Eastern Countries. It is worth mentioning 
that East Germany was excluded from the final draft of the 
Regulation at West Germany request while Yugoslavia was added to 
the list on suggestion of Italy (BEUC, 1986: p.20).
These EC measures were however decided according to a 
reasonable but arbitrary criterion (i.e. banning, without 
assessing the actual contamination, imports from Countries 
regarded as more affected by the fallout than the EC ones), rather
than being based on provisions concerning maximum permitted levels
of radioactivity in foodstuff. A part from being necessarily 
provisional with respect to external trade, the adoption of this 
criterion could not lead to any "harmonization" with respect to 
intra-Community trade and to the equal protection of public health
in the EC Member Countries. As far as this last aspect is
concerned, it must be mentioned that the recommendation issued by 
the Commission on 6 May was not implemented in several Member 
Countries, including France and United Kingdom.
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The Commission realized the need for common standards and, 
following discussions with Member States, sought urgent advice 
from the group of experts article 31 (EC Commission, 1989).
On 23 May the experts recommended provisional limits, 
specific for the Chernobyl case, for Caesium isotopes.
A week later the Council adopted a Regulation (Regulation of 
30.5.86, O.J. L 146 of 31.5.86) which replaced the previous import 
ban and fixed the maximum permitted levels of Caesium 134 and 137 
in foodstuffs. The Regulation imposed a limit af 370 bq/Kg for 
milk products and food preparations for infants, and 600 bq/Kg for 
all other foodstuffs.
Interestingly enough, the text adopted was remarkably 
different from the one proposed by the Commission (on advice of 
the experts art.31) on 23 May. Lower levels (100 bq/Kg for milk 
products and infants' foodstuffs and 500 bq/1 for other 
foodstuffs) had been suggested, but were strongly opposed by some 
Member States: France, Greece and United Kingdom wanted in fact 
much higher maximum levels. Finally, with the pressure from the 
Dutch Presidency, the limits of 370 and 600 bq/Kg (higher limits 
than the ones originally suggested by the Commission but much 
lower than the ones desired by France, Greece and UK) were adopted 
(see, BEUC, 1986: p.21).
The regulation issued on the 30 May was extended twice 
(Council Regulations of 30.9.86 and 27.2.1987) and was due to 
expire on 31 October 1987, the intention being to erect a 
permanent system laying down maximum permitted levels of 
radioactive contamination of foodstuffs in the event of a nuclear 
accident. By the end of October 1987, however, two political 
problems had arisen. In the first place, the Council failed to 
agree upon the permanent system and, secondly, the majority of 
Member States did not wish to extend the Regulation of May 1986 
for the third time (Grunwald, 1988: p.35).
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After a legislative vacuum of two months, a Council 
Regulation laying down maximum permitted levels of radoactive 
contamination of foodstuffs and feedingstuffs following a nuclear 
accident or any other case of radiological emergency was adopted 
(Regulation of 22.12.1987, O.J. L 371 of 30.12.1987). The limit 
of 500 bq/Kg 1-131 for dairy products was kept while higher limits 
were set for 1-131 in other foodstuffs (2000 bq/Kg) and for Cs 134 
and 137 (1000 bq/Kg for dairy products and 1250 for other 
foodstuffs).
b.2. Analysis
Several elements must be taken into consideration to 
understand the Community's response to the Chernobyl fallout.
As soon as such a crucial EC matter as trade was affected by 
Member States’initiatives, Brussels decided to utter a 
"harmonizing word" and then to take binding actions. But in order 
to define the Chernobyl fallout as an EC problem (rather than a 
national one), scientific and organizational uncertainties had to 
be managed. In particular, difficulties in the collection and 
evaluation of data as well as in the choice of the relevant legal 
framework and instruments had to be dealth with.
Concerning the first point, practical difficulties played a 
role in delaying and constraining EC action.
First of all, the communications channels between national 
authorities and the competent Commission's service had not been 
intended (under the terms of article 35 and 36 of the Euratom 
Treaty) for emergency situations s. Thus, it is not surprising 
that they proved to be inadequate (EC Commission, 1989: p.14). 
Furthermore, problems in gathering and evaluating data at the 
national level (due to gaps in the monitoring networks, lack of
5 This can be regarded as another indicator of the generalized 
underestimation, before Chernobyl, of the risk of major nuclear 
accidents with large scale consequences.
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coordination between local and central authorities and/or 
secretive attitude of central information sources) caused delays 
or even "holes" in the making of a Community wide -beside a global 
one- map of the fallout.
Beside these problems, different points of view concerning 
the evaluation of data emerged and had to be negotiated within the 
group of experts art.31 and within the EC Commission (Campos 
Venuti, interview; Ciani, interview; Oberhausen, interview).
Only by the end of May 1986 the Community was able to 
partially overcome the mentioned difficulties and reached the 
scientific and political agreement needed to adopt a Council 
Regulation on maximum permitted levels of Caesium in food.
As far as the management of organizational uncertainties is 
concerned (especially regarding Community/Member States relations 
in dealing with the fallout), it is important to examine how EC 
legal competences had been interpreted and utilized. In this 
respect, three main points can be made.
1) The Community resorted -much in the way of a "conditioned 
reflex"- to those legal instruments which it had grown accustomed 
>to (that is the regulation of trade), and realized only with delay 
that it was necessary to turn to the Euratom Treaty, rather than 
the EEC Treaty, in order to deal with the Chernobyl challenge 
(Grunwald, 1988). 2) Once the Euratom Treaty was turned to, the
Commission complained that, "Following Chernobyl the application 
of article 38 was difficult as the Commission did not receive 
adequate data in order to evaluate whether Basic Standards had 
been, or were likely to be, infringed" (EC Commission, 1986b: 
p.9). 3) Finally, giving the lack of EC provisions concerning
limits for radiation in foodstuffs, each Member State defined and 
applied its own rules.
i Summing up, it can be noted that the Community, while having
\at its disposal two Treaties and binding legal instruments, was 
not able to fully and timely utilize them in order to impose a 
'"harmonized" response to Chernobyl.
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This was partially due to problems within the EC 
institutions, like the relative slowness (in comparison with 
Member States) in realizing the possible scope and choosing the 
instruments for Community action. These problems can be viewed 
as the results of the marginal role and the lack of experience and 
resources of the EC institutions in the nuclear sector. In turn 
this situation is due to the diffused tendency among Member States 
to regard nuclear issues as national affairs; tendency that 
prevented the creation of a common nuclear market and that 
contributed in hampering the implementation of Chapter III of the 
Euratom Treaty.
Such tendency emerged also during the Chernobyl fallout as 
shown, for instance, by the reluctance of some Member States to 
push for and comply with EC provisions.
But the EC institutions showed to be unwilling to step aside.
c. After Chernobvl: towards a transnational wana^ment of nuclear 
risk.
c .1. EC regulations.
At its plenary session of May 1986, the European Parliament 
passed two resolutions requesting, inter alia: 1. that 
radioactivity limit values applicable to foodstuffs be established 
uniformly by the Member States at a level which would 
unquestionably guarantee that such foodstuffs were harmless to 
human health; 2. that these limit values would be applicable both 
to foodstuffs produced within the Community and imported 
foodstuffs. In this perspective, the Parliament requested the 
Commission to report on the Chernobyl accident and its 
consequences for public health and environment within the 
Community. The Parliament also requested the Member States and 
the Commission to arrive at a common position with a view to 
negotiating rapidly international standards which would make it
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binding to report any accident immediately to the IAEA and to set 
up effective inspection systems at the international level (EC 
Commission, 1986a: p.5).
In »June 1986 the EC Commission presented an action plan to 
deal with the problems encountered as a consequence of the 
Chernobyl accident (EC Commission, 1986a). Such plan covered 
five areas: Health protection, nuclear safety, emergency 
procedures, international action, research.
With respect to health protection, the Commission pointed out 
two main needs: the need to accelerate, standardize and automate 
the collection of data on radioactivity levels and to publish 
regularly the results; and the need to establish permissible 
maximum limits for radioactive contamination in advance of 
accident, so as to avoid controversy in the event of an emergency 
(EC Commission, 1986a: pp.10-11). Concerning nuclear safety, the 
Commission stressed the need to examine the possibility of setting 
EC emission standards for radioactivity, to harmonize plant safety 
criteria within the Community, and to address the problems of 
transport and disposal of radioactive waste (ibidem: pp.13-20). 
Emergency procedures, especially regarding rapid information and 
mutual asistance in case of accidents, were addressed by the 
Commission taking into consideration that two IAEA conventions on 
these subjects were going to be negotiated in the following months 
and that Community's internal negotiations should be started in 
such perspective (ibidem: pp.20-22). The need to reinforce 
international organizations (like the WHO and the NEA 6), is 
stressed in the Commission's action plan (ibidem: pp.22-23). 
Finally, the adaptation of research programmes in the light of the 
Chernobyl experience is suggested (ibidem: p.23).
6 The NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency), a technical agency of the OECD, 
was formed in 1958 to promote cooperation between 23 participating 
Western countries on the production and use of nuclear energy.
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In the following period various activities had/have been 
undertaken by the Commission in the above mentioned fields, 
especially concerning health protection and emergency procedures.
New EC provisions had been adopted and the EC Member States 
as well as the EC Commission participated in the working out of 
important post-Chernobyl international agreements.
As far as health protection measures are concerned, an EC 
regulatory system laying down maximum permitted levels of 
radioactivity in foodstuffs was established by the already 
mentioned Council Regulation passed in Decembre 1987. Such 
provision was then ¿unended in July 1989 (Council Regulation 
2218/89 of 18.7.1989, O.J.L 211 of 22.7.89) and supplemented by 
other Regulations: one concerning minor foodstuffs (Regulation 
944/89 of 12.4.1989, O.J.L 101 of 13.4.1989), another concerning 
feedingstuffs (Regulation 770/90 of 29.3.1990, O.J.L 83 of 
30.3.1990) and other two concerning foodstuffs export (Regulation 
2219/89 of 18.7.1989, O.J. L 211 of 22.7.89) and imports 
(Regulation 737/90 of 22.3.1990, O.J.L82 of 29.3.90) in case of 
nuclear accidents.
| These Regulations were worked out by the Commission on advice 
¡of the group of experts art. 31 and taking into account the 
recommendations of a Committee of high-level independent experts 
(see, EC Commission, 1988) convoked by the Commission following 
Chernobyl 7. The Commission also participated in the discussions 
on the WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius regarding radioactivity limits 
in food with a view to harmonizing such limits at the broader 
international level (EC Commission, 1989: p.13).
7 Formed by six scientists from radiation protection institutions 
of EC and non-EC countries, the Committee was asked to assess the 
scientific evidence in view of the Chernobyl accident, to consider 
the possible implications for the Basic Safety Standards and 
emergency reference levels, and to advice the Commission on future 
actions in the field of radiological protection. The Committee 
supported the work done by the group of experts art. 31 and added 
some recommendations on radiation protection research issues.
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With respect to the activities needed ion order to implement 
these new Regulations and to guarantee compliance with the Basic 
Safety Standards, the Commission asked the Member States 
authorities to provide for the arrangements required to exercise 
the Commission's right to inspect facilities for radioactivity 
monitoring (EC Commission, 1989: p.20); inspections, with a very 
limited personnell, were started in 1991. Moreover, after 
Chernobyl a computerized data bank called REM (Radioactivity 
Environmental Monitoring) was set up at the Joint Research Centre 
of Ispra to collect the results of environmental radioactive 
contamination in the Community. However such results are provided 
by national authorities on a voluntary basis, therefore it is 
possible (or even likely) that not all relevant information 
"reach" REM (Girardi, interview; EC Commission, 1991)8.
c .2. IAEA Conventions.
With respect to emergency management, the EC Member States 
and the EC Commission participated in the negotiations of two 
international Conventions on early notification and assistance 
procedures in case of nuclear accidents. These Conventions 
(Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents and 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or a 
Nuclear Emergency) were promoted by the Board of Governors of the 
IAEA that decided, on 21 May 1986, to establish groups of 
governmental experts having the task to produce drafts of the two 
international agreements before September of the same year 9.
8 It is worth mentioning that by June 1991 France provided the 
highest number of measurements of radioactivity in air but failed 
(together with Greece and Ireland) to report measurements on the 
foodstuffs included in REM; only Great Britain, Italy and 
Luxemburg provided measurements on all environmental samples and 
foodstuffs included in REM (EC Commission, 1991: p.18).
9 About the two IAEA Conventions see Adede, 1987; Bodea, 1989; 
Cameron et al., 1988; Linnerooth, 1989; Pestellini, 1989; Sands, 
1988.
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Experts from 62 IAEA Member States 10 and representatives of 
ten international organizations (including the EC Commission) met 
at the headquarters of IAEA in Vienna, and four weeks after the 
commencment of negotiations they adopted by consensus the two 
drafted Conventions. The texts (which are modelled on IAEA 
Guidelines prepared before Chernobyl u) were then submitted to teh 
IAEA Board of Governors that decided to transmit them for the IAEA 
General Conference which was to be held on 24-26 September 1986. 
After being adopted by the General Conference, the two Conventions 
were opened for signature on 26 September and were immediately 
signed by more than fifty States (54 the Notification Convention 
and 52 the Assistance Convention), later on joined by others. All 
the EC Member States signed the Notification Convention while 
Luxembourg did not sign the Assistance Convention. In December 
1987 the EC Council decided that the Community would accede the 
notification Convention while no decision was taken -in spite of 
the favorable opinion of the EC Commission- concerning the 
Community's accession to the Assistance Convention (EC Commission, 
1989: pp.14-15).
10 Established in 1957 as an autonomous intergovernmental 
organization, altough it is administratively a member of teh 
United Nations, the IAEA has 113 Member States. Its main 
objectives are to promote civilian nuclear energy development and 
to ensure, so far as it is able, that nuclear material is not 
illegally diverted for military purposes. In this respect, a 
system of safeguards had been developed. The IAEA deals also with 
safety aspects. Through the OSART teams (Operational Safety 
Review Teams) the Agency gives advice to national authorities in 
the safety field; however it has no authority to formulate 
internationally binding safety standards.
11 See Guidelines for mutual emergency assistance arrangements in 
connection with a nuclear accident or radiological emergency 
(IAEA, 1984) and Guidelines on reportable events, integrated 
planning and information exchange in a transboundary release of 
radioactive material (IAEA, 1985). The Chernobyl accident provide 
the momentum for shifting from mere Guidelines to more binding 
Conventions.
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According to the Notification Convention, in case of 
accidents the States which are or may be physically affected must 
be notified "fortwith" -directly or through the IAEA- and provided 
with specific information listed in art.5. However, the 
participants to the negotiations on the Convention were unable to 
agree on a particular threshold for reportable events; this means 
that if an accident occurs, it is up to the particular State 
whether to report a nuclear accident (see, Bodea, 1989; Hancher 
and Cameron, 1988). Beside that, the Convention does not 
establish any obligation on States giving or receiving information 
to make it available to the public. Concerning the scope of the 
Convention, most States were in favour of a "full-scope coverage" 
while some of the nuclear weapons States opposed the inclusion of 
accidents caused by nuclear weapons and their testing. Finally a 
compromise was reached by including an article (art.3) which 
establishes that States Parties may notify nuclear accidents other 
than those specified in art.l covering only civil use of nuclear 
energy (Bodea, 1989; Sands, 1988).
The Assistance Convention does not require any State to 
provide assistance, but provides for a general obligation on 
States to cooperate among themselves and with teh IAEA to 
facilitate prompt assistance. The Convention requires (as the 
Notification Convention) that points of contact 12 for the 
coordination of activities are designed and made known by the 
States Parties; moreover it establishes an important role for the 
IAEA as a channel for the provision of information and assistance.
12 Points of contact may be technical or political bodies. Taking 
the case of Italy, the FRG and France, the points of contacts for 
the two Conventions are respectively: the Italian Minister for 
Civil protection and ENEA-DISP (the last one only for the 
Notification Convention), the German Federal Ministry for 
Environment, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Interministry Committee for Nuclear Safety. It is worth noting 
that some countries did not provide points of contact and in some 
cases the points of contact are only "façades"; this situation 
(together with other problems) may hamper the implementation fo 
the Conventions (Weiss, interview).
Even if is an important contribution to international cooperation, 
the Convention has been criticized on a number of grounds; 
especially concerning the question of responsibility, not only of 
the assisted but also of the assisting State. In fact on the one 
hand, assisting States apparently do not assume any responsibility 
for any damage that they might cause; on the other hand, a State 
which had caused an accident and agrees to assist another affected 
State may require remiboursement~of assistance costs (see Sands, 
1988: p.47).
Beside favouring the accession of the Community to both 
Conventions, the EC Commission suggested two additional EC 
provisions in the field of information. The first one concerning 
Community arrangements for the early exchange of information and 
the other concerning public information in the event of a 
radiological emergency. Both proposals were approved by the 
Council which adopted a Decision on Community arrangements for the 
early exchange of information in the event of a radiological 
emergency (Decision of 14.12.1987, O.J.L 371 of 30.12.87) and a 
Directive on informing the general public about health protection 
measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of a 
radiological emergency (Directive of 27.11.1989, O.J. L 357 of 
7.12.89). It can be noticed that it had taken much more time for 
the twelve EC Member States to adopt a system for early 
notification which is wider in scope but does not add significant 
elements (no threshold level for reportable events is set and 
military facilities are excluded also from the EC Decision) to the 
similar system agreed within few weeks by more than fifty States, 
including the EC ones.
The approval of the Directive on public information had been 
an even more long and controversial process; but at least this 
Directive provides for aspects that are not taken into 
consideration in the Notification Convention 13. That is, the
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information to be given prior and in the event of a radiological 
emergency (i.e. in situations likely to result in members of the 
public being exposed to doses in excess to the limits set in the 
Basic Safety Standards) about health protection measures.
c .3. International learning.
It can be noticed that post-Chernobyl legal developments at 
the EC and the broader international level mainly focused on 
cooperation in the field of accident management. This is hardly 
surprising given the fact that Chernobyl "tested" existing 
(national) management procedures, that these procedures were found 
wanting, and that -as a consequence- a need for stronger 
international cooperation to deal with transboundary nuclear risk 
emerged.
Harmonization of emergency procedures and health safety 
standards has been pursued for mainly practical (need to have 
quick and reliable data, to rely on previously set standards, 
etc.) and political reasons (need to show the concerned public 
that action was taken at "high level"). However such 
harmonization has also important implications concerning equity 
aspects; to lay down maximum permitted levels of radioactivity in 
foodstuffs at the Community and the broader international level or 
to call for intergovernmental as well as public information imply 
that all States and citizens of any State must/should be treated 
according to the same, general rules agreed upon.
The adoption of the above mentioned regulations and 
agreements at the international level results from a change in the 
perception and framing of nuclear risk management issues. While 
previous to Chernobyl the management of nuclear power was regarded 
as a national affair (with the exception of nuclear weapons tests
13 The principles and procedures of this Directive are similar to 
those stated in Article 8 of the Seveso Directive concerning 
public information with respect to major industrial hazards (see 
Directive 88/610/EEC amending the Seveso Directive of 24.6.1982).
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and illegal trade of nucler material), after the accident the need 
for a transboundary management was acknowledged.
This change was made possible by the interaction of several 
elements: the experience of the Chernobyl accident and fallout, 
the reflection on such experience by several actors on the basis 
of existing "frames” (national policies in the field of nuclear 
power but also foreign affairs and others m , Treaties -like 
Euratom-, guidelines -like those of IAEA, etc.) and on the basis 
of the communication going on in the social, political and 
scientific arena. In other words a process of learning took place 
where certain aspects of previous knowledge were "unlearned" (like 
the assumption that a major accident with transboundary release of 
radioactivity could not really happen), others were modified and 
new knowledge was produced through experience and reflection on 
such experience constrained by existing policies, norms and 
scientific evidence. All this in a context of communication 
between politicians, diplomats, experts and non governmental 
organizations in various fora (such as mass media, governmental 
and scientific circles, EC and IAEA institutions).
The actions taken/adaptations made with respect to the 
transboundary management of nuclear risk were the result of such 
learning process.
If one takes, for instance, the EC Directives and Regulations 
issued after Chernobyl, it is clear that they were the result of a 
process characterized by the interaction of experience (mainly 
experience of the controversies within and between member 
countries and between them and EC institutions about mesures to be 
taken), reflection on experience (within the EC Commission, the 
group of experts art.31, NGOs, etc.) constrained by existing 
"frames" (EC trade policy and usual EC law making first, and then
14 One can think, for example, about the new attitude towards 
external relations of former USSR which emerged in the mid­
eighties due to Gorbachev's perestroika, and about how this new 
attitude influenced the more collaborative position of USSR within 
IAEA and the reaching of agreement on the IAEA post-Chernobyl 
Conventions.
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the Euratom Treaty and other Directives -such as the Seveso 
Directive on information aspects-) and in a context of 
communication among actors holding different views about 
scientific, political and information issues.
The fact that learning took place and had some results does 
not mean however that "the best of all possible worlds" had been 
reached.
If it cannot but be acknowledged that important steps had 
been taken to fill existings gaps in international law and improve 
international cooperation -especially at the technical level- in 
case of major nuclear accidents, several shortcomings (including 
those mentioned in the previous paragraph) hamper the 
implementation of the EC provisions and the international 
Conventions approved after Chernobyl. Moreover, the links between 
civil and military uses of nuclear power and the insulation of the 
regime regulating the nuclear sector from those concerning other 
sectors (for example, regarding environmental pollution or waste 
disposal) prevented and still prevent the evolution of more 
binding norms at the EC level and at the broader international 
one.
These mentioned shortcomings must be taken into consideration 
when trying to evaluate the adaptations made after Chernobyl in 
terms of both policy consistency and effectiveness. In this 
respect some scholars argue that if an accident similar to the one 
of Chernobyl were to occur today, the international and European 
regimes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy would be found 
wanting in almost every respect (Hancher and Cameron, 1988: 
p.195). If one think, for instance, of the discretion left to 
governmental authorities regarding the ^ threshold for reportable 
events and the possibility to exclude military installations, it 
is possible that in case of a major accident the same problems 
about obtaining quick information at source would arise. As far 
as countermeasures are concerned, the setting of limit values of 
radioactivity in foodstuffs in form of EC Regulation provides a
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good basis for preventing that actions are not taken in EC 
countires when these limits are exceeded; however, the choice and 
implementation of measures could be again a matter of controversy.
Beside that, the focus on accident/emergency management 
procedures raises some intriguing issues.
( On the one hand, the post-Chernobyl emphasis on harmonization and standardization of emergency response at the international level seems to contrast with the need for flexibility and local 
discretion which were considered desirable in the aftermath of the
■a¡1 TMI accident (see Lathrop, 1981). In this respect it can be 
argued that while harmonization efforts in form of warning 
systems, basic safety standards and assistance procedures are 
needed to cope with transboundary hazards, decentralized emergency 
management is also important to deal with the immediate local 
variations that may occur. The two aspects are not in contrast 
with each other: harmonized standards and procedures can be 
regarded as the general framework to be put in practice according 
to accident-specific and local circumstances.
Another intriguing issue to be addressed regards the 
implications of the very focus on emergency management. Even if 
it is understandable the fact that the Chernobyl accident set 
international organizations into motion toward improving emergency 
management given the poor response(s) to the fallout, it should 
not be taken for granted the relative lack of attention toward 
.preventing a major accident in Western countries. While following 
TMI many activities were started to improve the safety of nuclear 
reactors and the so-called "man-machine interface", this was not
5 the case following Chernobyl due to the generally (but far fromi"universally") agreed assumption that a similar accident could 
never happen in a Western reactor. As Joanne Linnerooth points 
out, "after Chernobyl, little attention was given to reexamining 
the nuclear option or to more rigorous, binding safety rules 
backed by an effective international inspectorate. In a sense, by 
de-emphasizing prevention and emphasizing response, ^he burden of 
nuclear risk is shifted from the industry to the public"
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(Linnerooth, 1989: p.26). Of course, accident prevention and 
accident management are both needed; and to improve the latter is 
more than reasonable, especially if one agrees with Charles Perrow 
that accidents are "normal" (Perrow, 1984). However, the 
mentioned burden-shift raises a problem of fairness since 
responsibility is partially transferred from those who may cause 
an accident, and should take all possible measures to prevent it, 
to those who may be affected from it and therefore should ask for 
information and comply with countermeasures.
c .4. Concluding remarks.
On the basis of the discussion offered above, it can be noted 
that at the EC and at the broader international level a shift 
of/increased emphasis (or partial reframing) on the transboundary 
dimension of nuclear risk and on the possibility (rather than 
almost impossibility) of major nuclear accidents took place 
following Chernobyl. As a consequence, legal and technical 
instruments to cope with transboundary nuclear risk were adopted.
This happened on the basis of reflection on experience within 
some major institutions (like the IAEA and the EC Commission) and 
on the basis of "transboundary communication" in international 
fora (such as the negotiation of the IAEA Conventions) and through 
the mass media.
Independently from the problematic aspects mentioned above, ), 
it can then be said that a collective learning that went beyond 
political borders (or international learning) took place.
/'
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CONCEPTUAL MODELS AND THE CHERNOBYL CRISIS: 
INTERPRETING RESPONSE AND LEARNING PROCESSES.
One threat, many responses and adaptations.
These few words summarize the core of what has been described 
and analysed in the previous pages.
And now, after making explicit in the first chapter some "key 
words/concepts" and the hypothesis that partially oriented and 
partially emerged from the empirical research, and after 
reconstructing some case studies and analysing their specific 
features, it is time to try to make sense of the overall 
"picture". In this last chapter an interpretation is therefore 
suggested concerning two linked but distinct problems addressed in 
the present work, that is why there had been different short-term 
responses and why there had been different medium/long-term 
adaptations following the same (Chernobyl) event.
By using the word "interpretation" I wish to emphasize that 
subjective elements always influence both the selection of 
evidence and the way of "making sense" of it. Moreover, any 
attempt to interpret "facts" and to answer why-questions 
(especially in the social sciences but also in the natural ones) 
is -as Mary Hesse writes (Hesse, 1974)- "theory laden". In other 
words it can be said that any explanation -and even any 
description- is interpretation because the identification of the 
key features and explanatory variables (in terms of cause-effect 
relationships, functions or other elements) does not depend on the 
objective analysis of objective facts but on the way we assemble 
and look at the evidence. As Graham Allison points out, what 
each analyst sees and judges to be important is a function not 
only of the evidence about what happened but also of the 
"conceptual lenses" through which he or she looks at the evidence 
(Allison, 1971: Introduction). Similarly, Erving Goffman (1974)
8
276
and other sociologists point to the importance of frames 
(including analytical frames) in "seeing" things.
This does not mean that "everything goes"i, that any 
interpretation is equally sound. On the contrary, the utilization 
of some "lenses" can reveal to be insufficient, useless or even 
misleading -like the use of a microscope to look at the moon- in 
analysing why certain events did occur. On the other hand, also 
the reference to conceptual models that are not able to explain 
all the aspects that we regard as important ones can provide 
useful insights. For instance, by making us aware of theoretical 
gaps to be possibly filled (or at least to be taken into account) 
in order to interpret/make sense of the evidence those models 
helped us to assemble.
On the basis of this premise, the "lens"/hypothesis that was 
put forward in the Introduction and was developed in the second 
chapter will be reassessed in the light of the case studies and by 
confronting it with alternative interpretations based on the 
conceptual models also discussed in the second chapter.
One way to approach the problem of interpreting response and 
learning processes by confronting different models could be to 
engage in a sort of "multiple lenses exercize". As in Allison’s 
book, in Kurosawa's film "Rashomon" or in the "Exercices de style" 
of Queneau the same story could be narrated in different ways 
depending on the different points of view/conceptual lenses 
referred to. But, differently from these examples, such exercise 
could turn out to be rather boring for the reader who already went 
through seven chapters. Such exercise would also run the risk of 
ending in a narrative that could be of limited help in identifying 
what we can see and what we eventually miss by using different 
conceptual lenses. Therefore three different and very simplified
1 This motto of Paul Fayerabend (see Fayerabend, 1975) has been 
often used to indicate a radically relativist attitude and it is 
used also here in this sense. However it must be mentioned that 
Fayerabend's idea of "everything goes" is much more complex than 
its popularization.
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"stories" concerning the responses to Chernobyl will be 
tentatively sketched, according to the models selected by Allison, 
for those who are interested in seeing how such "stories" could 
look like; but they are left as Appendixes.
With respect to the reconstruction and interpretation of the 
responses to Chernobyl according to the Rational Policy Model, the 
Organizational Process Model and the Bureucratic Politics Model, 
some points (partially anticipated in the second chapter) must be 
made 2.
The "story" based on the Rational Policy Model suggests a 
logical explanatory sequence, from goals to decisions/responses, 
but it fails to provide an empirically grounded interpretation of 
the Chernobyl case due to various elements. 1) It assumes that 
national governments and the EC acted as unitary actors, in this 
way neglecting intra-governmental conflicts (at the horizontal, 
inter-ministry, level and at the vertical, center/periphery, one) 
and conflicts within and between the EC institutions. In this 
respect the "rationalist story" seems credible only in the French 
case where a sort of "monolitism" (at least in public) was 
observed; but also in this case the Rational Policy Model fails to 
explain the reasons for such "monolitism" by taking it for 
granted. 2) Moreover, the passage from goals to decisions -based 
on the supposedly systematic and consistent evaluation of all 
options- does not account for the oscillations and shifts observed 
(for instance, from the issuing of reassuring statements to the 
adoption of relatively strict countermeasures in Italy and the 
FRG, or from no measure to some symbolic measures in France).
Those oscillations and shifts indicate the presence of not totally 
clear and stable goals and/or the difficulties in identifying the 
best means to achieve certain ends (for example, whether to hide 
the extension of the fallout or show efficiency in dealing with it
2 The "stories" offered in the Appendixes do not deal with the 
long-term changes occurred after Chernobyl; however most of the 
points/criticisms regarding the treatment of response processes 
within those "stories" also apply to learning processes.
in order to safeguard national nuclear programmes from anti- 
nuclear opposition). 3) If one takes long-term changes, it is 
even more difficult than in the case of short-term responses to 
realistically conceive them as the result of a long sequence of 
rational and intended choices.
The "story" reconstructed with the.help .of the Organizational 
Process Model provides us with useful elements (which will be 
discussed in the next paragraph) to interpret the responses to 
Chernobyl. What appears problematic in that "story" is that, by 
focusing only on organizational features, constraints and 
processes, it neglects social and political dynamics that proved 
to be very important in the Chernobyl case. The conflicts between 
political parties, the public trust or distrust in institutions, 
the relative political strenght of actors that ate weak in 
organizational terms (like environmental groups) being cases in 
point.
Finally, the "story" based on the Bureaucratic Politics Model 
covers many important elements regarding the response processes 
that followed Chernobyl, including the "politics of issues" and 
the processes of mutual adjustment in making choices. The 
Bureaucratic Politics Model offers then useful "lenses" (which 
will be mentioned later on) to understand our case, however its 
reliance on individual personalities, goals and skills is rather 
problematic. Certainly individuals like Zamberletti, Zimmermann 
or Pellerin (just to mention some important and visible actors) 
played an important role in shaping the responses to Chernobyl 
also due to their personal skills; but they could only exercize 
such influence thanks to (and constrained by) the specific 
features of the organization they were members of and the broader 
political and social context.
Having spelled out some of the limits of the "stories" 
sketched in the Appendixes, let us focus on some points regarding 
the explanatory/interpretive capability of the Policy
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Communication Model in dealing with response and learning 
processes.
a. Interpreting response processes.
One threat, many responses.
In the case studies presented in the previous chapters it has 
been shown that there was no generalized correspondence between 
the adoption or non adoption of different measures and the 
detected variations in the extension and seriousness of the 
radioactive contamination. This remark applies both within and 
between countries as showed by the German case (where higher 
precautionary measures were taken in Länder less affected than 
others by the fallout) and the French case (where no measures were 
taken also in areas as highly contaminated as in the neighbouring 
Italy and Germany). It has then been argued that each response 
(at the national, local and EC level) and the differences between 
the responses to the Chernobyl fallout cannot be explained by 
objectively different features of the problem to be faced. Other 
reasons have been looked for and an interpretation of the 
processes that developed in each case as well as some comparisons 
between the different cases were offered.
This was done by focusing on the way scientific and 
organizational uncertainties (which were both crucial due to the 
science-based nature of technological risks and to the ill-defined 
competences in a case of unprecedented crisis) were managed in 
defining the problem and responding to it. And this in turn was 
regarded as due to the relations (in each country and, in a 
different form, at the international level) between what 
scientists select as relevant knowledge, what politicians wish to 
know and to be let known, what information the mass-media have 
access to, pick out and construct as news, and what pressure 
social movements and/or interest groups are able to exert 
concerning the selection, utilization and diffusion of
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information. These relations also influenced the technical, 
legislative, organizational and policy adaptations made in the 
years following the accident.
When analysing the features of the Policy Communication 
Process in the Chernobyl case, some elements developed within 
issue framing/cultural approaches and within the Organizational 
Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model can be useful to 
analyse the role played by each actor and the interactions between 
the various actors both at the national and transnational level.
a.i.The role of governmental actors.
As far as governmental actors and, in some respects, EC 
institutions are concerned, the Bureaucratic Politics Model 
provides important tools to interpret conflicts and coalitions 
between Ministers as well as between central and local authorities 
or between officials of different EC institutions. These 
conflicts and coalitions can be partially explained by pointing to 
the subjective capabilities, perceptions, stakes, power and 
position (within the government or political parties or the EC 
Commission) of leading individuals. On the other hand, the 
Organizational Process Model reminds us that governmental leaders 
cannot be taken separately from the constellation of organizations 
that form the government (or the EC setting); and it explains how 
the specific features of these organizations influence the 
definition of the problem as well as the selection and 
implementation of options. On a more general level, issue framing 
approaches indicate that politicians' definition of problems as 
public/political ones or as laying outside their sphere of 
interest and concern is very much influenced by the broader social 
context. For example, the presence of strong anti-nuclear 
movements able to "politicize" nuclear risks (as in the German and 
Italian cases) or, on the contrary, a diffused acceptance of 
nuclear power (like in France) have a different impact on
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politicians' willingness to "see" certain problems as political 
(beside technical) ones.
Some contributions that point to the relative "weight" of 
organizational or political features and cultural ones can be 
found in the contributions on "policy styles" and in the (few) 
studies concerning policy making and crisis management 3.
The last ones analyse the interaction between the 
caracteristics of decision-makers, the characteristics of the 
relevant organizations and the characteristic of the crisis to be 
faced in shaping governmental responses at the national level. In 
this respect, Robert Jackson argues that governmental crisis 
management, "will be determined more by the factors of normal 
organizational behavior and the normal bargaining process than by 
between-nation differences per se" (Jackson, 1976: p.230).
This view can be confronted with the concept of "policy 
style" suggested by Jeremy Richardson and stressing instead cross- 
cultural /national differences (Richardson, 1982). Richardson 
defines, "policy style as the interaction between a) the 
governments'approach to problem-solving and b) the relationship 
between government and other actors in the policy process" 
(Richardson, 1982: p.13). He also suggests a typology of national 
policy styles as characterized by anticipatory or reactive 
governments' approach to problem solving, and imposing or 
consensual relationship between the government and other actors.
If one regards both "policy styles" and "normal 
organizational behavior and bargaining processes" as a sort of 
"genetic" properties of each (in the case of "policy style") or 
all (as implicit in the adjective "normal") country/ies and 
political system/s, a contrapposition between the two approaches 
will be unavoidable. However this contrapposition is not only 
unnecessary (and in fact Jackson uses the comparative "more-than" 
in the quoted sentence); it is also unreasonable. On the one hand
3 See, for instance, Jackson (1976) and Robinson (1970). From a 
more sociological perspective, but taking into account also some 
policy aspects, see Lagadec (1981).
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it is in fact impossible to separate the general features (like 
the reliance on SOPs or governmental positions) of organizational 
and bureaucratic behavior from their cultural and/or national 
specific connotations. On the other hand, culture and societies 
are differentiated and change over time; therefore different 
"policy styles" can live together (in a more or less conflictual 
way) in the same country« and they can change. Such changes being 
marginal or radical depending on the strenght of the historical 
heritage and on the transformations occurring in the political, 
economic and social basis.
Following this reasoning, both general, "normal", 
organizational and bureaucratic features and cross-cultural 
differences must be taken into account in analysing governmental 
crisis management and responses.
But, as previously mentioned, the responses to Chernobyl were 
not only governmental responses. In this respect, Richardson's 
inclusion of the relations between governments and other actors in 
the analytical framework represents a step forward in order to 
make sense of the overall picture. And to contextualize 
governmental actors in the broader policy communication process.
The elements provided by the above mentioned approaches 
contribute to the understanding of one aspect of the Policy 
Communication Model, that is what politicians wish to know and to 
be let known.
This depends, on the one hand, on politicians' subjective and 
"positional" interests, stakes, power and perceptions as well as 
on the organizational intelligence available at the governmental 
level in each specific situation. On the other hand, what 
politicians wish to know and to be let known also depends on the 
broader social context (and the corresponding "policy style")
4 Richardson (1982) and especially Hayward (1982) already 
acknowledged this point.
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where issue framing is characterized either by apathy, conflict or 
consensus.
a .2.The role of experts.
Important actors who are both within and outside the 
governmental sphere are the experts.
The role of governmental experts as advisors and their 
influence in shaping the governmental and EC definition of the 
problem and in selecting options has been stressed several times 
in the present work. Moreover, the role of non-governmental or 
counter-experts in suggesting alternative definitions of the 
problem and alternative options, as well as in exercizing a sort 
of informal peer review of the work of governmental experts, has 
been also pointed out. Last but not least the relations between 
experts, the media and (especially through the media) the public 
have been addressed.
The Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model provide us with useful tools to interpret the 
relations between experts and politicians. The first one by 
pointing to the process of organizational intelligence (that is 
the way information is selected and processed according to 
organizational features and procedures), and the second one by 
implicitly reminding us that the available information and the 
advices offered by experts are selected by politicans according to 
their interests and perceptions.
Organization Theory also contributes to the understanding of 
the functioning of scientific organizations. However, the 
specific features of such organizations and the behavior of 
individual scientists cannot be fully grasped without resorting to 
studies in the field of sociology and philosophy of science 5. 
Beside SOPs, programmes and repertories, also the cognitive
5 Some of these science-related issues are discussed in the first 
chapter, beside being addressed in the cases studies.
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dynamics of scientific research, the building and exercise of that 
specific sort of power which is represented by scientific 
knowledge must be analysed in order to interpret the disagreements 
between experts as well as their role as advisers and, using a 
term introduced by Martin Rein (Rein, 1986), as "sponsors of 
framing". The role of radiation protection experts and physicists 
(beside leading Ministers) during the Chernobyl fallout being a 
case in point. Beside "sponsoring" a certain frame, governmental 
experts also struggled to keep the "ownership" (Gusfield, 1981) of 
radiation risk as a problem that public action cannot do anything 
about. Due to the reasons discussed in teh case studies, such 
"ownership" was rather successfully kept in France and was instead 
challenged by counter-experts and the anti-nuclear movement in 
Italy and the FRG.
These elements, together with organizational features, enable 
us to interpret another component of the policy communication 
process, that is how and why scientists select what they regard as 
policy relevant knowledge.
What scientists select as relevant knowledge depends on 
specific features of the organizations they are members of, on 
specific features of scientific research, on experts' capacity and 
willingness to act or not to act as advisers, and on the 
public/political or purely scientific dymension of issues.
a.3.The role of mass media.
During the Chernobyl fallout the mass media of the various 
countries were directly involved in crisis management, 
particularly by diffusing information on countermeasures, and 
acted as means of communication between different sectors of 
society. Beside that, they also participated in defining the 
problem and indirectly (for instance, by giving voice to public 
concerns) in selecting options. At the transnational level it can 
be noticed that while no "EC mass media” as such exist, news
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spread beyond political borders and enlighted the differences and 
similarities between European countries (as showed in the 
discussion of the French media coverage of the responses to 
Chernobyl in the neighbouring Germany and Italy). Furthermore, 
national media also vehiculated in the Member States the 
"harmonizing words" issued in Brussels. In this way the media 
contributed in developing an "EC dymension", beside the various 
national ones, of the Chernobyl fallout.
Organization Theory provides a good basis to interpret 
processes such as news gathering, newsmaking and agenda setting.
In fact it points to the selective procedures through which news 
are gathered (by international and national news agencies as well 
as by each newspaper, TV or radio), to the routines (in terms of 
timing, standard format, language, etc.) involved in the making of 
the news, and to the organizational (beside political and 
economic) constraints which determine the contents and priorities 
of agenda setting 6.
However, also the interwinement between media and politics 
must be taken into account. On the one hand, political factors 
influence the way news are gathered, selected and constructed; in 
this regard, some authors link organizational and bureaucratic 
politics aspects by emphasizing the role of officials -and we can 
include, in the light of the Chernobyl case, also governmental 
experts- as crucial sources of news and their tactical use of the 
media (see, Sigal, 1973; Halperin, 1974: cap.10).
On the other hand, the mass media interact with and influence 
politics thanks to their own power base in society ? and to their
6 On the organizational features of mass media, especially 
concerning the press, see -for instance- Engwall (1978), Fenby 
(1986), McQuail (1983: cap.4), Sigal (1973), Tuchmann (1978), Wolf 
(1985, cap.3).
7 According to Michael Gurevitch and Jay Blumler at least three 
sources of media power can be identified: the structural root of 
media power springs from the media capacity to deliver to 
politicians an audience which is unavailable by any other means; 
the psychological root steams from the relation of credibility and 
trust developed by the media with members of their audience; the
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ability to produce and diffuse frames. As Gaye Tuchman writes, 
news is a frame that ”..imparts to occurrences their public 
character as it transforms mere happenings into publicly 
discussable events" (Tuchman, 1978: p.3). If one adds to these 
aspects the technological one, that is the quick development and 
diffusion of information technologies which make the contemporary
world a "global village" •, the increasingly important role of the
mass media emerges even more clearly.
All these elements help us to interpret the third component 
of the policy communication process, that is what information the 
mass media have access to, pick out and construct as news.
This is due to organizational and technological features of 
the media and to their relationships with the political and social 
system. Both these elements influence in fact the agenda setting 
of media and the framing of issues as news.
a.4.The role of public and private interest groups.
During and following the Chernobyl fallout, public and 
private interest groups participated in the problem definition and 
option selection processes.
As far as private interest groups are concerned, the nuclear 
industry exercized a crucial influence in framing the issue of the 
safety of nuclear reactors as a "Soviet" problem not concerning 
the "West" and in marginalizing that issue as much as possible in 
the "response agenda". Other private interest groups, such as 
farmers’ organizations, also tried to influence the governmental 
response by pointing to the economic cost and to the scientific
normative root that comes from tenets of liberal philosophy such 
as the freedom of expression (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1977).
8 As pointed out in chapter 3, inequalities in the diffusion of 
information technologies and constraints on their utilization make 
the "global village" not homogeneous.
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uncertainties involved in restricting the selling of certain 
foodstuffs. Even when they were not able to impose their 
definition of the problem, they succeded in making the issue of 
economic compensation being included in the "response agenda".
With respect to private interest groups it can then be said 
that their ability to exercize a pressure concerning the 
selection, utilization and diffusion of information depend both on 
their organizational resources and especially on their economic 
and, indirectly, political power.
Public interest groups were able (especially in the FRG and 
Italy) to make their voice listened to in spite of their scarce 
economic resources. Anti-nuclear and environmental groups 
participated in the policy communication process through arguments 
as well as through actions (mainly demonstrations) aimed at making 
their arguments and concerns visible. They suggested a 
definition of the problem in terms of the high risks involved by 
nuclear power technology and suggested both case-specific 
(i.e.countermeasures) and general (withdrawal from nuclear power) 
options. In this way they pushed politicians (both government and 
political parties leaders) to include Chernobyl and nuclear issues 
in the political agenda.
The organizational features and resources of the mentioned 
private and public interest groups differ remarkably 9. As already 
noticed, there is an enormous difference between the degree of 
complexity and the economic and technical resources of the nuclear 
industry and those of the various anti-nuclear groups. However, 
in the Chernobyl case those anti-nuclear and environmental groups 
which were better organized and were numerically and politically 
stronger, were able to use their unformalized and flexible
9 There is a large Organizational Theory literature dealing with 
business organizations. Less developed is the literature 
regarding the organizational features of public interest groups; 
interesting contribution in this field, especially concerning 
environmental organizations, can be found in Diani (1988); Nelkin 
and Pollack (1981); Rovelli (1988); Rucht (1989).
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organizational structure to spread and make visible their point of 
view by promoting local and national initiatives, by organizing 
counter-expertize to contrast governmental and industry experts 
and by obtaining access to the media. In other words, those anti- 
nuclear and environmental groups were able to make the most of the 
opportunities for communication available in the political system. 
Opportunities (in terms of the degree of access of the decision 
making process through courts, participatory procedures like 
hearings, referenda, etc.) that differ in the various political 
systems.
As far as the supranational context is concerned, it has to 
be mentioned that NGOs played a less important, or at least a less 
direct role at the EC level. This was due not only to the 
relative weakness of NGOs working at the EC level 10 but to the 
fact that the EC decision making process (with the multiple 
bargainings within and between the EC institutions and between 
them and the member states) mainly reflect internal (within the EC 
institutions) and inter-governmental bargainings. Which means 
that the EC response to Chernobyl was influenced by public 
interests groups in a mainly indirect way, i.e. through the 
pressure these groups had been able to exert within the member 
states u.
On the basis of the mentioned points it can be argued that 
the organizational features, the relative strenght and the ability 
of public interest groups to use the available communication 
opportunities, together with the characteristics of the various 
political and institutional systems (at the national and
10 The EC "ombrella organizations" of environmental and consumer 
groups are rather weak in economic and organizational terms. 
Besides, the vagueness of the notion of an "European public 
opinion" and the distance between EC institutions and citizens 
(usually bigger than in the national context) make also the 
political influence of these European NGOs quite weak.
11 This was the case also of business EC "ombrella organizations", 
even if such organizations have much more resources than 
environmental ones.
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supranational level), account for the pressure that these groups 
are able to exert concerning the selection, utilization and 
diffusion of knowledge.
a.5. Communicative interaction and uncertainty management.
The analysis offered above tries to shed some light on the 
specific features of and the interactions between politicians, 
experts, mass media and interest groups (public and private) as 
the main actors involved in the policy communication process.
All of them participated, in different ways, in the multi­
directional flows of information (including the provision of and 
contrasts between arguments) that took place during the fallout 
and in the related processes of problem definition and option 
selection.
If we start with the initiating event (the Chernobyl accident 
and fallout) and we try to summarize the main components of the 
process that lead to the responses to such event, the following 
chart can be drawn:
c o m m u n i c a t i v e  i n t e r a c t i o n
r
u n c e r t a i n t y  m a n a g e m e n t
(Chernobyl)
event >problem definitions
(emergence of a 
"dominant frame")
--->responses
(decisions and 
non-decisions)
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When "filling" this chart with some of the findings discussed 
in the case studies, we see that the same event gave rise to 
different definitions of the problem (frames).
While in France governmental experts and authorities were 
able to impose -in a non cohercive way- a definition ("dominant 
frame") of the fallout as an external problem, both in the FRG and 
Italy the "dominant frame" that emerged few days after the 
accident defined the fallout as a nationwide public health problem 
(with more emphasis on the "emergency" character of such problem 
in Italy and more emphasis, especially by Länder authorities, on 
the local variations of such nationwide problem in the FRG).
Moreover, not only different definitions of the problem gave 
rise to different responses, but also similar definitions of the 
problem resulted in partially different responses. Till the 
"dominat frame" defining Chernobyl as an external problem was not 
challenged (by the media and anti-nuclear groups) in France, no 
countermeasure was adopted and this no-response contrasted with 
what was happening in the neighbouring FRG and Italy. Even when 
such frame was challenged, only few symbolic measures were taken; 
partially because it was too late to do otherwise and partially 
because the "challenge" regarded more the secretive attitude of 
the responsible authorities that the extension and possible health 
consequences of the fallout. On the other hand, while 
precautionary measures had been adopted both in the FRG and Italy, 
differences can be observed in the legal character of such 
measures (mainly Ministerial decrees in Italy and recommendations 
by the SSK in Germany) and in their implementation (more 
differentiated in the FRG due to federal/state cleavages and 
political party conflicts).
Many case-specific elements contributed to the emerging of 
one or the other "dominant frame" (and marginalization of other 
frames), and to the selection of certain responses (including 
"non-decisions"). Among these elements (analysed in the case 
studies) one can mention the structure and role of in-house 
governmental expertise in the three countries, the "weight" of the
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nuclear programmes in national economy and politics, the activism 
or weakness of anti-nuclear opposition and counter-expertise, and 
so on.
On a more general level however, what appear crucial are the 
relations -or communicative interaction- between the relevant 
actors and the corresponding management of scientific and 
organizational uncertainties. These uncertainties had been 
managed, both in defining the problem and responding to it, in a 
strategic way (including attempts to deny them) but within the 
context of certain -eventually changing- constraints such as the 
evidence provided by monitoring data (evidence that was 
differently interpreted and used but had to be taken into account) 
and its diffusion within or outside political borders 
(international communication flows proved to be an important, 
while not necessarily binding, "constraint" to secretive attitudes 
by national authorities). In this respect, elements such as the 
accessibility of information (from governmental or non 
governmental sources within and outside political borders) and the 
degree of pluralism and/or fragmentation (horizontal or vertical) 
of the policy process proved to be very important in the Chernobyl 
case.
Summing up, the way each actor contributed to the policy 
communication process by gathering, selecting, diffusing and/or 
constructing information was due to the specific features of the 
(national or transnational) context and on the resources of -and 
power relations between- the relevant actors.
In turn, the different shape of the communicative interaction 
between actors in the cases under examination determined the way 
scientific and organizational uncertainties were managed during 
the fallout (mainly to take them into account or deny them, to 
cope with them through emergency or routine procedures, and so on) 
and, consequently, they determined the different responses to 
Chernobyl.
292
b. Interpreting learning processes.
Beside the various short-term responses, many medium- and 
long-term changes (changes in the framing of issues and technical, 
legislative, organizational and policy adaptations) followed the 
Chernobyl accident.
In the case studies some reasons are suggested concerning why 
these changes occurred and why do they differ in different 
contexts.
In the following pages a more general framework is offered by 
asking whether and how the conceptual models discussed above, and 
especially the Policy Communication Model, can help to interpret 
learning -beside response- processes.
Before embarking in such enterprise it seems necessary to 
previously simplify and clarify the "magma" formed by the various 
changes discussed in the previous chapters. The suggested 
simplification/clarification will focus on the actors (who are the 
"learners" ?), the process (how and which kind of learning has 
taken place ?) and the results (what has been learned ?).
On the basis of this simplification/clarification, the 
reasons and dynamics of the learning processes will be then 
explored.
b.l. Clarifying the "magma”: the actors, the process, the results,
b.1.1.Actors.
The actors who actually decided about adaptations to be made 
are the policy makers. But this does not mean that they have been 
the only learners. In fact, experts collaborated in formulating 
not only technical but also legislative, organizational and policy 
adaptations, and in some cases they directly elaborated measures 
that policy makers had simply to ratify (for example, concerning
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monitoring and radiation protection norms). Besides, public 
interest groups and the media pushed into the policy and political 
agenda some issues that were then addressed by legal, 
organizational and policy adaptations. What is more, they played 
a key role in fostering changes in the framing of issue; for 
instance, "sponsoring" a framing of the Chernobyl fallout as a 
problem not to be left in the hands of ("owned by") governmental 
authorities and experts.
As already discussed with respect to the responses to the 
Chernobyl fallout, if it is true that some individuals took a 
leading role in promoting (or opposing) certain measures, the main 
actors involved in the learning (as in the response) process have 
been collective actors. That is, governmental and trans- 
governmental (in the case of EC institutions) bodies, 
international organizations, scientific (both governmental and 
non-governmental) organizations, public and private interest 
groups and the media. The focus of analysis must then be on 
learning by collective rather than individual actors.
b .1.2.Process.
On the basis of the remarks suggested above, an 
organizational learning process, a policy learning process and a 
social learning process should be distinguished, the first two 
being parts of the third one 12.
Organizational learning refers to the way organizational 
features and dynamics brought about, constrained or prevented 
learning. Giving the fact that governmental and non-governemntal 
organizations are actors of the policy process, organizational 
learning can be regarded -in the present context- as a part of the
12 Governmental learning is regarded in this context as an aspect 
of policy learning and it is not specifically addressed because it 
focuses on specific actors rather than on a process 
(organizational, policy, social) like the other concepts referred 
to.
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policy learning process. This last process indicates the way 
policy was marginally or radically changed as a consequence of the 
new situation caused by the Chernobyl accident, including the new 
forms and contents of communication among the actors involved. 
Since policy making is embedded in the broader social environment 
and results from the interactions between various -not only 
governmental- actors, policy learning can be regarded as a form 
and part of social learning. Instead this last term, which 
indicates all the collective learning processes taking place in a 
society, is not reducible only to policy changes.
If we ask how these learning processes have been developing, 
both the framing of issues and the actions taken to deal with them 
must be taken into consideration. With respect to both these 
aspects, the role played by each of the mentioned actors and 
especially the interactions between them must be analysed to 
understand the mechanisms of and constraints to learning.
The working definition of learning suggested in the first 
chapter is referred to when analysing whether and how learning had 
been actually taking place after Chernobyl, and whether such 
learning explains the changes that had been made or is merely a 
label for describing them. According to such definition, learning 
is a collective cognitive process involving the acquisition of new 
skills and the re-framing of issues, which may then produce 
changes in behavior. Such process occur through communication and 
is based on the incorporation of new, or previously neglected, 
information and (usually) on self-reflection on previous 
experience. As far as this last point is concerned, it must be 
noted that learning not always involves self-reflection but may 
take place on the basis of unintended (quasi-automatic) "matching" 
between the cumulation of information and skills and the occurring 
of certain experiences.
While learning always produce cognitive changes, it does not 
necessarily bring about some practical results. In the Chernobyl 
case however both practical results and some less visible ones can 
be observed.
b.1.3.Results.
A way to find out what has been learned after Chernobyl is to 
look at the technical, legal, organizational adaptations described 
in the previous chapters. However those adaptations do not 
exhaust the scope of learning results.
A more comprehensive "list" includes social and governmental 
awareness that a serious accident can occur and that nuclear risks 
are transboundary (with the related adjustments in the field of 
monitoring, radiation protection, emergency management, 
information exchanges and mutual aid in case of accident). 
Moreover, other aspects should be added as different actors 
learned different lessons from Chernobyl. For instance, 
governmental authorities discovered to be unprepared to cope with 
transboundary environmental crises; EC institutions and some 
international organizations realized that there was room for them 
in the field of transboundary risk management, but they also 
experienced that national governments were not too willing to 
transfer to them some of their "sovereign" competences; lay people 
found out that those responsible for managing nuclear risk were 
not able to do it properly; the nuclear industry discovered to be 
vulnerable to a nuclear accident happening also far away and 
causing an increase in anti-nuclear opposition.
\f| In other words, the results of learning processes had been 
■both actual measures/adaptations and different ways of looking at 
things.
The following chart summarizes the main aspects of learnig 
processes:
(see next page)
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c.2. Conceptual models and learning processes.
Having (hopefully) clarified the "magma" of post-Chernobyl 
changes, we can explore the reasons and dynamics of learning 
processes in the light of the conceptual models previously 
discussed.
The Organizational Process Model and Organization Theory more 
in general provide us with useful tools to understand why certain 
adaptations at the organizational level, or organizational 
learning, have taken place and why did they differ.
Taking the cases, for example, of the reorganization of ENEA 
in Italy, of CEA in France and some nuclear centres (like Jiilich) 
in the FRG, as well as the marginal organizational changes adopted 
within the French Ministry of Industry or the designing of the 
organizational structure of the BMU in the FRG, the Organizational 
Process Model enable us to identify some organization-specific 
mechanisms of and constraints to learning.
Regarding the last ones, the difficulties met in adjusting 
the tasks and the goals of an organization like ENEA or in 
reducing the size and eventually the responsibilities of a "giant"
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like CEA (but also of a smaller organization such as the Jiilich 
centre), can be explained by the contributions that point to the 
entrenched ideologies and values that militate against 
organizational adaptability (Beyer, 1981) and to the need for, but 
also to the risks (like the risk of organizational paralysis) 
imp]J.ed by unlearning (Hedberg, 1981; Starbuck, 1983). Beside 
that, also the organization of the BMU, which was formed by 
putting together "pieces" of other Ministries and by leaving them 
as almost totally separate units while working under the same 
roof, can be partly regarded as the result of organizational 
inertia and resistance to radical changes. This seems to be even 
more the case concerning marginal adjustments like the 
establishment of a crisis information unit within the French 
Ministry of Industry. On the other hand, the resistance of 
organizations to radical changes can be also interpreted as a way 
to deal with limited internal flexibility and prevent the risk of 
paralysis involved by unlearning.
As far as the mechanisms of organizational learning are 
concerned, it can be noted that in spite of the mentioned 
difficulties and resistance to change, all the above mentioned 
organizational adaptations show an ability to learn from and 
adjust to experience by copying not only with the uncertainties 
involved in a changing external environment but also with the 
uncertainties regarding certain features, such as the flexibility, 
of each organization. This can be viewed as the result of a self- 
reflective (by organizations themselves) or imposed (for example, 
by politicians) re-evaluation of certain external events and 
previous organizational performance, and of a reframing of issues 
(for instance, nuclear safety in conjunction with -rather than 
isolated from- environmental policy issues as in the BMU case) 
through communication within organizations and between them and 
their environment.
Another point to be made concerns the fact that, once 
substantial organizational adaptations are made, they can 
influence the broader policy learning process. And this implies
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that not only organizational but also political resistance to such 
adaptations can arise in order to prevent radical policy changes. 
Or, on the contrary, organizational adaptations can be promoted by 
politicians as a substitute for policy change.
With respect to the last point, the Bureaucratic Politics 
Model contribute other important elements to explain why certain 
adaptations were or were not made and why did they differ.
Just to continue with organizations, it was already mentioned 
(in chapter 5) that the establishment of the BMU was the result of 
political conflicts between political parties about the nuclear 
issue together with the willingness and ability of a leading 
politician to "do something" in order to gain credibility and 
weaken the opposition.
To give another example concerning the importance of 
bureaucratic and also party politics in promoting or preventing 
adaptations, it can be reminded that the results of the anti- 
nuclear referenda held in Italy after Chernobyl (and which caused 
a core policy change) were not only the result of the widespread 
concern about nuclear power and the strenght of the anti-nuclear 
movement. They also reflected political manouverinq by the major 
political parties that tried to deal with a changed social 
environment in a way to preserve -or challenge- dominant positions 
within the governmental coalition.
Beside their general influence in promoting or preventing 
adaptations, political aspects also help to interpret why 
. different adaptations have been actually made. The presence or 
absence of strong political conflict (especially, but not 
exclusively, political party conflicts) over nuclear issues, the 
importance or irrelevance of central/local and federal/state 
cleavages, the openess or closure of the political (and legal)
! system to citizens’ participation are all important elements that 
made and make a difference in deciding about the adaptations to be 
-or not to be- implemented. However, it is worthwile to mention
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that these aspects go beyond the "top level" governmental circles 
analysed by the Bureaucratic Politics Model.
Also with respect to learning processes, as it was t.he case 
with response processes, the Policy Communication Model can 
provide a more comprehensive interpretation by including the 
aspects treated above but emphasizing the patterns of interaction 
between all the relevant actors in framing issues and taking 
actions.
If we take the adaptations which were made following 
Chernobyl, we see that they are the result of organizational and 
policy learning processes at the national and at the transnational 
level. And that in turn these learning processes cannot be 
regarded as a merely governmental "affair" but result from the 
multi-way and asymmetrical communication between policy makers, 
experts, the media, and public as well as private interest groups. 
Therefore they can be regarded as parts of a broader social 
learning process.
Let us clarify this point.
The management of the scientific and organizational 
uncertainties which emerged during the Chernobyl fallout continued 
after the short-term responses to the fallout itself and resulted 
in various kinds of adaptations.
Technical and organizational adaptations aimed at filling the 
gaps in monitoring networks, improving data gathering methods, 
harmonizing data and coordinating or centralizing their diffusion 
have been made in order to reduce at least the uncertainty in the 
factual basis. Legal adaptations in the field of radiation 
protection represent important tools for managing both scientific 
(about limit values) and organizational (about responsibilities) 
uncertainties. Organizational adaptations concerning the 
structure, tasks and even goals of certain organizations were also 
made to cope with the uncertainties about the role of these 
organizations in a changed political and social environment.
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Policy adaptations (both peripheral and, in few cases, core policy 
adaptations) represent the more comprehensive ways to manage the 
uncertainties which emerged during the Chernobyl fallout. This 
was done either by fillings some legal or organizational gaps 
while preserving the overall policy, or by "dismissing" (as in the 
Italian case) a too controversial "core" and "save" some parts of 
nuclear policy like nuclear research.
Concerning the reasons why and processes through which these 
adaptations were made as a consequence of (even if not necessarily 
indended to cope with) the scientific and organizational 
uncertainties experienced during the Chernobyl fallout, some 
points can be made by focusing on the interactions and 
communication between the involved actors.
We can start by asking why changes were made after Chernobyl; 
not only why certain specific changes were made, but also why did 
change in general occur. A counter-factual question may provide 
the hints to find an answer; in fact if we ask, "Would any change 
have occurred if the accident and the fallout would have been kept 
secret ?" the crucial role of information and communication in 
fostering change becomes clear. It was by knowing about them and 
by communicating about their causes, features and consequences 
that both short-term responses and medium-term adaptations were 
formulated and implemented.
Regarding this last point, an element to be emphasized is the 
dynamic of the communication processes; a dynamic which involves 
both controversy and consensus. It was mainly through 
controversies and disagreements that changes (in terms of framing 
of issues and actual adaptations) were originated. Till 
disagreements did not arise (or were kept well under control), 
nothing "happened". On the other hand, some forms of consensus 
(not "universal" but "partial", i.e. between some parts/actors 
involved in the process) about the seriousness of the event and 
the risks involved was needed to reach agreement on actions to be
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taken 13. in other words, different actors learned from the 
Chernobyl experience -and eventually took action- by being exposed 
to each other arguments and arguing and reflecting about them.
For example, adaptations regarding monitoring were the result of 
reflection on the deficiencies (gaps in the monitoring networks, 
unhomogeneity of data, etc.) experienced during the fallout, 
reflection that was shaped by the communication and controversy on 
this matter (controversy which was not confined to scientific 
circles but was made public by the media) between experts and 
counter-experts.
Of course this process did not start from zero. Previous 
frames, together with organizational and political dynamics, 
influenced the way actors experienced the various aspect of the 
fallout and the way they made and reacted to arguments.
As Hall argues -for instance- with respect to policy makers, 
"Policy makers are in a much stronger position to resist pressure 
from societal interests if they are armed with a coherent policy 
paradigm I*...Conversely, in the absence of such a paradigm, policy­
makers may be much more vulnerable to outside pressure" (Hall,
1990: p.21). The lack of such a paradigm can help explaining, for 
instance, the core policy change occurred in Italy following 
Chernobyl; its availability may instead account for the relative 
stability of German nuclear policy in spite of a strong anti- 
nuclear opposition, and for the continuation of the "tout 
nucléaire” option in France. Especially in the last case, the 
links between civilian and military purposes and the emphasis on
13 In this respect, I do not share Ernst and Peter Haas' 
emphasis on "consensual knowledge" as a basic component of 
learning (Haas, 1990; Haas, 1989). While being a basis to achieve 
the results of learning (mainly to take action), and being a 
possible result of learning processes, consensus is not 
necessarily a basis for learning. A strong consensus can in fact 
prevent learning, as demonstated -for instance- by the history of 
the relations between science and the catholic church.
14 A policy paradigm, also according to Hall (1990), is a 
framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only policy 
goals and instruments but also the nature of the problems these 
goals and instruments are meant to be addressing.
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nuclear power as a basis of French "grandeur" contribute in 
producing a strong, and hard to influence, policy paradigm where 
the nature of the problems (energy and defence independence), 
goals (large and state controlled production of nuclear power), 
and instruments (laws, economic incentives, etc.) are strictly 
connected.
From a broader perspective, Thompson and Schwarz (1990) argue 
Jthat the modes of learning -as far as far as environmental and 
related scientific/technological issues are concerned- are shaped 
by the previously mentioned "myths of nature" referred to by the 
various actors. Following this reasoning, no learning is possible 
for those -the "fatalists"- who think that nature is "capricious"; 
what is capricious cannot be predicted and eventually mananged.
For others learning is instead possible, though each is disposed 
to learn different things. For instance, those "egalitarians" who 
think that nature is "ephemeral" will interpret experiences like 
Chernobyl as a demonstration that certain technologies should be 
banned since they represent a too high risk; on the other hand the 
"hierarchists" who regard nature as "perverse/tolerant" will tend 
to consider Chernobyl as a demonstration that stronger controls 
are needed, and the "individualists" who think that nature is 
"benign" will develop a laissez-faire attitude.
This does not mean that each actor remains tied to his/her 
myth as one could induce from this typology. Post-Chernobyl 
changes show that even in the nuclear field, where the 
contrapposition between pro- and anti-nuclear positions usually 
prevent any possible dialogue, actors did not merely stick to 
their previous ideas and perceptions. Shifts occurred not only 
from one to the other cognitive packages and groups of actors (for 
instance, through cooptation), but also (even more interestingly) 
within the same ones. For instance, "hierarchist" type of actors 
had been influenced by "egalitarian" type of arguments -while not 
becoming themselves "egalitarian"- in the reframing (whether for 
conviction or opportunity is another matter) of the nuclear 
controversy in Italy; and this lead previous supporters of nuclear
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power to argue for the abandonment of the Italian nuclear 
programme. In the French case one can instead argue that 
"egalitarian” type of actors had been influenced by "hierachist" 
type of argument -even when they were not coopted by the 
establishment- when focusing on management aspects (like 
monitoring and information) beside -or rather than- asking for the 
immediate closure of all French nuclear plants. This shows that 
communication and reflection on experience had been as important 
as shifts in social context (i.e. from one to the other box of 
Thompson and Schwarz typology) in fostering reframing. And that, 
at the same time, the presence or absence of pre-existing strong 
frames (including policy paradigms) condition the content of 
reframing.
While there can be disagreements concerning whether the 
adaptations and the changes in the framing of issues occurred 
after Chernobyl represent improvements or not, it emerges quite 
clearly from the remarks suggested above and from the case studies 
that they represent something new which came out from the 
interactions between the actors involved in the differently shaped 
policy communication processes. Processes where the discourse on 
nuclear power had to be partially or radically reframed in terms 
of accidents that can (rather than cannot) happen, transboundary 
risks, credibility of institutions and other aspects previously 
neglected. And on the basis of this reframing, that occurred 
through communicative interaction, the mentioned technical, legal, 
organizational and policy adaptations were formulated, selected 
and implemented.
In this respect it is worth pointing out that these 
adaptations were not just the responses to the consequences of 
previous (nuclear) policies. Certainly the success or failure (in 
terms of nuclear programmes development, their economic costs and 
benefits, and their public acceptability) of previous policies had 
a crucial role in preventing or making relatively easy a core 
policy change. However, adaptations had to be made in response to
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a changed social environment (even if changes where not 
homogeneous in different contexts) where scientific and 
organizational uncertainties had become a public issue, where the 
credibility of experts and politicians had been challenged and 
where also non-governmental actors participated in shaping the 
policy discourse and in formulating or even selecting (as in the 
case of the Italian referenda) "learning options".
Beside the adaptations actually made and forming the 
"physical", visible components of policy learning, also these 
changes in societal relations and perceptions are lasting and are 
being "transmitted". For instance, through legislation (that, as 
pointed out by Gusfield, reinforces meanings) and through media 
coverage -even if decreasing over years- of the anniversaries of 
Chernobyl.
Regarding transmission processes it must be added however 
that when one tries to answer the question "what remains ?", mixed 
evidence can be referred to.
On the one hand, an increased attention and sensitiveness 
regarding nuclear risks seems to last; beside being "officially 
recorded" in national and EC legislation and in international 
Conventions, such attention seems to inspire the closure of 
several nuclear plants in the former USSR and GDR and the 
agreements on technical cooperation in the field of nuclear safety 
between the EC, former USSR and Eastern European countries. On 
the other hand, elements such as economic and political 
instability or the emergence of the debate on the greenhouse 
effect may "counterbalance" such sensitiveness towards nuclear 
risks. As far as the first element is concerned, economic and 
political instability tends to reduce the range of available 
options and to select from past experience only what is (or seems) 
useful to face present problems on the basis of certain 
priorities; industrial safety and environment and health 
protection usually not appearing among top priorities in these 
circumstances. With respect to the debate on the greenhouse
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effect it is worth mentioning that arguments for increasing 
nuclear power production as an alternative to energy sources 
producing C02 emissions are being put forward by the nuclear 
industry and by several experts. The suggested trade-offs 
between more nuclear risks or more C02 emissions is being 
presently discarded as unsound and unnecessary not only by 
environmentalists but also by many governmental authorities; not 
only (or mainly) because of the "memory" of Chernobyl but also 
because of the uncertainties surrounding the greenhouse issue. 
This "balance" may change or be consolidated in the future 
depending on changes in the greenhouse debate and/or nuclear 
accidents or discoveries (for example, regarding nuclear fusion) 
in the nuclear field.
The mixed evidence regarding "what remains" does not mean 
that learning did not take place following Chernobyl; it rather 
indicates that its results are not "given for ever".
Moreover, whether learning involves a capacity of doing 
better in copying with nuclear risks remains an open question.
And the challenge is a very difficult one since what is certainly 
going to remain for a long time is a burdersome "heritage".
"The pyramids of the Pharaohs have been there 
for a mere five thousand years. But to 
contain the radiation your nuclear pyramid 
must remain for at least one hundred thousand 
years...
That's some monument to leave our descendants, 
isn't it ?”
Vladimir Gubaryev, Sarcophagus
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Opening conclusion
"Eines Tages..werden die Kirschbäume aufgeblüht 
gewesen sein. Ich werde vermieden haben, zu denken: 
"explodiert”; die Kirschbäume sind explodiert, wie ich 
es noch ein Jahr zuvor, obwohl nicht mehr ganz 
unwissend, ohne weiteres nich nur denken, auch sagen 
konnte."*
Christa Wolf, Störfall
Beside and before being a technical, political and legal 
issue, Chernobyl meant a break in the experience of many persons; 
a break which has been more or less deep and lasting depending on 
geographical location and other elements.
Lessons have been drawn from Chernobyl, even if different 
persons will evaluate them differently on the basis of their 
positions, interests and perceptions.
Changes occurred in terms of practical adaptations and 
reframing of issues. In general terms it can be said that an 
increased awareness of nuclear risks spread together with the 
Chernobyl fallout and that more "tools" (technical, legal, 
political) to cope with these risks are now available.
This will not necessarily prevent other major accidents or 
allow a more effective management of such occurrences and their 
long-term consequences.
Certainly the mentioned changes can help recognizing and 
taking into more serious consideration warning signals and
* "One day the cherry trees will have blossomed. I will have 
avoided to think: "burst"; the cherry trees are burst into 
flowers, how still last year I could, while with some awareness, 
not only think but also say."
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eventually to react in a more timely and coordinated way to 
accidental events. However this will depend very much on 
economic, social and political conditions since attention to 
signals is very much influenced by the priorities of those who 
should be able to recognize them and response capabilities are a 
matter of political will and economic resources beside technical 
or legal instruments.
It is also true that maybe major accidents had been prevented 
since Chernobyl and we do not know about them: non-accidents are 
non-news, and this is a pity because a lot could be understood not 
only from disasters but also from successes in avoiding disasters. 
Hopefully someone else (with more technical knowledge and 
especially more access to nuclear safety "circles") will find out 
whether successes had been achieved, how and why.
Finally, many of the points of controversy that characterized 
the post-Chernobyl responses and medium-term changes are not 
"solved", therefore disagreements over the interpretation of 
evidence and the actions to be taken can still arise even if 
constrained by new national and international laws.
Which means that we cannot abolish uncertainty; we rather 
have to be aware of it and of our own limits, and live with them.
Looking through the Rational Policy Model.
Following the Rational Policy Model's assumptions, the 
national governments of the three countries analysed in the case 
studies as well as the EC institutions as a whole (particularly 
the Council and the Commission) should be taken as unitary actors 
that made choices in order to reach their goals. These goals 
should then be identified.
Differently from the case of the emplacement of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba analysed by Allison, the French, German and 
Italian governments as well as the EC institutions could not be 
aimed at making the Soviet authorities "retire the fallout". The 
goals that may be attributed to our "rational unitary actors" 
should then regard the management of the fallout, particularly the 
minimization of its consequences.
Three main goals (eventually conflicting) can be singled out 
in this respect: to protect public health and the environment, to 
preserve the national (or the European, in case there would be 
one) nuclear programmes, to preserve political credibility in the 
eyes of the public (i.e. electors).
In order to achieve one or more of these goals (according to 
national and EC priorities and preferences), several different 
choices could be made: 1) "do nothing", 2) pretend and try to 
convince others that nothing is happening, 3) take symbolic 
measures, 4) take substantive measures.
Following this reasoning, the national and EC responses to 
Chernobyl may be explained as follows.
Appendix 1:
Italy.
Given the small scale of the Italian nuclear programme, one 
can assume that the preservation of that programme was not an 
absolute priority for the national government. Beside that, 
while health and environment protection can hardly be regarded as 
a top priority the Italian government(s ), public concern on these 
matters was (is) quite widespread. Preservation of political 
credibility by showing responsiveness to public concern could then 
be regarded as the main goal of the Italian government in 
responding to Chernobyl.
In order achieve this goal, various options could be 
evaluated.
1) "Do nothing". But news about the fallout were spreading 
around Europe and had already reached Italian non-governmental 
bodies, mainly the press agency ANSA. Therefore to "do nothing" 
could result in somebody accusing the government for its 
immobilism and in a possible loss of credibility.
2) Pretend and try to convince the public that nothing 
serious was happening. This was tempted in the first days by
(some) governmental authorities, but failed due to contrasting 
views between governmental advisory bodies as well as to
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independent laboratories and anti-nuclear experts releasing data 
and warning against radiation risk also through newspapers.
3) Take symbolic actions. Generic recommendations (like 
washing carefully vegetables) were made by some government 
officials but they proved to be insufficient in face of a 
concerned public made aware of radiation risk by anti-nuclear 
groups and experts.
4) In these circumstances, to take substantive measures (i.e. 
restrictions in the selling and consumption of important 
foodstuffs) could be regarded, as the best option and then the 
rational choice to be made.
Federal Republic of Germany.
The German nuclear programme is one of the largest in Europe, 
environment protection is ranked quite high (in comparison with 
other countries) among the German governmental priorities, and 
political credibility can be regarded as a quite important element 
for German like for any other elected officials. Given this 
situation it is rather difficult to attribute to the German 
Federal government the intention to pursue one rather than another 
of the three mentioned goals. An additional goal of the German 
Federal government (not relevant in the case of non-federal 
states) could be to preserve or broaden its power versus the 
Länder. It could then be argued that the goal of the German 
Federal government was to find a "compromise" between the 
intention/need to preserve the nuclear programme, to protect 
public health and the environment, to preserve political 
credibility and to preserve its power versus the Länder.
Alternative options could then be evaluated as follows.
1) "Do nothing". But news were spreading in Europe and both 
the State and the alternative/green monitoring networks could 
detect the increase of radioctivity and accuse the Federal 
government for immobilism or take actions independently from it.
2) Pretend and try to convince the public that nothing was 
happening. This was tempted also in the FRG but failed due to the 
fact that independent laboratories as well as the Greens - 
represented in the Parliament and in some States' governments- 
raised the issue of radiation risk and that some States started 
taking measures.
3) Take symbolic measures. Also in the FRG generic 
recommendations were made by Federal authorities but were 
insufficient in front of a concerned public, a strong anti-nuclear 
movement and the authority of the Länder to take emergency 
measures.
4) Given this situation, to take substantive measures 
(setting threshold limits for several foodstuffs) can Be regarded 
as, the best option and then tjie rational choice to be made by the 
federal government.
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France.
Beside being the largest one in Europe, the French nuclear 
programme is important not only for civilian but also for military 
purposes. It can then be assumed that the main aim of the French 
government in responding to Chernobyl was to preserve the nuclear 
programme. One can also attribute to the French government thé 
intention to preserve such programme without losing political credibility.
In order to pursue this-goal the selection of the "rational 
choice" can be reconstructed as follows.
1) "Do nothing". Given the spreading of the news on the 
fallout around Europe, and especially in the neighbouring 
countries, this option was not viable.
2) Pretend and try to convince the public that nothing 
serious was happening. On the basis of the available evidence it 
seems that this is the option that was chosen by the French 
government (or. at. ..least by SC’PRI). And that choice could^be 
regarded^as .a. rational one in order to achieve the above mentioned 
goaT given the legal monopoly of monitoring data of SCPRI, the 
lack of independent monitoring units that could challenge such 
Service, the lack of a strong anti-nuclear movement and the lack 
of local authorities able and willing to contrast the central 
ones. However , this strategy partially failed due to an 
information campaign by the media and the.emerging of_ some anti- 
nuclëar dissent.
3~) Symbolic measures were then taken (the temporary ban of 
Alsace spinach) and this could be also regarded as a rational 
choice in the sense that it tried to pursue the given goal at the 
minor costs.
European Economic Community.
Nuclear power is indicated as an important source of energy 
by many official documents produced by the EC Council and 
Commission, however it has been already mentioned that the 
creation of an European common nuclear market failed. While it 
could then be attributed to the EC institutions the intention to 
preserve nuclear power as a source of energy, there is no EC 
nuclear programme as such (a part from the research programmes) to 
be preserved. On the other hand, while environment protection is 
becoming (especially after the approval of the Single European Act 
in 1987) a rather important EC policy field, it can be hardly 
regarded as a top priority of the European Economic Community. It 
must however be remainded that in the Chernobyl case, environment 
and health protection measures were strictly linked with such a 
"core" EC policy as trade. In these circumstances, it can then be 
attributed to the EC institutions the intention to preserve or 
even strenghten their political credibility and their power in 
front of/over the member states.
Accordingly, the selection of the best option can be 
reconstructed as follows.
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1) "Do nothing". The "activism" of some member states made 
this option not viable: in order not to be left aside, EC 
institutions had to take action.
2) Pretend that nothing serious was happening. This would 
contrast with the possibility to justify an EC intervention.
3) Take symbolic measures. EC Recommendations were issued 
but several members states did not listen to them and this could 
undermine the authority and credibility of EC institutions.
4) Take substantive measures. The choice to issue a binding 
"EC Regulation can then be regarded as "the" rational one in order
to achieve the given goal.
In few words it can be said that, according to the Rational 
Policy Model, the similarities and differences in the responses to 
Chernobyl can be explained in terms of different goals to be 
achieved by rational collective (national and transnational) 
actors. In particular, the adoption as well as the non adoption 
of countermeasures are both regarded as rational choices made in 
order to achieve different -or partially different- national and 
EC goals taking into account, and using strategically, the 
available information. Information concerning not only (and not 
especially) the extension of the fallout but concerning the 
possible consequences of alternative courses of action.
Comparison
VAppendix 2:
Looking through the Organizational Process Model.
Following the Organizational Process Model Model, the 
constellation of relevant organizations must be identified (in our 
case both at the national and at the EC level) and the account of 
the responses to Chernobyl must focus on three elements : 
organizational intelligence, organizational options and 
organizational implementation.
Italy.
As far as the governmental sphere is concerned, the following 
organizations can be identified as relevant for the management of 
the Chernobyl fallout; the Health Ministry and the Civil 
Protection Department, an emergency interministry committee (by 
the Civil Protection Department) and various advisory bodies 
(mainly ISS, ENEA and ENEA-DISP, and the technical committee - 
including these three institutions- established to advise the 
Civil Protection Minister during the fallout). It is important to 
notice that these organizations interacted with governmental 
organizations at the local level (local authorities, provincial 
and local units of the Health Service) and also with non­
governmental organizations like the mass media and the anti- 
nuclear groupsi.
Concerning organizational intelligence, both governmental 
(the mentioned Ministries, diplomacy, the national meteorological 
service, ENEA and ENEA-DISP, ISS, provincial and local health 
units) and non-governmental organizations (university 
laboratories, mass-media, local action groups) were involved in 
gathering, processing and diffusing information. Moreover, these 
organizations interacted with similar organizations within some 
other countries and with international or transnational 
organizations such as the IAEA, the WHO and the EC institutions. 
The difficulties met in obtaining information from direct external 
sources (i.e. Soviet authorities), in checking the information 
coming from indirect sources (for example, from US Press Agencies) 
and in gathering data through the existing (and insufficient) 
monitoring network have been already discussed. What shall be 
emphasized here is that this multi-level organizational 
intelligence shaped the definition (transboundary radiological 
emergency with possible impacts in Italy) and timing (starting 
from the day following the accident to the official end of the 
emergency) of the problem at hand.
On the basis of the information made available through 
organizational intelligence, organizational options were
1 Figure 2 (see cap.3) summarizes the governmental as well as non­
governmental organizations involved in the management of the 
Chernobyl fallout in Italy.
formulated and selected. The Civil Protection Department, with 
its emergency-oriented internal organization and tasks, played an 
important role in framing the problem to be faced and the options 
for action in terms of national emergency. Therefore, 
coordination of monitoring activities and centralization of data 
were decided upon. On the other hand the Health Ministry, advised 
by the ISS framed the problem and the available options in terms 
of a public health national emergency. As a consequence, 
countermeasures such as the prohibition to sell certain vegetables 
and fresh milk were taken. The reasons why the positions of -and 
options selected by- the Civil Protection and the Health 
Ministries prevailed over other Ministries (mainly Agriculture and 
Industry) were already discussed. What can be noticed here is 
that organizational features of these governmental bodies such as 
internal resources (like expertise), SOPs, programmes (for 
example, interministry as well as advisory bodies coordination) 
and response to external expectations influenced both their 
definition of the problem and their selection of options. 
Concerning this last point it should also be stressed that other 
important actors, that is the mass media, contributed to the 
definition of the problem and also indirectly influenced (for 
example, by making public experts'controversies and 
citizens’concerns)- to the selection of options. This was done by 
the mass media on the basis of their own organizational features 
such as the news making procedures/routines.
Organizational implementation. The implementation of the 
selected options was also influenced by the interactions between 
different organizations (governmental -central and local- as well 
as non-governmental) and by the organizational features of these 
organizations. On the one hand, organizational features such as 
gaps in the existing monitoring network required the involvement 
of organizations previously excluded. On the other hand, 
contrasts sometimes emerged between centralized and decentralized 
governmental organizations in implementing measures. Beside that 
non-governmental organizations exercized forms of informal control 
(for example, by asking for data and offering their own evaluation 
of such data) on governmental bodies. Finally the mass media were 
both directly involved in implementing measures (by diffusing the 
information needed for obtaining compliance) and in providing an 
arena for communication between the organizations involved in the 
management of the fallout as well as between them and the affected 
public.
Federal Republic of Germany.
The most important governmental organizations involved in the 
management of the Chernobyl fallout at the Federal level were the 
Ministry of Interior and its advisory bodies, especially the SSK. 
State administrations were crucial in dealing with the fallout at 
the decentralized level. Also non governmental organizations
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(independent research institutions, the media and the anti-nuclear groups) played an important role2.
Organizational intelligence. Both Federal and State 
organizations (monitoring institutions, specialized departments 
within the Federal Ministry of Interior and within some State 
Ministries, etc.) as well as non-governmental ones (independent 
research and monitoring institutes, mass media) were involved in 
gathering, processing and diffusing information. These German 
organizations also interacted with other national and 
international organizations and met various problems (similar to 
those already mentioned with respect to the Italian case) in 
obtaining data from direct external sources, checking those coming 
from indirect ones and coordinating monitoring activities at the 
Federal and State level. On the basis of the data made available 
by this complex organizational intelligence, the Chernobyl fallout 
was defined as a transnational radiological emergency with 
possible impacts in the FRG.
Organizational options. The Federal Ministry of Interior and 
the SSK opted for nation-wide measures. Monitoring data were 
centralized by the Situation Centre of the Interior Ministry and 
the SSK issued recommendations (in terms of limit values) in the 
field of radiation protection. At the same time, some State 
authorities opted for local measures (including different limit 
values) rather than implementing Federal recommendations. The 
tension between Federal and State options (i.e. between nation­
wide/centralized mesures and decentralized/State specific ones) 
characterized the management of the Chernobyl fallout in the FRG. 
Different kinds of organizational resources influenced the 
selection of and the tension between Federal and State options.
The Federal Ministry of Interior concentrated important resources 
in the nuclear field (money, personnell, authority and -through 
the SSK- expertise) and was able to set a programme (performed by 
its specialized unit, the Situation Centre) for centralizing and 
coordinating information. On the other hand, State 
administrations could rely on their authority in the field of 
emergency management and some of them were able to gather the 
expertise needed for justifying State-specific measures. The mass 
media also participated in the selection and tension between 
Federal and State options, the national mass media generally 
supporting Federal measures while those diffused at the local 
level (especially local newspapers) emphasized local conditions 
and decisions.
Organizational implementation. Also in the German case, some 
organizations previously excluded from the (official) monitoring 
network were then included as parts of the States’ networks.
Beside that, independent monitoring was carried on by laboratories 
and institutes close to or parts of the anti-nuclear movement.
The recommendations issued by the SSK had to be implemented 
(according to the German legislation) by the States 
administrations, but in some cases such administrations preferred 
to add or substitute to them some State-specific measures, and 
this caused a rather differentiated implementation of Federal
2 The organizations involved in the management of the Chernobyl 
fallout in the FRG are indicated in figure 4 (see, cap.4).
recommendations. Finally, the mass media were active (as in the 
Italian case) in the direct implementation of measures as well as 
in providing an arena of communication between different 
governmental and non-governmental organizations.
France.
Differently from the Italian and the German case, the French 
governmental organization that played the most crucial and visible 
role during the Chernobyl fallout was not a political but a 
technical body, i.e. SCPRI. Only in a second phase (about two 
weeks after the accident) the Ministry of Industry emerged as an 
important actor. Local governmental organizations and non­
governmental ones were less active and visible in the French case; 
also the mass media started questioning the government and playing 
a more independent role much later than in Italy and the FRG3.
Organizational intelligence. The collection, evaluation and 
diffusion of information was the main issue in the French case.
In this respect it can be said that the selection of options 
coincided -rather than being based on- the phase of organizational 
intelligence. Several governmental bodies (SCPRI, CEA, the Food 
and Hygiene Laboratories and EDF) were involved in the collection 
of monitoring data. However such data and their diffusion were 
strictly centralized by SCPRI on the basis of its legal authority 
in the field of health protection and according to its routines 
(including the reduction of activities during the weekends). 
Independent monitoring centres were lacking, the anti-nuclear 
groups were not able to challenge official figures and the mass 
media limited themselves to reporting governmental data. French 
authorities interacted with international organizations but, while 
complaining for the insufficient information provided by the 
Soviet authorities, they released only generic estimates on the 
impact of the fallout in France. The official definition of the 
problem that emerged from this situation was that of a serious 
accident which radiological impacts had been kind enough to stop 
at the French borders.
The selection of organizational options was implicit in such 
organization of intelligence and in such definition of the 
problem. The same organization -SCPRI- had a crucial role in 
gathering, evaluating and diffusing data as well as in suggesting 
countermeasures. Given this centralized power of a single 
organization and given its official definition of the problem 
(both of them initially unchallenged by other governmental as well 
as non-governmental organizations), no countermeasures to protect 
health and environment were taken. However, the French 
organizations involved in the management of the Chernobyl fallout 
had to react to inputs coming from organizations outside the 
French borders such as foreign governmental authorities, mass 
media and anti-nuclear groups and the EC institutions. Measures 
taken by German and Italian authorities, EC Recommendations,
3 Figure 6 of cap. 5 summarizes the action set of organizations 
involved in the management of the Chernobyl fallout in France.
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demontrations organized by anti-nuclear groups in several 
countries and the coverage of these aspects by foreign mass media 
diffused also in France (especially the press) roused the reaction 
of French media, anti-nuclear groups, independent experts and 
governmental authorities, particularly the Ministry of Industry 
which concentrate most resources and responsibilities in the 
nuclear field. Consequently some symbolic measures were decided 
upon, like the late and short ban of Alsace spinach.
Organizational implementation. While the implementation of 
the initial option (no countermeasures) was guaranteed by the 
centralized role of SCPRI, the implementation of the ban of Alsace 
spinach was rather problematic. Such implementation followed in 
fact a partially "ad hoc" procedure: the Prefects had in fact to 
to ratify and guarantee the compliance with an emergency decision 
(therefore a decision they should have been responsible for 
according to existing emergency plans) taken by a central 
authority (the Minister of Industry) who has theoretically no 
authority to take measures such as restrictions in the selling of 
foodstuffs. This procedure can be regarded as the result of an 
organizational dynamic that favoured the central role routinely 
exercized by the Ministry of Industry on nuclear matters over the 
adoption of specific emergency programmes which would involve a 
stronger role of Prefects, i.e. governmental authorities which are 
very important in general but not in the nuclear field.
European Economic Community.
The EC institutions mainly involved in the management of the 
Chernobyl fallout at the Community level were the EC Commission - 
particularly the Directorate General for Environment, Consumer 
Protection and Nuclear Safety*, DG XI- and the EC Council; also the 
European Parliament addressed the issue. Environmental and 
consumers' NGOs organized at the EC level (like the European 
Environmental Bureau -EEB- and the Bureau Europeen des Unions de 
Consummateurs -BEUC) did not play...
Organizational intelligence. Concerning the gathering of 
monitoring data (i.e. a kind of information which was crucial 
during the fallout), the EC institutions depended -and still 
depend- on the Member States. In fact there is no such a thing as 
an EC environmental monitoring networks. Beside that, the EC 
Commission did not use its right of access to monitoring 
facilities within the Member States. However, according to the 
Euratom Treaty, member states should send the results of the 
monitoring of radioactivity in air, water and soil to the EC
4 Now Directorate General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and 
Civil Protection.
5 A Regulation issued in 1989 (COM (89) 303 final) provides for 
the establishment of an European Environment Monitoring and 
Information Network to be coordinated by an European Environmental 
Agency. Both the Network and the Agency are still in the process 
of being organized.
XCommission (DG XI). As already mentioned, the Commission 
complained that it did not received adequate data to evaluate 
whether the Basic Safety Standards had been or were likely to be 
infringed in the Member States. While a Community system for 
rapid alert in case of food contamination was being established, 
the first news arrived of countermeasures (restrictions in the 
selling of certain foodstuffs) taken in some Member States.
Organizational options. On the basis of the mentioned 
information and lack of information, the EC Commission 
(particularly DG XI) initiated some actions on the basis of the 
Community * s competence in the field of trade and within the 
framework of the routine regulatory work in the field of safety 
done within DG XI. At first the Commission took two measures that 
did not require the previous approval of the EC Council, i.e. a 
Recommendation on maximum levels of Iodine 131 in milk and a 
Decision on imports of meat from Eastern countries. Member 
States' compliance with these (non binding) measures was 
unsatisfactory. Therefore the Commission resorted to the advice 
of its Group of experts on Basic Safety Standards and suggested a 
Council Regulation on maximum permitted levels of Caesium in 
foodstuffs. Also the European Parliament called for common limit 
values. Following some internal bargaining within the Council, a 
Regulation partially different from the one suggested by the 
Commission was finally approved.
Organizational implementation. Implementation of EC 
regulatory actions are responsibility of the Member States. The 
EC Commission must then rely on reports from national authorities 
to check whether EC measures are implemented. This was also the 
case following the Chernobyl fallout.
Comparison.
According to the Organizational Process Model, the responses 
to Chernobyl and the similarities and differences between them can 
be explained by referring to the features and behavior of the 
various organizations involved in the management of the fallout.
In this perspective, the adoption or non adoption of certain 
countermeasures can be regarded as the output of the interactions 
between different organizations sharing some general features but 
at the same time having peculiar characteristics and constraints.
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Appendix 3:
Looking through the Bureaucratic Politics Model.
Looking through'"'the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the 
responses to Chernobyl are explained by focusing on three steps: 
the politics of discovery, the politics of issues and the politics 
of choice.
Italy.
In the case of the Chernobyl accident and fallout, the 
politics of discovery did not only concern the actual discovery of 
the accident in the USSR and of the related radioactive 
contamination in most European countries. It also concerned the 
"discovery" that an accident regarded as almost impossible took 
place and that it could involve transboundary and long-term 
consequences on health and the environment. As far as this second 
kind of discovery is concerned, in Italy the contrasts emerged 
between the different perceptions and stakes of the Minister of 
Industry and the representatives of the nuclear agency (ENEA) and 
its safety division (ENEA-DISP) on one side, and those of the 
Minister of Health and the scientists of the ISS on the other 
side, with the Minister of Civil Protection taking a stand closer 
to the one of the Health Minister (while initially making 
reassuring statements) by pointing to emergency aspects. While 
the Minister of Industry and most experts of ENEA and ENEA-DISP 
mainly tried to belittle the significance of such "discovery" for 
the continuation of the Italian nuclear programme, the Minister of 
Health and the experts of ISS stressed the risk for public health 
involved by a major nuclear accident like the one just occurred.
The "politics of issues" developed accordingly. A mix of 
technical and political arguments were put forward by the 
different "players" regarding the causes of the accident, the 
possibility or impossibility for such an accident to occur in 
Italian -and, more in general- in Western nuclear plants, and the 
possible health and environmental impacts of the Chernobyl 
accident in Italy and in other European countries. On the one 
hand the Minister of Industry and the experts of ENEA and ENEA- 
DISP emphasized that a major nuclear accident was an extremely 
rare occurrence and that the Chernobyl accident was mainly due to 
peculiarities of the Soviet nuclear technology and -implicitly- of 
the Soviet political system. On the other hand, the Minister of 
Health and especially the experts of ISS repeated the warning 
already issued after TMI concerning the possibility of major 
nuclear accidents to occur and the need to improve Italian 
emergency procedures; beside that they stressed the necessity to 
deal with the Chernobyl fallout as a public health issue. The 
Minister of Civil Protection took the opportunity to strenghten 
his role by emphasizing some emergency aspects such as the need to 
quickly collect and evaluate monitoring data in case of 
technological accidents occurring both within and outside the 
borders.
The politics of choice can be sketched in the following 
terms. Starting from the first "moves" by the Minister of Civil 
Protection (i.e. the consultation with ISS and ENEA-DISP, the 
calling of a meeting of the emergency committee and the 
establishment of an ad-hoc technical-scientific commission) the 
selection among various possible actions was "channelled” towards 
emergency measures. But while the Minister of Civil Protection 
could have been satisfied with the mere centralization of data, 
the experts of ISS pushed for, and the Minister of Health issued, 
precautionary measures aimed at protecting public health against 
ionizing radiation. The Minister of Industry was not able to 
contrast this relatively quick development and he could not 
prevail over the Minister of Health once the problem had been 
defined in terms of health protection (and therefore within the 
competence of that Minister) and the ad-hoc coalition between the 
Minister of Health and the Minister of Civil Protection had been 
formed. These inter-Ministers bargaining were also influenced by 
the pressure coming from sectors of public opinion (particularly 
the anti-nuclear movement) which concerns were reported by the 
media.
Federal Republic of Germany.
Also in the FRG the politics of discovery developed beyond 
the actual discovery of the Chernobyl accident and fallout. 
However, differently from the Italian case, in the FRG no major 
inter-Ministers contrasts emerged concerning the significance and 
consequences of such occurrence. The Federal Minister of 
Interior, who concentrated all responsibilities in the nuclear 
field (including, through his advisory body -SSK-, radiation 
protection), was able to act as the central actor at the Federal 
level and to impose his perception of the accident as something 
that had to be dealt with (because of the fallout) but that could 
never occur "here". At the same time the political (beside 
scientific) "discovery" of local variations of the fallout was 
characterized by contrasts between Federal authorities and some 
State governments.
The distinction of responsibilities between Federal and State 
authorities was a main theme of the politics of issue. While the 
Federal Minister of Interior and the representatives of SSK argued 
for the need of centralized responsibility in the management of 
the fallout, some State Ministers (starting from the Green 
Minister of Environment of Hesse) pointed to the authority of the 
Länder to decide and implement emergency measures at the local 
level. Beside that, the procedural issue of Federal-State 
relations interwove with substantive issues (debated both in the 
Federal and the State Parliaments and within political parties) 
such as energy policy, nuclear safety and right to information.
The politics of choice was framed according to the mentioned 
tensions between the Federal (especially the Minister of Interior) 
and some State authorities. In some Länder precautionary measures 
were taken before the issuing of recommendations at the Federal 
level, also due to the need for local authorities to respond to 
initiatives by local action groups. In the attempt to keep the 
situation under Federal control, the Minister of Interior
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prescribed the centralization of data collection and issued the 
recommendations on limit values prepared by the SSK. While many 
States authorities decided to comply with these measures, many 
others decided to adopt different (lower) limit values and to add 
behavioral recommendations such as keeping children indoor. Also 
in the FRG the pressure exercized by the anti-nuclear movement, 
which initiatives and slogans were reported by the media, 
influenced the bargaining between the various governmental 
(Federal and State) "players"; for instance, by making them feel 
that something had to be done to cope with both the radioactive 
and the political fallout.
France.
In France the politics of discovery was mainly characterized 
as a politics of hiding. While the accident at Chernobyl was 
discovered in spite of the Soviet initial attempts to secrecy 
widely criticized by French authorities and media, the impacts of 
the Chernobyl fallout in France were hidden. The Director of 
SCPRI, well-known for being adverse to "excessive" safety measures 
in the nuclear sector, acted as the leading figure in this 
respect. For about two weeks he only released reassuring 
evaluations about the "low" levels of radioactivity and did not 
make public the monitoring data centralized by SCPRI.
Governmental leaders, including the Minister of Health 
(responsible for radiation protection) and the Minister of 
Industry (responsible for nuclear power promotion and regulation), 
kept silent on this specific point while joining the Director of 
SCPRI in diffusing reassuring statements.
Also the politics of issues was mainly left to technicians, 
maily the Directors of SCPRI, CEA, IPSN and the representatives of 
EDF. The safety of French plants and the impossibility for an 
accident like the one of Chernobyl to occur in Western reactors 
was asserted together with the need to preserve the French 
nuclear programme. As far as the issue of countermeasures to cope 
with the fallout was concerned, it was mainly treated as an 
external problem. Governmental experts (especially the Director 
of SCPRI) and politicians (for example, the Minister of 
Agriculture) repeated in several occasions that no measures was 
needed in France; they also explicitly or implicitly blamed the 
authorities of the neighbouring FRG and Italy for taking measures 
regarded as unnecessary or even wrong. The attempt to prevent the 
the issue of health risk (and related countermeasures) for the 
French population to reach the decision-making agenda can be 
regarded -in the words of Bachrach and Baratz- as a case of 
"nondecision-making", i.e. the manifestation of the second face of 
power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; 1963).
The politics of choice can be considered as an extension of 
such nondecision-making strategy. The choice not to adopt 
countermeasures was in fact implicit in the attempt to prevent the 
issue of health risk to emerge. However, when the governmental 
nondecision-making strategy partially failed due to external 
factors (such as some changes in the attitude of the media and a 
more visible role of anti-nuclear groups), many politicians 
started criticizing the Director of SCPRI. Once the nondecision-
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making coalition was (at least on the surface) broken, the 
Minister of Industry tried to restore his power and credibility by 
taking some symbolic action.
European Economic Community.
As far as the politics of discovery was concerned, the 
representatives of the EC Commission "discovered" that they were 
dependent on the willingness of the Soviet authorities to release 
information about the accident and on the willingness of the 
Member States’ authorities to communicate the results of 
monitoring.
The politics of issues focused on the issue of EC competence 
in the given circumstances. Officials of the EC Commission 
resorted both to the EEC and to the Euratom Treaty in order to 
assert their competence; in this respect they selected the issue 
of trade (within the Communisty as well as between the EC and non- 
EC countries) and the issue of health protection (particularly the 
compliance with Basic Safety Standards) as fields of 
uncontroversial EC competence.
The politics of choice proved to be quite controversial due 
to the multi-level negotiations that characterize the EC decision­
making process. This was especially the case concerning the 
adoption of the Council Regulation on limit values for Caesium.
The Member States' representatives negotiated within the EC 
Council the limit values to be adopted and finally agreed on 
values which were higher than the ones suggested by the EC 
Commission but lower than the ones suggested by some Member 
States' representatives.
Comparison.
Following the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the responses to 
Chernobyl can be interpreted as unintended outcomes of bargainings 
between leading governmental and EC actors having different 
interests, perceptions, skill and power. Different responses are 
regarded as the result of different configurations of the "game", 
depending on the mentioned attributes of the players involved, in 
the cases under considerations.




